Moral Hazard Problems in Branchless Banking – Empirical Evidence from Indonesia

Mangani, Ktut Silvanita and Balina, Rafal and Idasz-Balina, Marta (2019) Moral Hazard Problems in Branchless Banking – Empirical Evidence from Indonesia. In: Conference on Interdisciplinary Business and Economics Research. SIBR, Tokyo.

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Abstract

The aim of the research was to identify behaviors related to the temptation of fraud in branchless banking activities on the example of rural areas in Indonesia. A description of economic phenomena was used using the questionnaire method. It is established that in most cases, a representative of a branchless bank (agent bb) is a man running a business at home or close to home. Branchless banking clients are usually farmers, local translators, housewives and students. The most common types of transactions used within "branchless banking" are paying for electricity bills and other bill payments as well as savings transactions and current savings payments. Research shows that this type of banking is associated with the constant temptation of various types of fraud on the part of the bank's agent. The most important types of fraud in branchless banking in Indonesia were characterized

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