



Journal of Social and Political Sciences

Tampubolon, M., & Siahaan, C. (2022). Stigmatization of Former Corruption Convicts in Indonesian Parliament Elections. *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, 5(3), 22-30.

ISSN 2615-3718

DOI: 10.31014/aior.1991.05.03.360

The online version of this article can be found at:
<https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/>

Published by:
The Asian Institute of Research

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Stigmatization of Former Corruption Convicts in Indonesian Parliament Elections

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Abstract

This article examines the social stigma of defunct corruption convicted criminals in Indonesia's parliament elections using the stigma concept and human rights. This research is a socio-legal cogitate which disfigures the challenges of the electoral social stigma of peoples' political freedoms whenever one wants to pursue just after elections and be appointed through lawful means. Every Indonesian citizen may cast a ballot and be selected, which is granted and protected by the law. However, in most cases, such sheltered rights are limited once former prisoners from Indonesia run for positions in the council or legislature. The primary squeezing address is why the state should restrict prior devaluation of prisoners' capacity to run for parliamentary office whereas ensuring that each citizen's political rights are fully protected within the framework. The explanation for this may be that the national legislature is among the most fraudulent institutions in the country. Under the worst circumstance, former corruption convicts would be ostracized and will perpetuate a punishable offense after already being voted into power by a house of representatives. This paper proves the electoral demonization of a state as just a set of criteria for parliaments nominees.

Keywords: Former Convict of Corruption, Stigma, Political Freedoms, Stereotype

1. Introduction

In electoral politics, the right to vote as static voting rights (Aidt and Mooney, 2014) is a fundamental right. As a result, in guiding and getting exercise such rights, each individual must've been free of interference, harassment, and discriminatory treatment, along with all acts of violence that really can impede but also invalidate such rights. Throughout this paper, I will just look at the stigma of erstwhile corrupt convicts in Indonesia's 2019 election, which is one category of stereotyping prompted by a criminal history. Even though bribery is the ranked top one public enemy (World Bank, 2013), former criminals are infrequently treated differently in Indonesia since corruption has now become firmly embedded in Indonesian socio-cultural, organizational, and institutional structures (Prabowo and Cooper, 2016).

The Republic of Indonesia's General Electoral Commission released Rules No. 20 the Year 2018 (Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "PKPU") in July 2018, treating people differently against former corrupt prisoners

desiring parliament seats. Initially, retired and narcotic prisoners, former sexual assault prisoners, and former convicts were barred from being senators and representatives (Hantoro, 2018). Article 4 specifies the restriction; paragraph 3 asserts that: Within representative democracy and the accessible choice of potential nominees alluded to and in paragraph (2), it included previously condemned drug traffickers, associated with sex offenses, and bribery; as a result, nearly 199 former bribery prisoners could not partake in the 2019 Indonesian regional parliamentary elections (Wiwoho, 2019).

The above regulation further demonizes erstwhile bribery convicted criminals, just like and if they're not individuals to political freedoms. As per Holland (2003), perpetrators seem to be irreconcilable to ordinary people; if someone cannot become one citizen, they should never be capable of holding an elective position. There appears to be a perception that favors the choice to rescind voting representation. It will dissuade corrupt practices and convicts from committing crimes and the anxiety of committing criminal acts for every individual or governmental agency.

However, apart from government decisions that restrict political freedom as just a consequence of former corrupt practices convicts, a legislative nominee with such a criminal background needs to call Indonesian human rights dedication to the issue and multiplies their stigmatization. Former corruptors are nonetheless barred from entering the house of representatives, and it also prevented them from working in the public sector. However, and since acquiring a Credential of Good Conduct (SKBB) from police is necessary for applying for a position in government, the former bribery offender seems to be underemployed. Often these institutions require a person without criminal histories — particularly those whose political rights already have been rescinded due to licensing laws that formally disqualify people who received pre-defined forms of punitive action (Law No. 7 of 2017).

The ban on former corruption convicted criminals trying to run for a parliamentary desk in national or regional elections strives for parliamentary figures who are clean of faults throughout their decency (Supreme Court Decision, 2018). Participants are qualified to run for political office only when they fulfill the specified prerequisites: "Not been a prisoner with such a court verdict which has acquired perpetual legal effect," according to General Electoral Commission Rules (PKPU) Number 20 of 2018. Former corruption convicts are stigmatized under Article 240 section (1) letter g of National Elections Law No. 7 of 2017. Potential candidates for People's Representative (DPR, DPRD, DPD) have to be Indonesian citizens as well as fulfill the essential prerequisites:

"have not been put in prison based on an irreversible court judgment for breaking a law which is liable to imprisonment for 5 (five) years or more, except if honestly and openly telling the public that complainant is indeed a former prisoner."

Notwithstanding, the Indonesian Supreme Court Ruling Number 30P / HUM / 2018 overturned this law for the purposes as mentioned earlier:

"As long as the phrase 'formerly convicted corruption' is contradictory to higher laws and rules, particularly regarding Rules Number 7 of 2017 regarding Election process in conjunction to Act Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Senate Legislation."

The Indonesian Supreme Court relied on Article 43 paragraph (1) of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, where it asserts that "every citizen has a right also to be elected and cast a ballot in national elections based on equal rights thru direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair voting in compliance with the conditions of laws and rules." However, as per this study, peoples' democratic rights could be severely impacted because of the stigma associated with illegal record keeping. The Supreme Court Ruling enables former corruption convicted criminals to run for public office as long as those who truthfully assert towards the public that they have been former corruption convicts.

2. Method

This research is socio-legal (empirical), looking at how the law is used to denigrate societal individuality. The main legal substances seem to be statutory laws regulating national elections and regional offices elections, and

also a Supreme Court ruling, especially concerning a right to judicial review of a General Electoral Commission Legislation Number 14 of 2018 regarding the Personal Candidacy of National Election Participants for Representatives of the Regional's Council. The authors present an analysis of data to identify the prerequisites for such nominee of attendees in the National Election for House members of Legislators as community members with the ability to vote and be voted into office in Indonesian parliamentary contestation. This research critically analyses such information from standpoints of human rights and social stigmas.

3. Results & Discussion

Stigma is a treatment that conveys derogatory stereotypes to specific individuals or groups, causing them to become hostile and neglected, causing them to become socially isolated. Goffman (1963) defines stigma as people who do not fit into what society considers to be expected. It creates divisiveness for both his immersive and authentic social categories, significantly reducing his chances of succeeding throughout living. Stereotype encompasses all areas of a human's life besides negatively affecting personal social standing and relationship issues, changing one's stance and customs, and hurting a person's moral value, trying to make this same person less valuable (Gleason, 2019).

Researchers rarely see what other viewpoints Goffman's concept of social stigma does not encompass since it is broadly used among sociologists. Reporting purposes have been identified, and the personal block size for stigma and the source of the stereotyping. Even though the stereotype is a widespread concept (Yang et al., 2007), general societal and cultural aspects find out a person's or social group's social stigma and is not a known human concept (Manzo, 2004). Earlier academics' standpoints on stereotyping, like those of Goffman and Gleason, which assert stigma lessens life opportunities for stigmatizing groups and individuals, are a bit overly optimistic. True, stigma arises in every societal structure; stigma based on previous past offenses does not apply. A few more symptoms of stigma are positive and neutral concepts. Way of life and social inclusion are the yardsticks for establishing if a person or group committed a specific action and loses or changes his social identity (Jacobsson, 2002). In a particular circumstance, a few assemblies that erstwhile bribery prisoners have about the same position or possibilities in legislative contestation as other members of the society but do not penalize people.

3.1 Former Corruption Convict in Indonesia

Prisoners seem to be convicted criminals serving a prison sentence of losing autonomy in a correctional institution (Law No. 12 the Year 1995) and someone presently serving a prison sentence for a criminal offense (Garner and Black, 2019). Ex-prisoners will be released from a detention center (Penitentiary) or have served his/her prison terms. Prison term does not somehow show retaliation and vindictiveness, but therapeutic applications (Paula and Myrinda, 2012) or offender rehabilitative services (Bruyins and Cecile, 2012). The primary aim of punishment, in a broad sense, would be to promote justice, stand to gain, and predictability both for perpetrator and victim, as well as the larger society (Wenzel, et al., 2008). It enhances offenders' moral aptitudes and decreases their chances of incarceration (Howard, 2017). Prison sentence can also be used to continue improving a convicted person's character and inflict suffering upon that person convicted (Samosir, 1992). Toby (1964) is opposite to the use of punitive action to reshape the offender. If a prison sentence could indeed convert offenders' remorse into awesomeness, it would no longer imprison repeat offenders. The General Election Commission should not restrict recently departed corruptors from wanting to run for parliamentary office. Political parties will be well-prepared to select candidates for seats in the legislature who have honesty and integrity. Prison sentence is essential for preventing crime and preserving complacent self-esteem, although it is relatively ineffective through rehabilitating offenders (Toby, 1964).

The rationale of punitive action as virtuous restoration and recidivist obstacle because the desire to re-commit violent act appears to exist inside the human mind, as well as the offender, will emerge ulterior motives when an opportunity comes up, and such error is only standard practice, or there is nothing wrong with that as well (GIACC, 2020). If the primary aim of punitive action is to enhance the perpetrator's stemming and strengthen the convict's mental attitude, a jail sentence is not helpful. A comfortable prison experience would not dissuade the wrongdoer from breaking the law, and this will end up serving as a breeding place for the violent act (Lili, et al. 1995). Suka

Miskin, Indonesia's most prominent and only Custodial Institution for Corrupt practice delinquents, is a heaven on earth with luxurious amenities, as per a recent study on prison conditions in Indonesia (Mardiastuti, et al., 2018). Correctional facilities not assigned for non-corruption prisoners, such as Cipinang, one of Jakarta's most enormous, have three times the capacity. Two thousand eight hundred thirty-eight people are required to occupy a 984-person accommodation. The cell space, which was supposed to hold three people, kept holding seven prisoners. A 5 persons' cell must facilitate 13 people, while a seven persons' compartment must accommodate 21 people (Indirani, 2018). In terms of quality, such a punitive circumstance nurtures awful people of both the corrupt offenders rather than helping to educate them to be wonderful humans while still serving their prison terms.

In this respect, the restriction on appointing new former corruption prisoners for legislative positions is indeed very reasonable since former corruption prisoners are much more inclined to commit corrupt practices afterward (Hidayatullah, 2020). It or rather "corrupting influence practices seem to become deeply ingrained that they will have become accepted as normal" (GIACC, 2020). A few Indonesians presume that acts of corruption became so engrained that it still understood as standards and moral standards (Mapuasari and Mahmudah, 2018). Changing this would be a challenging task for a few reasons: That is apparent to re-educate corruption perpetrators that prison sentence is solely for virtuous fortress and that they are being punished correspondingly without luxurious facilities, while some crime violators are now being punished hugely disproportionate.

The most effective forms of punishment for corrupt offenders are social punishment, confiscation, and confiscated and returned the property to the state. The penalty is both expensive and demeaning. That is a heavily efficient and suitable strategy for countering corrupting influence behavior patterns since corruption is deeply entrenched in society. As a direct consequence, corrupt offenders are much less inclined to interact in this kind of illegal behavior under this kind of circumstances.

Being a member of Indonesia's People's Representative Council (DPR) is predicted to benefit a living of enjoyment and material possessions. Therefore, it should be unsurprising as many people are ready to spend enormous sums of money and even start voting to win an election as representatives and the senate.

3.2. Revocation of Former Corruption Convict's Rights

Former corruption convicts' rights to participate in government (including legislative) are rescinded for a legitimate reason. The House of Representatives is Indonesia's another very corrupt government institution, according to the Transparency International 2019 report, as cited by Indonesia-Investment (Indonesia Investment, 2019). For example, from 2015 to 2019, members of the People's Legislative Council scored the highest for criminal acts of corruption. (Indonesia: Transparency International, 2017).

It contravenes that Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on the grounds of Resolution 58/4 dated October 31, 2003, as prescribed in Law No. 7 of 2006 Concerning Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003. The misappropriation of a government position for self-gain is classified as bribery. Corruption is also a system of abusive governance behavior. Corrupt practices are described, and the encouragement, motives, implies, and risks of an unethical act committed. Bribery is decided to commit by misuse of power or violating the existing codes of conduct. I consider crime a severe crime. Corruption is a national and a potential global enemy, and that it is the primary cause of poverty. Section 10 of the Indonesian Criminal Code determines different crimes that the prosecuting attorney could demand and start imposing on a judge, such as abolishing certain privileges, forfeiture of particular items, and public release of a court's order. The Code's Article 35 broadens the accused's rights, which can still be annulled.

"Everyone is free to vote and has political beliefs," according to Article 23 paragraph (1) of Human Rights Law Number 39 of 1999. Further to that, the above Code stipulates that "every citizen may be voted and to vote in national elections fair liberty thru direct, public, independent, secret, truthful, and reasonable going to vote by the terms of laws and rules."

Therefore, because of the two preceding clauses, every Indonesian citizen has an innate lawful warranty to practice their ability to vote.

Revocation of political rights can be a new tool for law enforcement to dissuade morally bankrupt offenders. It is acknowledged that they have deemed imposing criminal penalties ineffective in minimizing corrupt practices actors — especially those in positions of public trust. Company punishments (incarceration) and financial penalties/substitute cash need not involve many evil perpetrators for one's damages. From the accused's standpoint, the judgment sometimes is deemed meaningful since this person concerned gets surety, and the offender can continue to enjoy such financial advantages upon completing the sentence.

Throughout phrases of the revocation of rights provisions, the Constitutional Court issued a viewpoint in judgment Number 4 / PUUVII / 2009, ruling that punishment for dispossessing voting representation seemed to be lawful, with the limitation of the abolishment of privileges hardly legitimate for five years after prisoner accomplished the sentence. The prisoner's political rights also are rescinded the day the court judgment is declared, as per the Criminal Code. That seems to be, for all those held in custody, the period of deprivation of political rights will be tallied starting from the first day of serving a sentence (imprisonment). In the meantime, the Constitutional Court must have established the constraints, and it is, the total number begins once the prisoner has served his proper sentence (especially imprisonment and confinement).

3.3. Stigmatization of Former Corruption Convict

Electoral rights are generally explicitly determined or recognized by the constitution. Article 27 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution affirms citizens' political rights, stating that "all citizens have the same position in government and law and thus are compelled to uphold the rule of law and government with no exception." The latter explains that every individual, along with local indigenous Indonesians and other nations identified as citizens by law, has the same political and legal right to stand well before the law and the government. Each citizen has a right to complete equality in government (the 1945 Constitution Article 28D paragraph 3). Acknowledgment of the constitution of citizens' political freedoms, as defined by the Law on Human Rights in particular. (1) Every citizen has a right to be voted and to cast a ballot in national elections on equal grounds, using direct, general, free, secret, truthful, as well as fair voting in compliance with existing laws and regulatory requirements. (2) Following the statutory regulations, every citizen has a right to take part in the political process directly or via a freely elected representative. (3) Every citizen has a right to be assigned to every government position.

Acknowledgment of constitution of peoples' political freedoms, as prescribed in the covenant on civil and political rights affirmed by Article 25 "Every citizen must have rights and 44 opportunities, with no distinction," as referred to in Article 2 or without improper constraints, for: (a) involvement within implementing national affairs, either directly or through freely elected officials; (b) involvement in implementing national affairs, either directly or through openly elected representatives; and (c) participation in implementing national affairs, either directly or through freely elected representatives.

The primary reason that recently departed crooked politicians' constitutional provisions should be battled is that Indonesia has a democratic government. In a democratic entity, choosing a particular location should involve people, either direct or indirect. A vote is cited in the 1945 Constitution in Article 27 paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 28, Article 28 D paragraph (3), and Article 28 E paragraph (4). (3). It also guaranteed the right to vote in the 1945 Constitution in Article 1 paragraph (2), Article 2 paragraph (1), Article 6A paragraph (1), Article 19 paragraph (1), and Article 22C paragraph (1). Democratic systems are among essential factors that determine the success of constructing law and order, protecting human rights, democratic values, and the position of political freedoms, which is quite crucial through government. It intrinsically tied political rights to an ability to vote or be voted, which is a fundamental right of the individual or citizen and should be safeguarded by the government. As a rule-of-law nation, Indonesia invariably affirms fundamental rights and the constitution, in which political rights also include freedom to vote and be appointed.

The primary goal of restricting political representation would be to build public confidence within representative democracy. Those who will be voted into office or have a morally excellent reputation are therefore not former corrupt lawbreakers. Afterward, the individuals would see that having committed corrupt practices would lead to severe punishments, and some may think seriously about committing bribery countless times.

The question is why the state restricts the political rights of former corrupt legislative candidates. There are a few different requirements under this case. The first one is the state's recognition, guarantee, and protection of the human rights of the Indonesian people. Second, it ruled the country in the name of the People's Supremacy. Third, the *lex priori de rogat legi inferiori* or the higher legislation takes precedence over lower legislation. This premise seems to be coherent to Hans Kelsen's theory that more subordinate legislation must come first, followed by higher legislation. Fourth, the state is viewed as autonomous, with rights and responsibilities comparable to individuals (*natuurlijk persoon*); fifth, State Administrative Law recognizes *Freies Ermessen*, which occurs once authorities or state administrative authorities have been assigned the power to make decisions that are not mandated by laws. The autonomy to act underpins the exercise of power (*beleidsvrijheid* or *beoordelingsvrijheid*). Sixth, the government should be allowed to consider the fulfillment of political freedoms without trying to deprive nominees of ones' rights. Finally, it implies that when a parliamentary nominee reveals to the public that he was implicated in such a criminal offense or is a former convict, the problem of constrained rights may well be confined.

In addition, many lawful remedies have been suggested to solve restrictions on former prisoners' political freedom for any of them to run for seats in the legislature. The state must have acknowledged respectively pluralist and nationwide democratic liberties. A Supreme Court ruling that the current regime could indeed enact could stop ex-corruption convicts. It implies that constitution guarantees the political rights of all citizens, such as ex-corruption convicts. Undoubtedly, such privileges could be restricted without passaging a law and following principles of reasonableness. Voting ideologies and one' implementation are now at the core of Pancasila's constitutional republic, and ignoring voting representation is an abandonment of the people's autonomy and a violation of candidates' constitutional protections. Last, under the universal human rights principle, every nation assures the privilege to vote in an election also to be voted into power. As just a consequence, Indonesia is obliged by law, like a state that assures these rights, to pass laws, regulatory requirements, as well as other necessary steps to ensure that each citizen, without discrimination, does have the opportunities to appreciate the above right to gain goals successfully.

3.4. Political Stigmatization

According to a social phenomenon that has emerged, former corruption convicts who have been released from detention are not well accepted to re-enter society. Former corruption convicts who have been imprisoned, according to the public, have a high proclivity to re-offend (people who repeatedly commit crimes, in the sense of relapse such as illness). It would highlight a prisoner who, after already being released from one detention facility, does not gain back his civil dignity in his community or faces discrimination inside their social environment. Former bribery convicts are stereotyped, have such a lower status, and find it hard to incorporate into the societal structure (Frost, 2011). Undoubtedly, former corrupt practices convicts running for parliamentary office should honestly and openly announce to the public that they have been former corruption prisoners (Law No. 12 of 1995). A declaration must be passed and accomplished before being appointed as a candidate and after being chosen as a candidate for parliamentary delegates. It should show the consequence of publicly announcing oneself a former corruption convict inside the mission/vision candidacy declaration, which must be open and honest about what it is. The records must be forwarded to the General Electoral Commission ("KPU"), such as (Law No. 12 of 1995), reveal the stereotype which still exists for parliamentary candidates who were former corruption convicted criminals. A letter from the editor-in-chief of a regional or national mass media organization, backed by proofs, describing that potential candidate had also honestly and openly conveyed oneself here to the general populace as a former.

1. A certificate stating that the prospective candidate is not a repeat offender;
2. Statement letter from the head of the correctional institution stating that the prospective candidate has completed serving imprisonment;
3. Certificate of completion of conditional release, conditional leave, or leave before releasing from

the head of the correctional institution, if the prospective candidate is on conditional release, conditional leave, or go before release;

4. The court decision that has permanent legal force;

The General Election Commission (KPU) makes announcements about former corruption convicts in regional or national print media and on the General Election Commission's website every day during the campaign period. Therefore, the election organizing committee could indeed manage the above declaration assignment depending on the number of ex-corruption convicts, whether at the national or regional level. The involvement of an electoral oversight body to oversee the above official statement is crucial to accomplish the clauses legally required, accomplish the sense of social justice in society, and minimize bigotry against the deployment of election results, which are now being held.

A further primary aim of the declaration would be for political groups to designate a spotless companion and has a proven track record. The nominee of parliamentary representatives seems to be part of the political talent acquisition. Political leaders could indeed start educating their representatives regarding democracy by publicly disclosing a candidate's condition to the general populace. Furthermore, it benefits electors since political parties have successfully introduced nominees who are truthful and liberated of legal problems.

Parties involved as both have subsequently used chiefly these flaws as a shield to dismiss the candidacy and forbid former corruption convicted criminals. The standard explanation would be that the debate conflict with elevated laws. Admittedly, only when Elections Law No. 7 of 2017 is often used as legitimate guidance for 2019 general elections. Moreover, there may not be a solo work of literature that asserts ex-corruption convicts cannot run for public office. Finally, article 240 Section 1 only stipulates a few prerequisites for such a candidate, notably that they are non-drug consumers and have never been sentenced to prison for committing a serious crime and who is punishable with imprisonment for five years or over, except if those who clearly and freely acknowledge to the public that they have been a former prisoner. Ultimately, there are new sanctions for those who have committed criminal offenses frequently (recidivist).

4. Conclusion

It barred former corruption convicts from running for legislative office in the 2019 election to achieve good governance free of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. However, it has increased the social stigma attached to former corrupt convicts. A ban on former corruption convict contestants through PKPU violates the rights as it is not premised on the constitution or even the principle of reasonableness.

Moreover, the PKPU's "prohibition" standard appears to contradict the Law No. 20 of 2018 guidelines "permitted upon that circumstance that it will be admitted towards the public," deeming the PKPU's confiscation rules voidable. Given the KPU's independence, the Government, Election Supervisory Agency, and People's Representative Council must also endorse the same regulations issued by General Elections Commission (KPU) Number 20 of 2018 regarding Nominees for representatives of a DPR, Provincial DPRD, and Regency or City DPRD. The General Election Commission should not restrict recently departed corruptors from wanting to run for parliamentary office. Political parties will be well-prepared to select candidates for seats in the legislature who have honesty and integrity.

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