

# ELECTORAL MANIPULATION IN INDONESIA'S 2019 NATIONAL ELECTION

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## ABSTRACT

This article investigates data manipulation in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential election employing social networks. Alteration of information has become a subconscious issue. It has been carried in a range of methods to win the general election and change the state ideology. Although a few assert Indonesia is the most democratic state globally, it does not show genuine democracy. There is still a significant level of deception, false representation in the election process, and religious politicization are efficient ways to lower the opposing side. They used political funds until election participants voted. This article investigates how voting information deception could certainly affect Indonesia's democratic values. It also contends that, while citizen engagement is increasing, the significance of democracy is declining associated with information deception and electoral malfeasance.

**Keywords:** Information tinkering; politicization; hoax; violation; right to vote

## Introduction

Every candidate in the election expects a victory in the last election results. The candidate took various paths to win the election, including but not limited to money politics and information manipulation. Manipulation of information at the time of the election is a political manipulation that aims to influence the election's outcome. At that democratic event in Indonesia, two presidential candidates with unique backgrounds competed to win the number one seat. Joko Widodo's humble reputation for clean governance attracted many Indonesians who were tired of the corrupt Jakarta elite. Prabowo Subianto is a descendant of a prominent Jakarta family, carrying out aggressive and sometimes dirty campaigns with an image as an influential leader<sup>1</sup>.

Comparatists and country researchers had also lauded Indonesia's electoral progress and consistency, especially over the past two decades. Elections are held regularly throughout the country, ensuring that officeholders ranging from village heads to the President are elected

directly by citizens. In addition, Indonesia has a vibrant social life, and its media is free. In a 2009 article, noted democracy scholar Larry Diamond praised Indonesia for becoming a "successful democracy — with no obvious risks or potent anti-democratic obstacles upon that horizon."<sup>2</sup> Diamond called Indonesia a "relatively progressive democracy." Other comparativists, like Diamond, see Indonesia as a functioning democracy, with public support for democratically elected government amongst this highest and most steady in Asia. The Indonesian government has launched among the essential pillars of a healthy democracy: general, reasonable, and serene elections<sup>3</sup>. The 2019 general election was the biggest democratic event in the history of democracy in Indonesia because the Regional People's Representative Council, the People's Representative Council, and the People's Representative Council and held the presidential election simultaneously<sup>4</sup>. Indonesia's election is the most complicated in the world because its participation rate reached 82%<sup>5</sup>. This success has been subject to social

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Harding, 2019<sup>1</sup>  
Diamond, 2010<sup>2</sup>  
Bland, 2019<sup>3</sup>

Farisa, 2018<sup>4</sup>  
Butt, 2019; Bland, 2019; Berita Satu, 2019<sup>5</sup>

media's role, which not only functions as self-existence but is also helpful in influencing the political climate of a country<sup>6</sup>. Of the 132 million people who use social media in Indonesia, 120 million access it through smartphones or tablets. Campaigning through social media efficiently and inexpensively enables the spread of campaign messages and allows political messages to be targeted and have a broad reach that involves voters<sup>7</sup>.

Although Indonesia is the world's most democratic country, that claim is still debatable<sup>8</sup>. Lipson (2019)<sup>9</sup> claims that the 2019 election was the most transparent in history, although inevitable missteps or stinky strategies have been used to prove fraud. In terms of implementation, Indonesia is not a genuinely democratic nation. Through terms of the implementation, Indonesia is not really a genuinely democratic nation<sup>10</sup>, since the mode of tolerance and acceptance is indeed a prerequisite for democratic governance, one that Indonesia requires<sup>11</sup>, and it has not extirpated rising inequality<sup>12</sup>. yet Indonesia has a democratic state, restricted civil availability to an electoral process, and relatively low-performance public engagement<sup>13</sup>. The electoral system in Indonesia seemed to be awe-inspiring or tarnished by forgery<sup>14</sup>.

In addition, the Ministry of Information and Communication discovered 486 fake news stories in April 2019; 209 of these frauds were purely political<sup>15</sup>. Political forgery refers to deception directed at presidential and vice-presidential candidates, parties contesting elections, the General Election Board (KPU), and the Electoral Oversight Body (Bawaslu). In some regions in Papua, the Polling Station (TPS) use the Noken system as an election mechanism for conducting voting and counting (Putungsura), using Noken as a container or place to replace the ballot box<sup>16</sup>. Tabuni (2019)<sup>17</sup>, as quoted by VOA Indonesia, stated that the Noken system somehow does not

practice true democracy. The Noken system eliminates inalienable freedom to choose with a conscience which path he should take. As this system employs a big man or tribal leader, he asserts the villager's ballots and delivers to a few candidates.

Identically, a variety of verbal violence occurred during the Prabowo campaign. Prabowo was a presidential candidate in the 2019 election who the Gerindra Party supported. Prabowo is easily emotional, with a campaign model that does not use mass force but uses verbal and non-verbal violence threats that do not show Indonesia and are a crime that tore democracy<sup>18</sup>. Prabowo kicked off the podium and accused the Republic of Indonesia Police and the Indonesian National Army of being neutral and not supporting individual candidates who were foreign minions; he also, without evidence, said that someone had robbed State National Corporation (BUMN)<sup>19</sup>. During the campaign, Prabowo Subianto included: "The Republic of Indonesia will disperse in 2030, rob a burning house, the media have no right to block the title of journalist<sup>20</sup>. Because of verbal violence committed by Prabowo, riots arose, which left 200 injured and six dead<sup>21</sup>. During the 2019 election campaign, Prabowo using verbal violence turned out not to be in his favor because treating people with verbal violence was not the right tool to support their political arguments. Voters need to elect a figure who can convince candidates with politeness in political discourse<sup>22</sup>. Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno lost the 2019 presidential election, mainly because they could not provide sufficient evidence to support their claim in the Constitutional Court that 'systematic and massive violations occurred before and after the election<sup>23</sup>.

Various politicization practices show Indonesia is not a genuinely democratic country based on the 2019 elections: religion's politicization. Religious claims often become masks for other

Tirto, 2019<sup>6</sup>

Media Indonesia, 2020<sup>7</sup>

Saputra, 2019; Aziz, 2016; Azhari, 2010<sup>8</sup>

Lipson (2019)<sup>9</sup>

Warburton & Power, 2019<sup>10</sup>

Menchik, 2016<sup>11</sup>

Aspinall, 2015<sup>12</sup>

Marco & Ufen, 2008; Bubandt, 2014; Diamond, 2008; Horowitz, 2013<sup>13</sup>

Bacon, 2012; Diamond and Platter (2015)<sup>14</sup>

Detik News, May 1, 2019<sup>15</sup>

Ronsumbre, 2019<sup>16</sup>

Tabuni (2019)<sup>17</sup>

Okezone, 2019; Seword, 2019<sup>18</sup>

Nathanegara, 2019<sup>19</sup>

Seword, 2019<sup>20</sup>

Seword, 2019<sup>21</sup>

Dunn, 2019<sup>22</sup>

Butt, 2019<sup>23</sup>

motives and interests, mainly political and economic ones<sup>24</sup>. Ungrateful politicians use worship places, such as mosques, as political vehicles to satisfy their desires for power, such as the campaign that voices 'it is haram to pray for the bodies of certain candidate voters'<sup>25</sup>. Politics uses religion's politicization because it is considered the most practical, cheap, and easiest way to win people's vote and sympathy, even though its rationality is questionable<sup>26</sup>. In the governor of DKI Jakarta, the same practice used mosques as a campaign tool<sup>27</sup>. Even Muhammadiyah Central Executive Yunahar Ilyas, who has been an expert witness on religious defamation cases by A Hok, considered the ban on choosing non-leader Muslims not to violate the constitution<sup>28</sup>.

Yet the success team of Prabowo Subianto, the presidential candidate in the 2019 election, used religion as campaign material by saying Djoko Widodo was a kaafir, a liar, an unworthy, a Chinese man houseboy, and a traitor to the nation. Second, there was the practice of money politics in the Indonesian general election. Aspinall (2014)<sup>29</sup> and Rozi (2006)<sup>30</sup> mentioned that Manipulation and malpractice during the electoral process go on in Indonesian elections. Money politics is already part of the Indonesian political system<sup>31</sup>. At the time of each election, a 'dawn attack' is carried out to direct voters to choose individual candidates by giving money at dawn before the election takes place. The methods used are usually buying votes (vote-buying), delivering goods to specific groups (club goods), providing a variety of social services, and using public funds for the interests of Electoral pork-barrel politics<sup>32</sup>. Some voters do not vote (Golput) if the candidate does not give money because they consider buying votes a fortune and undeniable<sup>33</sup>, making it challenging to avoid transactional politics in Indonesian elections.

So it is not surprising that political manipulation cases such as hoax, the politicization of religion,

money politics, and hate speech stain the Indonesian election. For example, the number of Election Violations in 2019 increased rapidly compared to the 2014 elections<sup>34</sup>. Based on the problems mentioned above, this article seeks to answer how candidates use media to manipulate information in the general election in Indonesia? What is the motive behind information manipulation on social media?

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Political Manipulation has long been a long debate among scholars. An ideal election's characteristics are that the election process must be transparent, impartial, and free from political Manipulation beginning before the election and ending with the election results<sup>35</sup>. Dahl (1979)<sup>36</sup> notes that the actual polls should fill several criteria, including inclusiveness, equal vote, effective participation, enlightened understanding, and plan control. This democratic model advocates universal equality and equal rights for all people in the political process. Gould (1994)<sup>37</sup> stated that the political process's character by a system of 'one person one vote' in which citizens own the opportunity to choose one of the political leaders who compete for votes<sup>38</sup>. Although social media can be a powerful campaign tool, it is a toll to rob freedom and kill democracy. Bartlett (2018)<sup>39</sup> claimed that the era of technology (information) places us in very different circumstances, and we live in an age that is not shaped by openness but by manipulation. Specifically, Lee (2018)<sup>40</sup> said that manipulators spread propaganda and manipulate political parties' or politicians' credibility in the political domain. Trickery campaigns and foreign interference processes infrequently depend only on internet advertising; those who have used deceiving front groups, fraudulent social networking sites

Marshall, 2018<sup>24</sup>

Pratama, 2019<sup>25</sup>

Marshall, 2018; Media Indonesia, 2018<sup>26</sup>

Kompas, 2017<sup>27</sup>

CNN Indonesia, 2017<sup>28</sup>

Aspinall (2014)<sup>29</sup>

Rozi (2006)<sup>30</sup>

Aspinall, 2014<sup>31</sup>

pork-barrel politics; Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015<sup>32</sup>

Tirto, 2017<sup>33</sup>

JPN.Com, June 15, 2019<sup>34</sup>

Eriksson 2002; Goodwin-Gill, 2006<sup>35</sup>

Dahl (1979)<sup>36</sup>

Gould (1994)<sup>37</sup>

Lechmann, 1989<sup>38</sup>

Bartlett (2018)<sup>39</sup>

Lee (2018)<sup>40</sup>

accounts, web search methodologies, and automation tools to alter conversations online, among many other strategies. So many obstacles to the global communications ecosphere have been inextricably linked, and policymakers should respond to challenges through various initiatives<sup>41</sup>. They have designed digital advertising systems with capabilities that can be conveniently utilized. Once political strategists politicize advertising technology, those who use this to recognize weak spots in which individuals and groups are the most susceptible to strategic influence. Individuals' information is being used against them in such cases and is used to assist political advertising agencies in influencing their objectives effectively. Such political Manipulation violates human rights<sup>42</sup>. According to Eysenck and Wilson, manipulation itself is only for the Manipulation itself benefit of fraudsters and not for the deceived interests. Information manipulation in elections influences the level of political uncertainty because one of the regime's fundamental assumptions is the process of 'political uncertainty'<sup>43</sup>. Various literature has reviewed the manipulation of information in elections to influence election results<sup>44</sup>. Information manipulation is a sub-category of election crime that aims to influence the elections' process and outcome, usually occurring near the election<sup>45</sup>. The concept of political uncertainty because of information manipulation is an exciting thing for political researchers because manipulating information influences the political process. According to Joseph Schumpeter (2017), electoral procedures are institutional arrangements to come at political choices wherein people possess the authority to decide thru a competition for folk's electorate. The emergence through risk perception linked to high political turmoil can have two effects on financial strategy. First, policy instability raises a perception of the risk of foreign funds, leading to a higher cost of equity. Pástor & Veronesi<sup>46</sup> The emergence through risk perception linked to high political turmoil can have two effects on financial strategy. First, policy instability raises a perception of the risk of foreign funds, leading

to a higher cost of equity<sup>47</sup>. Second, political turmoil raises management's perception of a firm's cash flow risk seeing as personal firms' free cash flow seems to be susceptible to both peculiar and agglomeration surprises (Berkman et al., 2011), for political unpredictability, accumulate investment profit, and volatility. As a result, throughout periods of high political turmoil, a tendency to experience economic deficiencies and pressing the outside share market raises.

## METHODOLOGY

The descriptive qualitative approach used in this study to investigate social relations, systems, or events by providing background information about the problem at hand<sup>48</sup>. This paper discusses how the 2019 presidential election in Indonesia uses social media to manipulate data. This study intends to gather more information and a more detailed picture of information manipulation in Indonesia's 2019 elections. The authors conducted qualitative studies using a series of documentary references and relevant documentation predicated on election-related information. The authors dissected the issues using both information manipulation and human rights concepts. In terms of theoretical and scholarly contributions, this article offers a valuable comprehension of the assessment of information manipulation and its effects on the voting freedoms of both candidates and voters. The authors divide this article into five parts that discuss political Manipulation and violations of civil and political rights in Indonesia's 2019 General Elections. Part I: Overview; Part II: Literature review; Part III: method; Part IV: Findings and discussion, which includes three types of political manipulations and adulterated motivating factors next to trickery information. This part also discusses the candidate's political reason and the political right infringement of political Manipulation; Part V is a final chapter that serves as a framework for future research on the evasion of information manipulation and violations of peoples' political rights.

Crain & Nadler, 2019<sup>41</sup>

O'Byrne, 2014; Afshari, 2011<sup>42</sup>

Schedler, 2013<sup>43</sup>

Alvarez, Hall & Hyde 200influenceer, 2019;

Simpser, 2013<sup>44</sup>

Borzyskowski, 2019; Mochtak, 2017<sup>45</sup>

Pástor & Veronesi (2012, 2013)<sup>46</sup>

(Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Gao & Qi, 2012; Hou et al., 2017; KELLY et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017)<sup>47</sup>

Creswell, 2002<sup>48</sup>

## DISCUSSION

### 1. Manipulation of the Rules Governing Elections

Articles 488 to Article 554 of Law Number 7 of 2017 about National Elections classifies campaigning against prohibitions, conducting campaigns outside the General Election Commission (KPU) schedule, providing false information regarding voter lists as Criminal Election (Election). In addition, in connection with this election crime, Article 2 letter b of the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2018 stipulates that:

District courts and high courts have the authority to examine, try to decide election crimes arising from reports of alleged election crimes that the General Election Supervisory Agency forwards to the Indonesian National Police within twenty-four hours after the Election Supervisory Agency declares that the alleged act is an election crime<sup>49</sup>.

Indonesia has legal frameworks concerning the principle of direct, public, accessible, and secret elections (LUBER). Indonesia has legal frameworks concerning the principle of direct, public, accessible, and secret elections (LUBER). Article 22E of the Republic of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution stipulates that:

President and Vice President, and members of the People's Representative Council (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), and Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) are held every five years. They should be direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair<sup>50</sup>.

Indonesia also has regulations relating to general elections, including Joint Decision of General Elections Commission (KPU), Election Supervisory Board (BAWASLU), and General Election Organizer Honorary Board (DKPP) regarding the Code of Ethics for Election Providers. These regulations impose an ethical code on election organizers. Article 280 paragraph 1 letter h of Law No. 7 of 2017 on Elections expressly states that coordinators, contestants, and electoral campaign teams still may not be using government resources, religious sites, and educational facilities. It has

frequently disregarded simply such a rule because these rules do not apply in practice.

Recent surveys on Indonesian politics describe political incumbents and candidates' attempts to manipulate electoral laws, evade formal accountability, apply protection and violence for political purposes, and revive and maintain dominant party institutions. Head of the National Criminal Police Investigation and Guidance Bureau found that up to now, 554 reports had been submitted to the police regarding election crimes. Of these, it declared 132 notices criminal election crimes, so the law sent the process. Of these, 31 were money politics cases, and the mode was still conventional (Gita, 2019).

For instance, during the 2019 elections, Election Supervisory Board (BAWASLU) received 16,043 reports of election violations, but only 345 were criminal violations (BAWASLU 2019). The Task Force, which the Ministry of Communications and Information formed, gathered over 700 pieces of content that had been identified as hoaxes (KOMINFO, 2019). According to data from the Digital Forensic Research Lab, a group that searches for false information on social media, Facebook deleted 234 pages, accounts, and groups on Facebook and Instagram involved in coordinated efforts to influence elections by spreading incorrect information (Paddock, 2019). The impacts campaign has been meant to facilitate the Prabowo Subianto candidate pair (Paddock, 2019). In contrast, data from the Indonesia Indicator says that around 23% of the total hate speech and hoaxes that attacked Joko Widodo on Twitter were related to religious issues. The same proportion also occurred on the social media site Facebook<sup>51</sup>.

Hoax is the most common to influence the voting process. In April 2019, the Ministry of Communication and Information identified 486 scams, with 209 coming from political parties. Political fraud includes threats on presidents and vice-presidential contestants, related political stakeholders in the election process, the General Electoral Commission (KPU), and the Electoral Oversight Body (BAWASLU). An alleged hoax about the existence of seven container units containing 2019 election ballots that the police had punched in Bekasi was among the hoaxes

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Article 2 letter b of the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2018<sup>49</sup>

Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia<sup>50</sup>  
Election Supervisory Body, 2019<sup>51</sup>

spread to discredit Joko Widodo. In October 2018, the police arrested the administrator of the owner of the SR23 Instagram account, who had distributed thousands of content with provocation and hate speech. He also used other versions, which contained a photo stating that President Joko Widodo was a Communist. In addition, the Directorate of Criminal Acts (Siber Bareskrim Polri) arrested the owner of a Facebook account for allegedly uploading hoax news about Chinese citizens detained by the Army members for making fake Identity Cards (KTPs), which will later be told to vote for Joko Widodo. There was also hoax news that seven containers from China reportedly contained 10 million presidential ballots in each container, punched for number 1, namely the pair Joko Widodo and Ma'aruf Amin. In recent years, the dependability of information on the Internet has emerged as a critical issue in modern society. Social networking sites (SNSs) have transformed how information is disseminated by allowing users to share content freely. As a result, SNSs are increasingly being used as vectors for the spread of misinformation and hoaxes. In addition, it disseminated the volume and speed with which information makes it nearly impossible to assess reliability quickly, emphasizing the need for automatic hoax detection systems.

As evidence, based on the users who "liked" them, we can classify Facebook posts as hoaxes or non-hoaxes with high accuracy. Two classification techniques are available: one based on logistic regression and the other on a novel adaptation of boolean crowdsourcing algorithms. The research gets classification accuracy exceeding 99 percent on a dataset comprising 15,500 Facebook posts and 909,236 users, even when the training set contains less than 1% of the posts. It also shows the techniques' robustness: they work even when attention to users who like a hoax and non-hoax posts is restricted. These findings imply that mapping the pattern of information diffusion could be a valuable component of automatic hoax detection systems<sup>52</sup>.

Voters exposed to and believed in hoaxes and expressions of hatred towards Joko Widodo did not vote for Joko Widodo. He was the primary

target of false news, accounting for 28.98 percent, while Prabowo Subianto received 20.85 percent. Facebook accounts for 45 percent of all fake news and disinformation based on shared information<sup>53</sup>. Manado, a Jakarta-based organization, founded for counter-hoax news, reported in 2018 that 28.98% of the deception was directed at President Joko Widodo and 20.85% against Prabowo Subianto.

Spreading hoaxes and misguided words on social media are seen as the most straightforward way for evil actors to launch large-scale persuasion campaigns<sup>54</sup>. For political purposes, fake news has caused social, ethnic, and religious divisions and the polarization of identity politics. I regard a hoax as a powerful tool for reducing an opponent's electability and winning elections. The same situation occurred during the U.S. Presidential election, as someone widely assumed that Donald Trump got elected as just a result of misleading information<sup>55</sup>.

Interestingly, both presidential candidate pairs were hit by hoaxes, false news, and black campaigns, but it did not affect the victory at the end of the vote. The Jokowi-Ma'aruf pair, who were more vulnerable to hoaxes and false news, was elected President with a vote ratio of 85,607,362, or 55.50 percent of total national legitimate votes and valid votes for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno received 68,650,239 votes or 44.50 percent of the total national helpful votes<sup>56</sup>. Hoaxes, black campaigns, and frauds committed and carried out by the opposing camps did not weaken the political dominance of the Jokowi-Ma'Aruf sides. This is because of the opposition movements that will reduce targets' achievement<sup>57</sup>. As a result, the party suffers, voter dissatisfaction grows, and the number of voters decreased<sup>58</sup>, and have the potential to harm the political system by lowering feelings of political efficacy, trust in government, and possibly satisfaction with the government on its own<sup>59</sup>.

## 2. Manipulation of vote preference formation and expression

A robust political patronage relationship between election organizers, candidates, and

(Tacchini et al., 2017).<sup>52</sup>

Lamb, 2019<sup>53</sup>

Deagon, 2019<sup>54</sup>

Fitrianingrum, 2019<sup>55</sup>

KPU, 2019<sup>56</sup>

Kahn & Kenny, 2004<sup>57</sup>

West, 2014<sup>58</sup>

Lau et al., 2007<sup>59</sup>

voters is one of the kinds of vote preference formation and experience<sup>60</sup>. Political patronage is a dispensation from success for material value or mutually helpful strength and share connections, a non-universalistic quid pro quo among people, and inequality having to stand<sup>61</sup>. Sympathizers, cadres, or even political party officials carry vote buying out before the general election. It carried the practice of money politics out by giving money, staple foods, rice, oil, and sugar to the public to attract public sympathy to vote for the party politician concerned. Money politics is born out of a candidate's mistrust and success teams to win by honest means. Also, the problem arises because of issues in the recruitment context of public officials. The recruitment process, which does not rely on the capacity and an unblemished track record, produces instant candidates who cannot attract voters.

Vote-buying, such as giving money to voters (money politics) and the misuse of state money to buy votes (Pork Barrel), are common in the Indonesia election<sup>62</sup>. Money politics and patronage are two things that often occur in elections in Indonesia because they can influence voter preferences so that it will benefit candidates who use this strategy electorally<sup>63</sup>. Seeing from previous studies in Latin American Countries that vote-buying is a benefit for turnout<sup>64</sup>. The same pattern in Africa, where establishment candidate political groups employ their stance to improve their re-election chances, straightforwardly misappropriating state resources for political advantage<sup>65</sup>. It is a "take and gives the relationship between the candidate and voters mutual benefit. The voter will get service from the candidate, commonly in money or material, or position, and the candidate receive votes from voters.

Another transactional politics to influence the voting process is to use the company fund to buy voters. Based on data released by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), as quoted by Widayati (2019)<sup>66</sup>, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) confiscated 400 thousand envelopes in 84 boxes with IDR 8 billion. Something allegedly intended the money for

'election dawn attacks.' BSP (initial) is suspected of taking bribes from A.W. (presumed), Marketing Manager of P.T. Humpuss Transportation Kimia (HTK). An Indonesian conglomerate corporation was intended for the suspect to help P.T. HTK agree on using its vessels for fertilizer distribution from P.T., Indonesian Logistics Fertiliser. During the 2019 election campaign, other money politics cases captured by the police include IDR 1,075 billion in cash and attributes of one political party in Lamongan, East Java.

Though buying and selling votes is common in Indonesia, the impact on election results is low. That the practice of buying and selling franchises only affects about 11% of the total votes<sup>67</sup>. For example, three perpetrators admitted they would distribute the money to 2,400 people. The money to be distributed is IDR 20,000 or US\$. 1 36 per person<sup>68</sup>. Voters with IDR 20.000 have a relationship with poverty and economic situation as Kefer (2007)<sup>69</sup> claims that voters with low-income practice clientelism and exploit voters from such relation.

### 3. Manipulation of the voting process

During the 2019 general election, they also found Manipulating the voting process in some polling stations (TPS). These frauds occurred at domestic polling stations (TPS) and polling stations abroad, such as Selangor-Malaysia, Sydney-Australia, Wan Chai-Hong Kong and, The Hague- the Netherlands. The diaspora cast thousands of ballots in Malaysia a few days before foreign ballots were opened. The alleged findings of several voting bags supported President Joko Widodo and several legislative candidates in Selangor, Malaysia<sup>70</sup>. Tempo also observed that Indonesian citizens in Sydney, Australia, could not exercise their right to vote because of the alleged lack of the foreign election committee (PPLN). The polling station at the Queen Elizabeth Stadium reportedly saw 20 Indonesians allegedly living in Hong Kong forced into the area after being disappointed because they could not vote. Elections in the Netherlands did not report any technical

Birch, 2012<sup>60</sup>

Roniger, 2004<sup>61</sup>

Aspinall et al., 2017<sup>62</sup>

Aspinall et al., 2017; Okthariza, 2019<sup>63</sup>

Carreras & Irepoglu (2013)<sup>64</sup>

Ohman, 2014<sup>65</sup>

Widayati (2019)<sup>66</sup>

Muthadi, 2018<sup>67</sup>

Wismabrata, 2019<sup>68</sup>

Kefer (2007)<sup>69</sup>

The Strait Times, 2019<sup>70</sup>

difficulties. However, the challenge faced by voters was that the embassy location was difficult to reach.

In some regions in Papua, for example, the Noken (a multifunctional knotted or woven bag, native to the Papua) system is intended as a mechanism for conducting voting and counting in elections held at the Polling Station (TPS), using Noken as a container or place to replace the ballot box. Tabuni (2019)<sup>71</sup>, as quoted by VOA Indonesia, stated that the Noken system does not practice true democracy. The Noken system denies an individual's right to choose with a conscience, which he/she should elect. Because this traditional system uses a big man or tribal chief, claims the villager's votes, and is given to one candidate from several candidates<sup>72</sup>.

There are at least two systems that encourage candidates to compete to collect as many votes as possible. First, the competition for candidates at parties is tight and tight. Candidates who feel the potential to win big will manipulate the vote by inflating or reducing their opponents' voices, not opponents of other parties. Second, there are still weaknesses to support the election system, which can open gaps in creating vote manipulation. Manipulation at least occurred in two things, namely voter data and tiered vote count recapitulation. Voter data in every election is always a severe problem because the data is never accurate. Meanwhile, the tiered recapitulation of vote counts still allows counting errors and manipulating vote acquisition results.

#### **4. Manipulation of Information as a Violation of Civil and Political Rights**

The right to vote elections freely is a constitutional right guaranteed by the state. The right to vote and free elections are the two pillars of a democratic government that should, of course, be carried out without Manipulation, primarily affecting the right to vote. Democracy as a part of politics is considered the best way to manage government in Indonesia, but it is used as a momentum of politicians for political interests in practice. Therefore, the voting process should be direct, public, accessible, and confidential. Do not automatically implement voting to realize the people's rights because the people's votes are bought to get the desired

number of votes. Manipulation with hoaxes, false news, and black campaigns make elections a place for human rights abuse. The voice of the people is denied, and it becomes a tool of negotiation. Such methods will make it difficult for voters to choose because they have freely hijacked their rights for particular political interests. The principle of holding direct, public, accessible, and confidential elections (LUBER) can be negotiated whether with money or other conditions that affect voters' independence to determine their political choice.

Even though democracy is already in place in Indonesia, there have been some setbacks in terms of fundamental freedoms. In Indonesia, the state of democratic governance and fulfillment of voting freedoms seems to be disastrous. A real impact on community rights does not follow the legal and political arena's openness to human rights discourse. Instead, it formally adopted human rights as a political strategy to avoid actual implementation<sup>73</sup>.

The 1945 Constitution, Act No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, and Law No. 10 of 2008 concerning General Elections Members of the People's Legislative Assembly and the Regional Representative Council all recognize people's right to cast a ballot in a national election. In addition, many international basic frameworks enforce different federal laws, safeguards peoples' engagement in participating in politics ubiquitously or fairly instead of discriminatory practices.

Although these regulations have been very comprehensive, eliminating and restricting voting rights and the right to express opinions in public often still occur during elections. In 2019, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) found: 'There are over 6,100 cases of people who have been prosecuted only for expressing their opinions in public, over 300 of them involving minors. At least 51 people died while exercising their right to express their political views in public. That is data from only 16 provinces [of 34 provinces in Indonesia] so that the actual number can be higher. The Civil Society Coalition found 1,022 cases, including technical and administrative violations, findings regarding participation and voting, and, finally, the organizers' readiness.

#### **5. Motives behind political Manipulation**

Hadiprayitno, 2009<sup>73</sup>

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Tabuni (2019)<sup>71</sup>  
Suchahyo, 2018<sup>72</sup>



The authors' viewpoint is slightly different from the arguments in general, as described above. Suppose in previous studies, the manipulation of information was carried out to ensure victory or to be able to pass the minimum winning limit. In that case, this article argues that the Manipulation of information in the 2019 election was carried out to win the election and other hidden motives to replace the Pancasila state's ideology with the Islamic Khilafah state. How to identify this motive? It is necessary to see who supported the Prabowo Subianto pair and the extent of their involvement in the Khilafah ideology and what they do, and how they manipulate information during the elections to realize the mission. Although the Prabowo Subianto pair always denied supporting Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), there are indications that the Prabowo Subianto pair had been elected as President and Vice President, the Islamic Khilafah state would stand up to replace the Pancasila ideology. To more easily understand this, it is necessary to know the information manipulation efforts of the Prabowo Subianto pair and the critical relationship between them and their supporters, who are predominantly hardline Islamic/Khilafah supporters.

First, the drive for broader implementation of Sharia law in Indonesia would have strengthened Prabowo's victory<sup>74</sup>. The sympathizers of HTI, the currently banned hardliner Islamic organization, included another Islamist organization that campaigned for the global caliphate and expressed its support for Prabowo (Chew, 2019). The swift support from hardliners and Islamists for Prabowo has caused concern among nationalists, moderates, and minorities, including LGBT groups, who fear that Indonesia's current conservatism trend will accelerate (Chew, 2019). The Indonesian Survey Institute noted that supporters of presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto with Sandiaga Uno, who wants Indonesia to become like the Middle East, increased from 38.8% in August 2018 to 50% in September 2018. Groups who wished to the Khilafah to change from Pancasila, like HTI, gathered on Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno's side. However, Prabowo's side found it quite difficult to win the election because the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) is a paramilitary force and with no interest

in the current administration, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is profoundly undemocratic<sup>75</sup>. Groups who wished to the Khilafah to change from Pancasila, like HTI, gathered on Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno's side. However, Prabowo's side found it quite difficult to win the election because the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) is a paramilitary force and with no interest in the current administration, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is profoundly undemocratic<sup>76</sup>. During the Manado campaign, North Sulawesi was supported by the ex-HTI group supported supporters of the Prabowo-Sandi pair. The indications were that their courage waved the Al-Liwa on the main stage of the campaign (Prabowo), the anti-Pancasila. Prabowo's closeness to the radical Islamic movement that wants to establish the Khilafah in Indonesia is inseparable from several incidents during Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto.

## CONCLUSION

Manipulation of information in the 2019 Indonesian general elections falls into three categories: trickery of electoral law, deception of cast a ballot preference formation and appearance, as well as deception of the voting process. The three models of Manipulation are an action to influence individual opportunities in electoral competition and achieve political motive behind the participation in the general election that leads to the violation of the political rights. Both presidential candidates used the information manipulation strategy to changes the level of political uncertainty but did not determine the winner. Both presidential candidates played similar information manipulation methods in the media, but they did not influence the voters.

Many determinants affect the outcome of the national election, including the effectiveness of the strategy being carried out. The final effect of information manipulation, in general, does not benefit candidates and causes adverse effects on democracy. Various methods are used to manipulate information, including the campaign of circumcision, hoaxes, the politicization of religion, and disseminating misguided information through social media to discredit

Chew, 2019<sup>74</sup>  
Hermawan, 2019<sup>75</sup>

Stott, 2019<sup>76</sup>

specific candidates from receiving votes predetermined election.

Hoaxes, transactional politics, religion, and negative campaigns' politicization were not suitable for the democratic process. They negatively impacted the party and the movement and impacted the target because it made voters apathetic and distrustful and could delegitimize elections and the democratic process. Acts of manipulation of information are considered violations of civil and political rights because there are restrictions on casting votes for candidates or voting directly, publicly, freely, and confidentially, which are embraced in Indonesia's principle of elections. Political parties' role in realizing the nation's goals is different from the nation's political policies. Primordial interests are used to move the wheels of government with their respective interests. Personal interests are the primary and neglected people's interests.

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