

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia

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I

Introduction

I.1 Background

In midst of March 2011, the people and the government of Indonesia were once again shocked by some acts of terrorist in this country. But this time, the terrorist used a different way to terror the people. They put bombs in a book. This book parcel bombs then delivered to some people. They are Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), the musician Ahmad Dhani, General Komisariss Pol Gorries Mere, Yapto S. Soerjosoemarno, a member of Pancasila Youth, and previous Chief of West Java District Police.¹

Previously, at the end of February 2010, the government also found some terrorist did their paramilitary training in Aceh, a place where a conflict once had occurred between the government of Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), a movement to freed Aceh that had been existed for almost 30 years. At that time, some terrorism observers were sure that terrorist used separatist as their partner and cooperated with them to achieve their goals.

However, the government of Indonesia convinced that this action has nothing to do with the movement (GAM). Since, they believed that the conflict between GAM and the government of Indonesia has already ended on 15 August 2005 when both parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki. The negotiation at that time was mediated by former Finland President, Martti Ahtisaari.

¹ “Teror Paket Bom Buku lagi” (Another Book Parcel Bomb) accessed from <http://metro.kompasiana.com/2011/03/18/teror-paket-bom-buku-lagi/> on 1 April 2011.

From this paramilitary training, Chief of Public Relations Division in Indonesian Police (Polri), Edward Aritonang, on 2nd March 2010 explained that the police had caught 13 persons in Aceh Besar, Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, that were indicated as members of terrorist networks. All were Indonesian and caught as they were indicated doing a military training with an Indonesian trainer who has been trained abroad. The police got this information from some documents seized by the police. Besides, the police also seized three fire arms and eight bullets from their training place as well.²

One week later, the police caught other terrorists in Pamulang, Tangerang. There were 4 persons in Jakarta and West Java. Three of them were shot in an internet workshop as they tried to fight and escape from the police. Edward Aritonang was sure that these performers were linked with the terrorist group in Aceh. Again according to Aritonang, these performers were functioned as weapon suppliers and fund raisers for their paramilitary activities in Aceh.³

Head of Anti-terror Desk in Coordinator Ministerial of Political, Law and Security, Ansyad Mbai, said that the presence and activities of terrorist in Aceh Besar could be a part of a new great scenario to prepare an attack Malacca Strait. Although this people haven't realized yet about the plan and even though the facilities to support was still not ready yet but this cell group can be part of Jaringan Islamiyah or Al Qaeda who had arrange a big attack. He believed this because terrorist group will always have a sophisticated plan and work method to attack their potential targets. And their targets will always develop and never be static.⁴

² *Polri Tangkap 13 Teroris di Aceh* (Indonesian Police Caught 13 Terrorists in Aceh) accessed from <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/1267545515/polri-tangkap-13-teroris-di-aceh>, on 1 August 2010.

³ *Pemberi Dana Teroris Aceh* (Fund Raiser for Terrorist in Aceh), accessed from <http://www.detiknews.com/read/2010/03/09/183011/1314802/10/polri-kelompok-pamulang-pemasok-senjata-pemberi-dana-teroris-aceh>, on 1 Aug 2010.

⁴ *Keberadaan Teroris di Aceh untuk Siapkan Skenario Teror Besar Baru* (The Presence of Terrorist in Aceh is To Prepare a New Great Scenario Terror) accessed from <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/03/09/2223324/Keberadaan.Teroris.di.Aceh.untuk.Siapkan.Skenario.Teror.Besar.Baru>, on 1 Aug 2010.

As we know, Malacca Strait is one of the most important and busiest lanes in the world. More than 50,000 vessels pass through this strait. These vessels carry almost 38% of world trading, and almost 60% of gas and oil resources needed by Japan and China. It means Malacca strait holds a very important role to the international trading and economic. However, this strategic strait is joined by some dangerous, particularly pirates and terrorist group. Thus, it is possible that this terrorist group will cooperate with the sea pirates to destroy the international trading in Malacca Strait.

Once they bomb this strait, many countries will suffered from economic and resources loss, particularly Japan, China and United States. That is one reason they try hard to persuade Indonesian government to cooperate in fighting against terrorism in Malacca Strait, to keep this strait secure.

Indonesia has experienced more than 20 times of terrorist attacks since year 2000.⁵ The first attack that claimed by the police carried out by the terrorist group in Indonesia happened on 1 August 2000. At that time, a bomb exploded in Philippine embassy. The explosion came from a car parked in front of the Ambassador of Philippine's residence. These attacks then continued with a bomb in Malaysian embassy, bomb in Gedung Bursa Efek Jakarta, and a series of bomb at some churches in Indonesia on Christmas eves.

In September 2001, there was a bomb at Atrium Plaza, Senen, Central Jakarta. Afterwards, there was a bomb in fast food restaurant in Makasar, South Sulawesi and a month after this attack, there was a bomb at Australian International School, Jakarta. In new-year eve at 2002, a grenade exploded in a restaurant in Bulungan Jakarta. And during this year, there were a series of bomb attacks at churches in Palu. One of the

⁵ <http://indocashregister.com/2009/07/18/rentetan-serangan-bom-teroris-di-indonesia-2000-2009/> accessed on 2 August 2010

biggest terrorist attacks in this country was Bomb Bali that occurred in 12 October 2002, in which 202 victims died and mostly were Australian. Several weeks later, in December 2002, there was another explosion in Mc Donald's restaurant, in Makasar.

Another assembled bomb exploded in front of Police Headquarters Jakarta on 3 February 2003 and in Soekarno-Hatta airport, Cengkareng, on 27 April 2003. And on 5 August 2004, there was a bomb in JW Marriott hotel that caused about 11 people died and 152 people injured. Afterwards, there were several bombs exploded in a café in Papolo, Sulawesi, in Australian embassy, Jakarta and in Immanuel Church in Palu Central Sulawesi..

In 2005, there were two bombs exploded in Ambon and in front of Abu Jibril's house, one of policy makers for Majelis Mujahidin, in Pamulang, Tangerang. In the same year, Bali suffered again from bomb exploded in 5 October, at Raja Bar Kuta and Jimbaran Café. Another bomb in Palu exploded once again on 31 December 2005.

Afterwards, Indonesia seemed to be more peaceful during the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla regime between 2005 and 2009. However there were bomb explosions in Hotel JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in July 2009. The bombs exploded early in the morning and almost at the same time. This accident obviously shocked not only the people of Indonesia but mostly the government.

It happened exactly nine days after the election's day in Indonesia and two days before the visit of Manchester United team. This attack made some terrorism observers believed that this time the motif of terrorist attack has changed. It means that not only did the terrorist group try to attack the American, Australian or foreigners who stay in Indonesia and their properties but also the Indonesian

government and its agencies. Even, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for several times explained that some terrorists carried out their military training by using his picture as their target.⁶

The terrorist group military training in Aceh is another example. When this group was raided by the police in early of March 2010, some members of this group shot Indonesian police. Besides, when there was a robbery in a bank in Medan, North Sumatera which indicated carried out by terrorist group in mid-August 2010, the performers shot a police and two bank's security officers to death. After this raid, the policemen directly searched, caught and shot some robbers who were predicted as the members of Jamaah Islamiyah, in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Medan. But then, the group that led by Abu Tholut took revenge by attacking a sector police office in Hampan Perak, North Sumatera, last September 2010, and murdered at least three policemen there.⁷

From the raid of the terrorist group in Pamulang, Aceh and North Sumatera, Indonesian Police found some long distance bomb triggers, air rifles, pistols, ammunitions and fire arms such as AK-47, M-16, AK-56, FN, Revolver and thousands bullets. It convinced the police that now the terrorist group is trying to attack the government officer directly instead of bombing the foreigner's properties.

I.2 Question Research

It has been more than 10 years since the first attack of terrorist networks in Indonesia. And the police have tried many efforts to catch terror performers for this decade. Although the performers have been caught, sent to prison and even shot to death, the

⁶ *SBY: Wajah Saya Dijadikan Sasaran Tembak Teroris* (SBY: My Picture Was Used As A Shooting Target by Terrorist), accessed from <http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/17/1/239722/sby-wajah-saya-dijadikan-sasaran-tembak-teroris> on 16 August 2010.

⁷ "Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer" (Act of The Military Governor's Network), *Tempo*, No. 3931/27 September – 3 October 2010, pp 108-113.

terrors keep happening in this country. It continues to occur and causes many losses. Moreover the target itself has changed. From the above explanation then we arrive to the questions that will be answered from this research:

1. How is the terrorism handling actually carried out in Indonesia?
2. Why the actions or the terrorist group activities in Indonesia could not be stopped totally?

I.3 Goals and Purposes of Research

This research will examine the way of the government of Indonesia in handling terrorism in its country. Therefore, this research is expected:

1. To describe in details what kind of activities carried out by the government of Indonesia particularly the police and Special Detachment 88 in countering terrorism in this country.
2. To describe any obstacles that faced by the government of Indonesia to counter terrorist actions.
3. To explain what makes the terrorism group and their activities remain continue in Indonesia.

I.5 Methodology

This research will examine the above questions by using some literatures from newspaper, magazines, journals, government documents as well as interview with Indonesian Police and other related agency regarding this matter. And since the data are in the form of words, sentences, paragraphs, and observations then I use qualitative research strategies in this research.

Besides, I use case study approach since I try to go into greater depth and get more details on terrorism handling in Indonesia and the explanation why it is difficult to stop it.⁸

I.6 Theories

The activities of terror have been used since thousand years ago. Originally, terror was used to defeat enemy. In ancient Greek history, Xenophon (431 – 354 BC), an Athenian who was exiled then joined the Spartan, tried to use the psychological warfare as a tool to weaken enemy. At that time, using poison and carrying out a secret revolt to beat their enemies were common things to do. Furthermore, Kautilya in his book, *Arthashastra*, wrote that *Tunim Yudha* or secretly war can also be used to beat the enemies.⁹

Terror then developed into a way to against certain regime, particularly the dictatorial one. Terror activities were chosen by Zealot group (66 – 73 AD) during the Roman occupation in Judea territory. This group refused Roman occupation since they believed that Roman rule was incompatible with Jewish freedom, and that the Jews should be free of Roman control. They fought for Jewish's purity in religious aspect so strict that they refused any behavior that considered against the Jewish Law. Zealot's member group usually mingled with the people in market and public area. And whenever they saw a violation, they took out their dagger from their robe and stabbed the transgressor.¹⁰

⁸ See W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1997, pp 327-341.

⁹ Adjie. S, *Terorisme*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2005, pp 1-3. Read also Jack Douglas and Frances Chaput Waksler, "Kekerasan" in *Teori-teori Kekerasan*, edited by Thomas Santoso, Jakarta, PT Ghalia Indonesia, 2002, p 18. To know more about the idea and war strategy of Xenophon, you may also look at his book "Hellenica" that can be accessed from http://books.google.com/books?id=Ver3NTRYvcAC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, 2 December 2010.

¹⁰ Adjie, *ibid.*

During this time, Zealot had become the political party that opposed Herodes' regime as well. For many people the attacks that carried out by this group caused terror and fear to them. However according to the member group this action was motivated by the religious teaching that supported by their holy book. And they just wanted to maintain their purity and religious teachings.

Almost in the same idea with Zealot group, Ku Klux Klan ran some terror actions as well. After the Civilian War in America (1861 – 1865), some reactionaries in South America created a terrorist group, *Ku Klux Klan*. The members of this group tried to intimidate government's supporters simply to perform their dislike to government.¹¹

On contrary, a regime can do the same thing. In the name of protecting power and justice, Robespierre, the leader of French Revolution commanded to catch more than 300.000 people and executed more than 17.000 of them with an engineered court. He even commanded his guard to cut his political enemies' head off during his regime.¹²

Since the 20th centuries, the terrorism has changed its face again. Not only in their motivation but also in the networks and weapons they used. Terrorism has become a part and characteristic of social and political movement in one country. And now, terrorism actions involved not only one country but also many countries. A terrorist group in one country usually funded by second country, training in third country, weapon provided by fourth country, and operated in fifth country. For example the terrorist group that killed many people in Lod Airport in Israeli, came

¹¹ Jack Douglas and Frances Chaput Waksler, *op.cit.*

¹² A.M. Hendropriyono, *Terorisme: Fundamentalism Kristen, Yahudi, Islam (Terrorism: Fundamentalist Christian, Jewish, Islam)*, Jakarta, Kompas, 2009, pp 61-62.

from Japan, trained in Korea, weapon provided by Italy and funded by West Germany and its action has attracted the sympathy of some Arab countries.¹³

The term terrorism comes from Latin word “terrere” or “terror” means something that can cause a dreadful fear; a frightening situation; or an ability to bring fear.¹⁴ In 1937, following the assassination of a Yugoslavian king and a French foreign minister by ethnic separatists, The League of Nations attempted to generically define terrorism for the first time as “All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.”¹⁵

Adjie Suradji, Indonesian Air Force pilot who criticized the President of Indonesia last September, in his book defined terrorism as an ideology that through force tries to express a message, by using illegal actions such as harshness, cruelty and murdering. And the actor, individually or group, who uses those illegal actions is named terrorist. As a terrorist group, its movement should have an effective leadership and strongly supported by its member, particularly the people who support fund for the group and the people that has the same ideology with them.¹⁶

Furthermore, as quoted in Hendropriyono, Walter Reich defined terrorism as a strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large. Besides, Brian Jenkins interprets terrorism as the use of force designed to bring about political change. Paul Johnson describes terrorism as a deliberate, systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to

¹³ *Ibid.*, p 4-6. Read also Rohan Gunaratna, “Introduction: Change of Continuity” in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 2004, pp 1-15.

¹⁴ Budi Gunawan, *Terorisme: Mitos dan Konspirasi (Terrorism: Myth and Conspiracy)*, Jakarta, Forum Media Utama, 2006.

¹⁵ Accessed from http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/ss/DefineTerrorism_2.htm, on 2 December 2010.

¹⁶ Adjie, *op.cit.*, , p 11.

gain political end. Thus in his mind, terrorism is politically evil, necessarily evil and wholly evil.¹⁷

From many definitions of terrorism performed in his book, Hendropriyono then concluded that terrorism has no value. There are no ethic values about good or bad, morality norms about right or wrong, and aesthetic values about beauty or not beauty. The only language that shown in terrorism is how to bring fear and panic in public, and this is universal. They use force and threat, physically or mentally to anybody without exception. And this fear is used for public support to his goals. Thus, according to Hendropriyono, terrorism is a criminal shown by some parties whose values lie on their own mind.¹⁸

Therefore, to counter terrorism obviously needs an effective counter-terrorism capacity. Learning from the 9/11 attack in America, according to Randy Borum, there are five major objectives in counter-terrorism training.¹⁹ *The first* major was that all investigators and intelligence personnel at all levels needed to develop greater subject matter expertise and therefore they should adapt and modify their skills and basic approach to their professional tasks. In this case their main focus was supposed to be on prevention that driven by intelligence.

The second major was to emphasize the importance of prevention, interdiction and proactive approaches. Most enforcement resources are deployed after an act has occurred while by contrast anti-terrorist operations are supposed to identify and interdict terrorist threats before an attack happens. It requires, of course profound changes in the way they approach this problem.

¹⁷ A.M. Hendropriyono, *op.cit.*, pp 25-28.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p 38.

¹⁹ Randy Borum, "Counter-Terrorism Training Post-9/11" in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 2004, pp 62-70.

The third major objective was to give operators the necessary tools to enact a preventive approach, specially the role of intelligence. It was needed since the nature and structure of transnational extremist such as terrorist group are much different than that of traditional state-sponsored military forces. They are harder to locate, to observe and to infiltrate.

The fourth objective was to give guidance about how to identify information of interest and how to apply it to the new operational objectives of a war on terrorism. According to Borum to understanding what extremist groups believe and how they operate is important to combat terrorism. Therefore in counter-terrorism training, such as that carried out by the national intelligence agencies in America in the post 9/11, a deeper understanding of the motives of terrorism and how they influence target selection and behavior was required.

The fifth objective was to enhance and emphasize inter-agency and cross-disciplinary collaboration. This information was supposed to be shared not only between different intelligence agencies but also within agencies and between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. As Manning said, quoted in Borum's article, "Without better cooperation, data gatherers will not know what information to collect and analysts, and therefore will not have the necessary pieces to assemble or forecast a composite of impending threats."

I.7 Writings Systematic

Chapter 1 : is contained the introduction of terrorist actions in Indonesia, the research questions that will be answered by the end of this research, and some theories that will be used to answer the questions. This chapter also contained the goals and purposes of this research, the

methodology that conducted to gain data needed to answer the research questions and the writing arrangement as well.

Chapter 2 : is describing the terrorist actions in Indonesia, when and where it happened, their leaders, the victims, their motives and the way of the government handled those actions.

Chapter 3 : will explain some factors that caused the terrorist group flourishing developed in Indonesia.

Chapter 4 : is containing the summary and conclusion from the previous chapter.

II

The Chronological of Terrorism in Indonesia

(Year 2000 – 2010)

II.1 Chronological of Terrorist actions in Indonesia

Since August 2000, Indonesia has experienced more than 20 times of terrorist attacks until the year 2011.²⁰ The form of the attack itself has changed as well as the motifs. The terrorist has changed their motifs from attacking foreign interest including its people, properties and their business in Indonesia into attacking the interest of the government of Indonesia and its agencies, including the police officers, military personnel and their offices.

In year 2000, there were four bombings occurred in the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, two of which targeted official foreign interests. The first one was exploded at the Embassy of Philippine in Menteng, Central Jakarta on 1 August 2000. Unidentified assailants detonated a car bomb in front of the Philippine Ambassador's residence as the Ambassador was entering the compound. There were 2 Indonesian people died and three other persons seriously injured, including the Ambassador, Leonides T Caday, and slightly injured 18 bystanders, including one Filipino and two Bulgarians.

After the tragedy, there was another bombing that happened towards another embassy in the same month. Unidentified perpetrators also conducted a grenade attacked against the Malaysian Embassy in Kuningan, South Jakarta, on 27 August 2000, but no injuries resulted this time. However the Indonesian police had caught and punished some performers of this attack, such as Iwan Setiawan alias Husen,

²⁰ Budi Gunawan, *op.cit*, p 114. Read also Kompas, 8 October 2005.

Saifan Nurdin, M. Nurdin and one former police officer, Ibrahim Hasan, with at least 6 years and 4 months in jail. Yet, in the next month, the terror still continued in Bursa Efek Jakarta (*Jakarta Stock Exchange*).

The bomb explosion in Jakarta Stock Exchange's happened in underground parking floor P2, on 13 September 2000. It was one of the most destructive bombings had occurred in Indonesia. It caused 10 people died, 90 injured, 161 cars and some of the buildings destroyed. Afterwards, other bombings exploded in the same year, exactly on Christmas Eve, 24 December 2000. There were 23 explosions in some churches and Christian schools spread out in some cities in Indonesia. These explosions caused 16 people died and 96 injured altogether.

In the year 2001, there was 5 bombings happened in Jakarta. First bombing happened on 10 May 2001 at Jalan Guntur, South Jakarta. This time, Yayasan Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa Iskandar Muda building was bombed. It caused 3 people died and half of the building ruined. The next explosion was happened on 22 July 2001 at Saint Anna Church in Duren Sawit, and Huria Kristen Batak Protestant Church in Jatiwaringin, Kalimantan. Both churches locate in East Jakarta. And once again those bombings injured some innocent people.

Afterwards, Atrium Plaza in Senen, Central Jakarta, became the target of terrorist group. They exploded this mall in 23 September 2001 and it caused 6 people injured. Then, in 12 October, Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant in Makassar was bombed. However no victims that injured or murdered at this attack. Another bomb which was located in MLC Life Makassar also planned to explode but luckily it failed. Last bombing in this year was happened in Australian International School (AIS) in Pejaten, South Jakarta on 6 November 2001. A handmade bomb was

exploded at the yard of the school. No victims at this attack but the building destroyed.

In new-year eve at 2002, there was a grenade exploded in a restaurant in Bulungan, Jakarta. It caused one people died and another one injured. And during this year, there were a series of bomb attacks four churches in Palu and triggered the conflict there extended. Furthermore, one of the biggest terrorist attacks in this country, Bomb Bali, occurred in 12 October 2002. It caused 202 people died and mostly Australian. Several weeks later, in December 2002, there was another explosion from assembled bomb in Mac Donald's restaurant, in Makasar.

Another assembled bomb exploded in front of Police Headquarters Complex, exactly in the lobby of Wisma Bhayangkari, on 3 February 2003 and in Soekarno-Hatta airport, Cengkareng, on 27 April 2003. A bomb exploded in public area at the terminal 2F, in which 2 people were seriously injured and 8 others mild-wounded. And on 5 August 2003, there was a bomb in JW Marriott hotel that caused about 11 people died and 152 people injured.

In the year of 2004, another serial of bombing happened in Indonesia such as a bomb in a café in Palopo, Sulawesi that occurred on 10 January 2004. This attack killed four people. And on September 9th 2004, there was Australian Embassy bombing. A large explosion occurred in front of Australian Embassy, 5 people were killed and hundreds of people injured at that time. The explosion also damaged several buildings in the vicinity such as the Plaza 89, Gracia Tower, and BNI Building. And in the end of 2004, another bombing happened at Immanuel Church, Palu, Central Sulawesi, on 12 December 2004.

The serial bombing in Indonesia still continued. There were two bombs exploded in Ambon on 21 March 2005. Another bombing happened at Tentena on 23

Mei 2005, in which 22 peoples were killed. On 8 June, 2005, another bombing happened in Pamulang, Tangerang. A bomb exploded in a house of a member of Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) M Iqbal alias Abu Jibril in West Pamulang. But there were no fatalities.

In the same year, Bali had suffered again from bomb that exploded in 12 October, at Raja Bar Kuta and Jimbaran Café. At least 22 people killed and 102 injured at this attack. Another bomb in Palu exploded once again on 31 December 2005. It exploded at a market in Palu, Central Sulawesi, and killed 8 people and injured at least 45 people.

Afterwards, Indonesia seemed to be more peaceful during the regime of Presiden Susilo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, until there were bomb explosions in Hotel JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton, South Jakarta. The bombs exploded on 17 July 2009, early in the morning and almost at the same time. These attacks obviously shocked not only the people of Indonesia but mostly the government.

It happened exactly nine days after the election of Presiden Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Boediono and two days before the visit of Manchester United team. This attack made some terrorism observers believed that this time the motif of terrorist attack has changed. It means that not only did the terrorist group try to attack the American, Australian or foreigners who stay in Indonesia with their properties, business and interest but also the Indonesian government and its agencies, including the police officer, military personnel and their offices.

Some attacks in 2010 happened as if they confirmed their new motifs. When the terrorist group military training in Aceh was raided by the police in early of March 2010, some members of this group shot Indonesian police. Besides, when this group robbed a bank in Medan, North Sumatera in mid-August 2010, the performers shot a

police and two bank's security officers to death. After this raid, the policemen directly searched, caught and shot some robbers who were predicted as the members of Jamaah Islamiyah, in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Medan. But then, the group that led by Abu Tholut took revenge by attacking a sector police office in Hampan Perak, North Sumatera, last September 2010, and murdered at least three policemen there.²¹

In March 2011, another terror happened again. This time the terrorist used a new way to terror the people. They put bombs in books and delivered to some people that considered block their actions. Some bombs were delivered to Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), the musician Ahmad Dhani, General Komisar Pol Gorries Mere, Yapto S. Soerjosoemarno, a member of Pancasila Youth, and previous Chief of West Java District Police.

We can see the activities and the performers of terrorism in Indonesia 2000 – 2010, from the table below²²:

Date of Accident	Place of Accident	Remarks	Actors and Penalty
1 August 2000	Philippines Embassy, in Jakarta.	An assembled bomb exploded inside a car that parked in front of the Ambassador of Philippines' house in Menteng, central Jakarta. This explosion killed 2 people and wounded other 21 people, included the Ambassador, H.E Leonides T. Caday.	Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai (got verdict 20 years in prison). Fatur Rahman Al-Ghozi and Edi Setiono (all his life imprisonment)
27 August 2000	Malaysian Embassy,	A grenade exploded in	Iwan Setiawan

²¹ "Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer" (Act of The Military Governor's Network), Tempo, No. 3931/27 September – 3 October 2010, pp 108-113.

²² Budi Gunawan, *op.cit.*, pp 114-116. See also "Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000" (Bom Explosions in Jakarta since 2000) accessed from <http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan>, <http://www.gatra.com/2001-08-06/artikel.php?id=8939>; <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/10/21/LU/mbm.20021021.LU81897.id.html>

	in Jakarta.	Complex of Malaysian Embassy in Kuningan, Central Jakarta. No victims at that moment.	alias Husen (6 years and 4 months imprisonment), Saifan Nurdin (6 years and 4 months imprisonment), M. Mudin (8 years imprisonment), and Praka Ibrahim Hasan (all his life imprisonment)
13 September 2000	Jakarta Stock Exchange Building, Jakarta.	A big explosion happened in parking area P2 of Jakarta Stock Exchange Buildings, Jakarta. 10 people died, 90 people wounded and 161 cars damaged.	Tengku Ismuhadi (all life imprisonment), Iwan Setiawan, Saifan Nurdin, M. Mudin, Praka Ibrahim Hasan, Irwan bin Ilyas (all life imprisonment), Ibrahim Abdul Wahab.
24 December 2000	Christmas's Eve Bombings.	Series of explosions happened in some cities in Indonesia, such as in Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung, Mojokerto, Mataram, Pematang Siantar, Batam and Pekanbaru. There were 23 churches attacked, 16 people died, 96 people injured, and 37 cars damaged altogether.	Zoesfriyoes bin Yunus alias Datok Rajo Ameh alias Mukhtar Tanjung (got verdict 3 years), Abdul Jabar, Edi Setiono alias Abas (all his life imprisonment), Asep alias Darmin alias Abdullah (fugitive), Ibrahim (fugitive), Musa (Malaysian, fugitive), Dani (Malaysian, imprisonment), and Toni Togar (20 years verdict)
10 May 2001	Yayasan Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa Iskandar Muda (Foundation of the Welfare of Iskandar Muda's Students), Jl. Guntur, South Jakarta.	An assembled bomb exploded in the building and caused half of the building damaged and killed 3 people as well.	Muslihuddin Muarif (4 years imprisonment), Taufik Abdullah (1 year imprisonment), Mushalli (2 years imprisonment)

22 July 2001	Santa Ana Church in Pondok Bambu and Huria Kristen Batak Protestant Church in Jatiwaringin, East Jakarta.	The bombs exploded in the morning when the pastor was serving the Sunday ministry. The bombs injured tens people who were attended the church.	Dani alias Taufik bin Abdullah Halim (20 years imprisonment), Edi Setiono alias Abbas (all his life imprisonment).
23 September 2001	Atrium Plaza, Senen, Central Jakarta.	An assembled bomb exploded in Atrium Plaza, Jakarta, near Pizza Hut Restaurant, and wounded 6 people.	Edi Setiono alias Abbas and Taufik bin Abdul Halim.
12 October 2001	Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant in Makassar.	A bomb exploded in KFC restaurant and damaged the restaurant, but no victims. Another bomb put in MLC Life office but failed to explode.	
6 November 2001	Australian International School (AIS) in Pejaten, South Jakarta	An assembled bomb exploded in the school park.	
9 November 2001	Petra Church in Koja, Jakarta.	An assembled bomb exploded in the church and caused damage to the building only.	Ujang Haris and Wahyu Handoko (both are still in processed)
1 January 2002	New Year's eve bombings.	Series of bombings happened in a restaurant in Jakarta with 1 people died and another one injured, and four churches in Palu – Central Sulawesi but no victim.	Hasballah (dead because of the grenade), and Tarmizi (still in processed)
12 October 2002	Paddy's Cafe and Sari Club, Kuta, Bali	Three bombs exploded in Bali. 202 people mostly were Australian died and more than 300 people wounded. In the same time, an assembled bomb exploded in Philippines's Consular General's office in Manado, North Sulawesi.	Abdul Goni (all life imprisonment) Abdul Hamid, Abdul Rauf, Imam Samudra (death penalty), Achmad Roichan, Ali Ghufroon alias Mukhlas (death penalty) Ali Imron alias Alik (all life imprisonment), Amrozi bin Nurhasyim alias Amrozi (death penalty), Andi Hidayat, Andi

			Oktavia, Arnasan alias Jimi (died), Bambang Setiono, Budi Wibowo, Dr Azahari alias Alan (died in raid by police in Kota Batu, 9 November 2005); Dulmatin (died on 9 Maret 2010), Feri alias Isa (died), Herlambang, Hernianto, Idris alias Johni Hendrawan, Junaedi, Makmuri, Mohammad Musafak, Mohammad Najib Nawawi, Toni Togar (20 years verdict), Umar Kecil alias Patek (caught in Pakistan), Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok (all life verdict), Zulkarnaen
5 December 2002	Mc Donald Restaurant in Makassar	An assembled bomb exploded in the restaurant and caused 3 people died and 11 injured.	Agung Abdul Hamid alias Ansar alias Yakup alias Budi, Mirzal alias Ghozi (fugitive) and Hizbullah Rasyid (fugitive)
3 February 2003	In front of Indonesian Police Headquarter complex, Wisma Bhayangkari.	No victim.	
27 April 2003	Terminal 2F, Cengkareng Airport.	10 people wounded.	
5 August 2003	Hotel J.W Marriot.	A suicide bomb in a car driven by Asmar Latin Sani exploded and damaged some parts of Hotel Marriot. 12 people died and more than 150	Noordin M Top (died in raid by police in Solo, Central Java), Asmar Latin Sani (suicide bomber)

		injured.	
10 January 2004	Café in Palopo, South Sulawesi.	An assembled bomb exploded and caused 4 people died and 2 others injured.	Jasmin, Arman, Komar, dan Jasman (Jasmin's brother), Ahmad (fugitive), Ahmad Rijal, Yedi, Binardi, Arnan, and Idil. All are in law processed.
9 September 2004	Australian Embassy	A big explosion from a car parked in front of Australian Embassy caused 9 people died, hundreds people injured and the building of Australian Embassy damaged.	Noordin M Top, Heri Gholun (suicide bomber), Air Setiawan (died in raid by police in Jatiasih, Bekasi), Jaja (died in raid by police in Aceh), yaitu Rois (death penalty), Ahmad Hasan (death penalty), Apuy, and Sogir alias Abdul Fatah .
12 December 2004	Immanuel Church in Palu, Central Sulawesi	No Victim	
21 March 2005	Batumerah, Ambon	No victim	Wahyu alias Rusli Mardhani alias Uci alias Farid alias Zulfikar
8 June 2005	In front of Abu Jibril alias M Iqbal's (One of decision makers of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) house in Pamulang, Tangerang.	No victim	
12 October 2005	Raja Bar, Kuta and Jimbaran Café, Bali.	Some suicide bombs exploded in some café caused 22 people killed, and 102 people injured.	Amrozi (death penalty), Dwi Widiyanto, Moh Olyly, Anif Solihin dan Abdul Aziz (all are in prison), Muhammad Salik Firdaus, the suicide bomber in Kafé Nyoman, and Misno alias Wisnu,

			the suicide bomber in Kafe Menega.
31 December 2005	In Tentena market, Palu.	A bomb exploded in the market, caused 8 people died and 45 people wounded.	Upik Lawang and Taufik Buraga.
17 July 2009	Hotel JW Marriot and Hotel Ritz Carlton.	A suicide bomb exploded inside the building and killed 9 people and injured more than 50 people.	Dani Dwi Permana, Nana Ikhwan Maulana Noordin M Top, and Ibrohim
2 March 2010	Aceh	Paramilitary training in Aceh done by some terrorist that have been trained in Pakistan.	
8 August 2010	A bank in Jl. Aksara, Medan, North Sumatera.	A military and two bank's security officer were shot by some people that predicted as member of terrorist group.	Tony Togar (in prison)
21 September 2010	Sector Police office in Medan	Three police officers were shot and killed with long shot guns.	Abu Tholut
16 March 2011	Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), the musician Ahmad Dhani, General Komisaris Pol Gorries Mere, Yapto S. Soerjosoemarno, and previous Chief of West Java District Police.	The terrorist used book parcel bombs to terror.	Still on seeking.
15 April 2011	In At Taqwa mosque, Cirebon, during the prayer.	Suicide Bomb, done by a young man, who was prayed together with many people, including the police.	

II.2 The Evolution of Terrorism in Indonesia

From the table above, we can see that there are some changes in the attacks of terrorist group in Indonesia. Until the year 2005, the terrorist group mostly used assembled bomb in making terror to the people, except for the first Hotel JW Marriot

Bombing in 2003, Bali Bombing in 2002 and 2005. However they changed it into the suicide bombs in the year 2009 as they bombed Hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton, and eventually they used weapons and small guns to attack the government as well as the police after the raid in paramilitary training in Aceh, 2010.

Thus from the explanations below, we can figure out that at least there are three aspects that have changed in terms of the terrorism actions in Indonesia; the method they use to terror, the target that aimed to terror and also the motivation in running their activities.

III.2.1 The Method

From the first attack of terrorism until the year 2005, we can see obviously that almost all of the terrorism performers in Indonesia used assembled bombs that put in some places or buildings in running their activities. Some of these bombs covered by plastic bags and put in the buildings that aimed to be bombed by the terrorist such as that happened in some bombed churches in Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung, Mojokerto, Medan, Batam and Pekanbaru during the Christmas Eve 2000. The terrorist also put a bomb in a car as that occurred in front of Australian Embassy in September 2004.

It was convinced that the bombs were assembled by Dr. Azahari, who was shot by the police in a raid in Kali Batu, 2005 and Dulmatin, dead in a raid in Temanggung, March 2010. They used potassium chlorate, kalium chlorate, trinitrotoluene (TNT), aluminium and sulfur that believed can increase the velocity and effect of the explosion produced by TNT.

Other bomb assemblers were Upik Lawang and Taufik Buraga who suspected as designers of the bombs in Tentena Market in Central Sulawesi and in Kawua, Poso, in 2006. Different from what happened in Bali, in Kawua they put

the assembled bomb in a flashlight and exploded once anyone pressed the “on” button. This flashlight bomb caused 1 person died.

However, the terrorist also used another method by using bombs in terms of making terror. They used suicide bombs. In this way, they put assembled bombs in a waistcoat or a rucksack and brought by the performers to the buildings they aimed to explode. It happened in Paddy’s café Bali, in Bali Bomb I as well as in Raja's Bar and Restaurant, Kuta and Nyoman Café, in Bali Bomb II.

Some others also used a suicide bomb in a car. The performers put a bomb in a car and drove it near to the building and exploded in a few moments as they set it previously. This method used by the terrorist when they exploded a minibus in front of Sari Club restaurant, in Bali, October 2002 as well as in Hotel JW Marriot in Jakarta, August 2003.

The suicide bombings were also used by terrorist group in JW Marriot and Hotel Ritz Carlton tragedy, in 2009. Dani Dwi Permana, a young man-19 years, did it in Hotel JW Marriot while Nana Ikhwan Maulana, 28 years old, brought bombs in his suitcase in Hotel Ritz Calrton. The bomb assemblers put nails and bolts in the bombs as it believed can enhance the destructive force of the bombs. Firthermore, this suicide bomb happened again recently in midst April 2011, in mosque At-Taqwa, near the resort police headquarter in Cirebon, West Java. The police are now still looking for the bombers.

The other method used by terrorist in Indonesia is as what happened in Aceh. There was a paramilitary training in a forest by using guns and weapons. From the raid of the terrorist group in Pamulang, Aceh and North Sumatera, Indonesian Police has found some long distance bomb triggers, air rifles, pistols,

ammunitions and fire arms such as AK-47, M-16, AK-56, FN, Revolver and thousands of bullets.

From the testimony of Tatang Mulyadi, the police officer whose duty is to watch the logistic and weapon warehouse in police headquarters in East Jakarta, it is known that he sold some weapons to Ahmad Sutrisno, the connector to Mohammad Sofyan Saori. Sofyan used to be the police officer who was fired in 2009 because he chose to join jihad. Sofyan then known joined the paramilitary training in Aceh.

Moreover, Tatang admitted that he has received Rp. 200 million from Sutrisno for selling those weapons. Sutrisno, himself has made transaction with Sofyan 17 times and sold 24 weapons altogether, with varied price from 5 to 10 million rupiah.²³ Sofyan then sold those 24 long and short barrel weapons to Dulmatin. There were AR 15, AK 47, AK 58, and FN Broning completed with the bullets. Sofyan received Rp. 375 million altogether for this transaction from Dulmatin.²⁴

From the above explanation then we can see that terrorist group now uses both the assembled bombs and weapon to carry out their activities. Unfortunately, the terrorist got these weapons easily from the police. Simply by paying some numbers of rupiah to the police then they got the weapons they wanted, to continue their plan and activities in this country.

The terrorist usually gets their fund from some donors. These donors mostly come from the people in Indonesia who are sympathetic to their goals or support

²³ "Senjata Teroris diambil dari Gudang POLRI" (Terrorist's Weapons Took from Police Warehouse) accessed from <http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/211245-senjata-teroris-diambil-dari-gudang-polri>, 15 April 2011

²⁴ "Bekas Polisi Jual Senjata ke Dulmatin" (Former Police Office Sold Weapons to Dulmatin) accessed from <http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/211212-bekas-polisi-jual-senjata-ke-dulmatin>, 15 April 2011

them with certain interest. Yet, many of them never realize that this fund will be used for terrorist activities, said Wawan Purwanto, the intelligent observer.²⁵ The terrorist simply used the strategy to collect fund for social or religious charity but then corrupted it.

In this case, Densus 88 has caught Abdullah Sonata, the fund seeker for terrorist cell in Indonesia and has brought Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to the trial. The police accused Ba'asyir has provided funds to terrorist group, particularly in training in Aceh, though he denied it. While doing this research, the trial of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir regarding this matter is still on processing.

Some fund providers also come from abroad, though according to Wawan not as many as that come from domestic.²⁶ This referred to Al Qaeda. The previous Head of Indonesian Intelligent Agency, AM Hendropriyono predicted that all suicide bombings in Indonesia linked to Al Qaeda, both in methods and funding.²⁷ This fund mostly used to develop terrorist network in Indonesia, in terms of observation to the target, infiltration and penetration, members recruitment, network creating and network development.

Besides, terrorist group gets money also from robbery or stealing such as that happened in Medan, 2010. Chief of Indonesian Police, Gen. Bambang Hendarso Danuri explained that the robbers tried to get some money to finance their terror activities. Then they would use the money to purchase bombs'

²⁵ "Abdullah Sonata Diduga Pencari Dana bagi Teroris di Indonesia" (Abdullah Sonata Predicted as the Fund Seeker for Terrorist in Indonesia), accessed from <http://www.primaironline.com/berita/politik/abdullah-sonata-diduga-pencari-dana-bagi-teroris-indonesia/print> on 28 April 2011.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ "Hendro Menduga Al Qaeda Danai Jaringan Terorisme" (Hendro Predicted Al Qaeda Funded Terrorism Network) accessed from http://rol.republika.co.id/berita/74252/Hendro_Menduga_Al_Qaeda_Danai_Jaringan_Terorisme on 28 April 2011

equipments, weapons and ammunitions to support their activities and achieve their goals.²⁸

III.2.1 The Target

Not only did the terrorist change in their method but also they changed the target they aimed to terror. At the beginning of their attack in this country, the terrorist targeted foreigners or westerners, their properties and their interest in Indonesia. The embassy of Philippines, the embassy of Malaysia, the embassy of Australia, the Australian International School, Hotel J.W Marriot and Hotel Ritz Carlton and some cafes in Bali are examples of their target.

Besides, they also attacked some churches in many areas in Indonesia since 2000. They attacked the sacred place for Christian since they predicted that Christianity as a product that brought by Dutch or colonial which is represented western. It happened particularly in Christmas Eve, 2000. There were 23 churches, located in Batam, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, Sukabumi, Pangandaran, Bandung, Kudus, Mojokerto and Mataram were attacked by the terrorist. It happened again in 2001 at Santa Ana Church in Pondok Bambu, Huria Kristen Batak Protestant Church in Jatiwaringin, East Jakarta and Petra Church in Koja, North Jakarta. In 2004, there was another bombing in a church. It occurred in Immanuel Church in Palu, Central Sulawesi.

Furthermore, the terrorist not only attacked the foreigners or westerners, including their properties and interest, but also the people of Indonesia. It can be seen when they put bombs in Foundation of the Welfare of Iskandar Muda's Students, Jakarta Stock Exchange, KFC and Mc Donald restaurants in Makassar,

²⁸ "Perampokan CIMB Medan Terkait Terorisme" (Robbery in CIMB Medan Related to Terrorism) accessed from <http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2010/09/21/169756/16/1/Perampokan-CIMB-Medan-Terkait-Terorisme> on 28 April 2011

Abu Jibril's (the member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) house in Tangerang, Tentena market, a bank in Medan, delivered some book parcel bombs to the house of Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) and the musician Ahmad Dhani.

Recently, even the terrorist also targeted their attack to the government who considered supporting the interest of western and infidel, such as the police officer, military and their properties. The terrorist cell attacked the sector police office in Medan, North Sumatera, in September 2010 by shooting some police officers who were on duties at that time. It happened again, when there was a suicide bomber in a Moslem Prayer on 15 April 2011, in At Taqwa mosque, which located in precinct police headquarter in Cirebon.

Even, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for several times explained that some terrorists carried out their military training by using his picture as their target. And since the police have found some bombs and ammunitions in Jatiasih, Bekasi, in August 2010, they predict that the next target of terrorist group in Indonesia is the President, as told by Gen. Edward Aritonang.²⁹

III.2.3 The Motives

The terrorist in Indonesia seemed also changed their reason in carrying out their attack. Despite its sophisticated weapons and professional training, supported by the U.S., UK and Australian authorities, Indonesian police remains missed and consequently the terrorist attacks continue to take place. Since the creation of Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication (DKPT) in 2002, later known as

²⁹ *Serangan Teroris Mengarah ke Presiden* (Terrorist's Attack towards President), accessed from <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/hukum/2010/03/21/brk,20100321-234228,id.html> on 16 August 2010.

Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT), and Densus 88 in 2003, Indonesia remains experienced several times of terrorist acts until now. This is to suggest that, firstly although Indonesia is about to launch counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive strategy. This is in the sense of preventing the spread of jihadist ideology, which legalizes the use of violence to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination within security officers and with other agencies as well as with public in their counter-terrorism strategy.

So far, Densus 88 have arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror and killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. This might be an outcome of a good work of intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88, as confirmed by Tito Carnavian, Deputy of Enforcement and Nurturing Capabilities of BNPT.³⁰ The decrease numbers of terrorism actions lately, both quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently show the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution. The law remains debated and the capability still needs to be further proven, yet it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this argues that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence *per se* but mainly at the preventive program. Although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by predicting and collecting information of the potential bombings such as happened in Bali last March, they still lack of surveillance to the spread of the ideology.

³⁰ “Penanganan Terorisme 70% berkat Peran Intelijen” (70% of terrorism handling is due to Intelligence) accessed from <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/08/03/lpcank-penanganan-terorisme-70-persen-berkat-peran-intelijen>

As confirmed by Rohan Gunaratna, to effectively combat the very current terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must conduct a comprehensive strategy.³¹ This is to say, first and foremost, state and local government should be in accordance with private sector and individuals in countering terrorism. Ultimately, all resources of a nation should cooperate to protect their territory, domestic population and critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks. This ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other ministries that are needed in this program involve the education, religion, psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting apprehension of terrorists, prevention the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the ex-jihadist and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist re-enters the society.

Secondly, this also suggests that terrorism cannot be managed solely by hard approaches but mainly need soft approaches. So far, the Indonesian government has these two elements. In addition to Densus 88, the government has also formed a national agency, namely BNPT, which arguably conducts a softer approach to counter-terrorism. With regards to “soft” approaches, BNPT may look at the counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi government. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, explains the three programs of soft counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program.³²

³¹ Rohan Gunaratna, “Introduction: Change or Continuity?” in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17.

³² Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy,” in *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Program*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 97, September 2008), pp. 1-25. See also Rohan Gunaratna, “De-radicalization Programs around the World”, in *Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration*, March 2010, pp. 7-8.

In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of Education coupled with Minister of Religion who runs lectures and programs throughout schools and religious schools to educate and warn students from a very early to university level about the dangers of extremism and the effects of terrorism and violence. This also promotes the nationalism to avoid any violence based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”.

The rehabilitation strategy is carried out to rehabilitate and reeducate terror perpetrators and supporters, religiously and psychologically. For this, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers to have a dialogue with arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The cleric should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel being humanized and thus communicate openly.

Prisoners who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process are transferred to after rehabilitation center, to facilitate the transition back to society. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether a candidate is possible to release or not. Assistance remains provided after a detainee is released from the care center. This is in locating a job and receiving other benefits. The government should provide job opportunities so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments.

III

The Development of Terrorism in Indonesia and Counter-Terrorism

III.1 Background

Many terrorist observers have praised of Indonesian government for its counter-terrorism strategy. Indeed, Sydney Jones mentioned that Indonesia is the best country on the efforts of counter-terrorism.³³ Credit is given to the provision of law and hard counter-measurements in Indonesia. Supported mainly by the United States (U.S.), Australia and United Kingdom (UK), the Indonesian police, particularly Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), have arguably succeeded to arrest terrorists. This affirms that the financial and logistic supports coupled with training from the U.S. government through U.S. Diplomatic Security Service, as well as Australian and British authorities, have developed the capability and professionalism of Densus 88 in countering terrorism in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, there are some critics who are skeptical of this special detachment. One of these claimed that Densus 88 is only good at conducting counter-terrorist strategy but not counter-terrorism.³⁴ This suggests that Indonesian police is very capable in arresting the perpetrators but cannot prevent terrorists from doing their acts nor prevent the bombing for taking place. Despite its sophisticated weapons and professional training, Indonesian police continues to miss detection of bombing and consequently the terrorist attacks continue to occur. This is also confirmed by

³³ "Pemberantasan Teroris di Indonesia Terbaik," (The eradication of terrorism in Indonesia is the best) accessed from <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/286992/pemberantasan-teroris-di-indonesia-terbaik>.

³⁴ Kumar Ramakrishna, "US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism?" in *After Bali: the Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia*, Kumar Ramakrishna and Tan See Seng (eds), (Singapore: IDSS, 2003), pp. 305-337.

Ansyaad Mbai, Head of the Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT).³⁵ Since the creation of DKPT (Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication) in 2002, later known as BNPT, and Densus 88 in 2003, Indonesia experienced more than ten times of terrorist acts.³⁶

In fact, the terrorist bombings in Indonesia occur almost every year until 2005. However, terrorist attack seems to have disappeared between the years 2006 and 2009. Then, it continues to occur again afterwards. Therefore, this paper will answer the question of why the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia could not entirely eradicate terrorism in this country. What factors have caused the efforts of counter-terrorism authorities to be ineffective? And what should the Indonesian government do to manage this problem?

This paper argues that the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is ineffective mainly due to its partially conducted and not coordinated adequately. There are at least three factors that resulted in a lack of strategy of counter-terrorism in this country. First is the lack of coordination within the Police institutions and with other security-related apparatus. Secondly, although Indonesian authorities are about to launch the counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive strategy. Finally the problem lies in the lack of other agencies and public engagement in their strategy. These shortcomings cause the Indonesian government to fail to eradicate terrorism thus.

³⁵ “Densus 88 Andalkan IT Tangkap Teroris” (Densus 88 counts on technology to arrest terrorists) can be accessed from <http://www.sindonews.com/read/2012/03/08/435/589790/densus-88-andalkan-it-tangkap-teroris>

³⁶ Budi Gunawan, *Terorisme: Mitos & Konspirasi (Terrorism: Myth & Conspiracy)*, (Jakarta: Forum Media Utama, 2006), pp. 114-116. See also “Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000” (Bom Explosions in Jakarta since 2000) accessed from <http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan>.

To examine the argument, this paper adopts the comparative research method. As comparative method is to compare particular nations, societies or cultural units,³⁷ this paper mainly compares the hard approaches of Indonesian government and the soft approaches carried out by Saudi Arabian government, particularly in conducting counter-terrorism strategy. The hard approaches carried out by Indonesian government refer to the security forces that are deployed in eradicating terrorism. The security forces are profoundly good at counter-terrorist but not counter-terrorism. The police, through Densus 88, have succeeded to detain more than 600 terror perpetrators, but they cannot entirely eradicate the terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the soft counter-terrorism strategy implemented by Saudi Arabian government.

Essentially, the Indonesian government needs to combine both the hard and soft approaches in her counter-terrorism strategy. In so doing, the government, through BNPT, should coordinate all elements of this nation. This includes the security apparatus, military, intelligent, other related ministries, religious leaders and public to implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The government should also effectively implement a holistic and inter-connected strategy. To examine my argument, this paper will be divided into four sections. First section describes the strategy of countering terrorism that is carried out in Indonesia. The second section explains the working ways of Densus 88, which mainly uses hard counter-measurements. The third section examines the achievements of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia coupled with its weaknesses. Eventually, this paper examines the challenges faced by counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia by looking at the counter-measurements of Saudi Arabian government.

³⁷ W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Third Edition, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), pp. 402-405.

III.2 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia

Every country has its own perception on threats that originate externally and internally. Accordingly, they need to set up their respective policy to protect their national interest and homeland security. With regards homeland security, Christopher Bellavita defines it as a concerted national effort involving the state and local government, combining with the responsibilities of the private sector and individuals to prevent and to protect their territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against threats, namely terrorism, man-made and natural hazards, catastrophic events and social trends that may disrupt their stability. This is in addition to threats against the sovereignty of their state.³⁸

In the case of Indonesia, which is the focus of this article, terrorism is perceived as one of threats that should be managed. In fact, this country has experienced many terrorist actions carried out with political and religious purposes. Since its declaration of independence, Indonesia has encountered insurgent movements, coupled with terrorist actions that challenge her sovereignty. Among these are Darul Islam (DI), RMS (the Republic of South Moluccas), PRRI/Permesta and GAM (Aceh Freedom Movement). In addition, since 1990s the government of Indonesia has to deal with Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia (JII) that was originated from DI but are arguably more radical in the sense of their ideology and methodology.

JII is perceived as a political-religiously driven terrorist group.³⁹ The ideology and strategy of JII were primarily influenced by Al Qaeda as some cadres of this movement were trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980. In the training camp, together with the Afghanistan and Arab Mujahidin, JII's members gained their ideology in so-

³⁸ Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?" in *Homeland Security Affairs*, (vol. IV, No. 2, June, 2008), pp. 1-30.

³⁹ Kumar Ramakrishna, *op.cit*, pp. 305-337. Regarding religion and terrorism see also Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 81-130.

called Salafi Jihadism coupled with military capability. The ideology essentially allowed their followers to conduct violence and extreme measures to overthrow their government, in achieving their goals, mainly to establish a Khalifah system and spread Salafi Jihadism to all Moslems in the world.⁴⁰ The military training accommodated them with a capability to set a military strategy and conduct it for achieving their goals.⁴¹

After proclaiming his 1996 and 1998 fatwa, Osama Bin Laden personally invited Sungkar and Ba'asyir, the highest leaders of JII, to visit his sanctuary in Afghanistan and asked them to support the ultimate purpose of Al Qaeda.⁴² This is to fight against the U.S. and her allies wherever they might be found. Initially, JII applied its strategy to gain public support and spread Salafi Jihadism thought through their engagement in Poso and Ambon in the late 1990s as there were religious conflicts in this country. They then continued their strategy to attack Christians with a series of church bombings in 2000-2001 and used religion sentiment as its justification.⁴³ However, Al Qaeda's attack on World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 ultimately encouraged JII to shift their strategy. Consequently, JII stopped attacking Christians and started destroying the U.S. and her allies as well as their interests in Indonesia by bombing

⁴⁰ Mark Stout, "In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorist," in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (vol. 32, no. 10, Sept, 2009) pp. 872-892. See also William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (vol. 35, no 4, Nov, 2003), pp 521-545 and John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb Influence on the 11 September Attacks, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (vol. 16, no. 2, 2004), pp. 222-252.

⁴¹ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafi Jihadisme di Indonesia (NII to JI: Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia)*, (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), pp. 204-207.

⁴² Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (vol. 58, No. 1, March, 2004), pp 47-68. See also Solahudin, *ibid*, pp. 247-250.

⁴³ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity, in Post-New Order Indonesia*, (New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2006), pp. 185-206. See also Tjandra Dewi, "Jejak Peledakan Bom di Indonesia (1998-2002)" (Trace of Bombing Explosions in Indonesia (1998-2002)) accessed from <http://majalah.tempinteraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/10/21/LU/mbm.20021021.LU81897.id.html>

iconic targets such as embassies, hotels, restaurants, cafes, malls, stock exchanges and so forth.⁴⁴

Although Indonesia has experienced a number of public terrorist actions carried out by JII since 2000,⁴⁵ it was the first Bali Bombing in October 2002 that forced the Indonesian government to include the strategy of the eradication of terrorism in their national political and security agenda. Initially, the government of Indonesia incorporated legal measures in their counter-terrorism acts. They published the Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002 regarding the criminal act of terrorism in accordance with Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2002 regarding the procedures for protection of victims and witnesses in the heavy human rights violence. Later, these two regulations become *Undang-undang* (Law) No. 15/2003 and No. 16/2003. Both laws essentially define terrorism as a criminal that related to domestic security.⁴⁶ Consequently, the agency that has ultimate authority to deal with is Indonesian police and subsequently they need to conduct criminal justice process prior to arrest of the alleged perpetrators.

Further, President Megawati Soekarnoputri instructed the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security to formulate a set of an integrated and comprehensive policy to eradicate the crime of terrorism as well as create a non-structural task force unit to support his duty.⁴⁷ Accordingly, the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security at that time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed a Coordination Desk in his ministry to coordinate the terrorism eradication, known as Desk Kordinasi Pemberantasan

⁴⁴ “Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000” accessed from <http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan>.

⁴⁵ See Solahudin, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-262. Imam Samudra with his team planned to explode some churches in Medan, North Sumatra in 28 May 2000. One of the bombs exploded at GKPI Church, the other two bombs at other churches failed to explode.

⁴⁶ Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002, chapter I, article 1 (1), can be accessed from http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/perpu_1_02.htm

⁴⁷ Instruction of President to Coordinator Minister of Political and Security no. 4/2002 can be accessed from http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/inpres_4_02.htm

Terrorism (DKPT), as he launched a decree no. 26/2002 in November 2002. Essentially, this coordination desk consists of Indonesian police, military and intelligence that should work together.

III.3 The Hard Approaches of Densus 88

Nonetheless, DKPT could not work effectively and cooperatively so that each unit worked separately. As of 2002, there was a debate regarding the distinctive functions between Indonesian police and military. It was then suggested that the police should have full control in the domestic security and law enforcement while the military had to serve the general national security and defence matters. This also had an impact on counter-terrorism measures. The simultaneous attacks of terrorist group, coupled with investigation process of previous attacks, caused the Indonesian police to launch its anti-terror unit. The decree launched by Chief of Indonesian Police no. 30/VI/2003 justified its creation. It was later known as Special Detachment 88 of Anti-Terror (Densus 88).⁴⁸

The creation of Densus 88 was initially funded and trained by the U.S. government. The U.S. granted about US\$ 24 million to form and train this special force in 2003. This is not to mention the training, operational assistance and logistic support from Australian and British government. As they were primarily trained by the U.S. Secret Service, CIA and FBI, the capability of Densus 88 is similar to the anti-terror special force in the U.S. In its development, Densus 88 now has about 400 personnel who have capabilities in investigation, intelligence, bomb squad, strike

⁴⁸ Galih Priatmodjo, *Densus 88: The Undercover Squad*, (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2010), pp. 45-46.

forces as well as sniper.⁴⁹ This is all essential for their operation in capturing bombing perpetrators and terrorist's supporters.

One characteristic of Densus 88 is secrecy in their operation so that only the commandant knows all plans and strategy. To some extent, confidentiality is vital as they have to raid the terrorists' sanctuary and catch them without any deterrence. However, Thomas Quiggin from Centre of Excellence for National Security, Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) confirms that a globally observed obstacle to good intelligence on asymmetric threats such as terrorism is the obsession with secrecy. To him the interactions between the press, the administration and various intelligence community officials are inevitably. In fact, most of the individuals involved outside intelligence agencies knew that there was nothing new in the press stories that would aid terrorists in any way.⁵⁰

Moreover, secrecy causes security apparatus in other districts and other authorities to refrain from fully supporting the operations of Densus 88 as misunderstanding may arise. Consequently, they may not reach an optimal outcome. Even so, they became victims in some operations due to their lack of information and coordination. This happened, for example in 2009, when Densus 88 asked the Regional Police in East Java to support them in carrying out its action to arrest Azhari in Batu, East Java. The Regional Police had to sterilize the area where Azhari was hiding. By the time of their action, some members of the Regional Police did not know that they were about to arrest Azhari. This situation might hamper the operation. Further, Hendropriyono, the former head of Indonesian intelligence agency, also commented that they could have arrested Azhari alive and gotten more information from him. It is important for intelligence task, to request for help and

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁵⁰ Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age*, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2007), pp. 162-164.

coordinate with another anti-terror squad from Indonesian army that is more capable.⁵¹

In another occasion, three police officers in sector Hamparan Perak, North Sumatera, were murdered as some terrorists attacked their office in September 2010. The perpetrators were allegedly members of the group of Abu Tholut, the leader for JII military camp in Aceh. Indeed, the terrorists attacked police office as they wished to revenge against Densus 88 who has previously arrested and shot several terrorists in tacit raids in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Lampung, near Hamparan Perak. The lack of information and coordination caused the police officers to be ignorant and unprepared for terrorist attacks to their office.⁵² Essentially, the lack of coordination caused the local authorities and other security agencies, which understand the situation and local geography as well as ways to conduct a tacit raid better, cannot involve effectively and optimally.

III.4 The Achievement of Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia

Since its creation, Densus 88 has arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror as well as killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. According to Tito Karnavian, Deputy of Enforcement and Nurturing Capabilities of National Agency of Terrorism Eradication (BNPT), the success of their efforts mainly depends on the role of intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88.⁵³ This confirms that the actions carried out by Densus 88 are strengthened by the capability of intelligence in carrying out their role. The success of Densus 88 to arrest Amrozi,

⁵¹ “Bagus tapi dengan Kritik” (Good but with critics) in Tempo magazine, No. 40/XXXIV/28 November – 4 December 2005.

⁵² “Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer” (The Action of the Military Governor’s Network) in Tempo magazine, No. 3931/27 September – 3 October 2010.

⁵³ “Penanganan Terorisme 70% berkat Peran Intelijen” (70% of terrorism handling is due to Intelligence) accessed from <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/08/03/lpcank-penanganan-terorisme-70-persen-berkat-peran-intelijen>

the first Bali bomber, in less than 4 weeks after the bombing in October 2002 was arguably one of its achievements. From the arrest, police could then catch Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Ali Fauzi and Imam Samudra several weeks later.

Despite its efforts in arresting a number of perpetrators, Densus 88 remains failed to prevent the bomb attacks. In reality, they kept occurring. Among such attack are the bombings at Mc Donald Restaurant in Makasar, December 2002; Hotel JW Marriot in Jakarta, August 2003; Australian embassy in Jakarta, January 2004; the second Bali Bomb in 2005, Hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton in July 2009 and Cirebon Bombing in April 2011. These are the testimonies of the weaknesses of intelligence capabilities in countering-terrorism as mentioned by former head of Densus 88, Suryadarma Salim.⁵⁴ This is in addition to the weaknesses of law enforcement regarding intelligence as acknowledged by Ansyad Mbaai.⁵⁵

However, the decrease in numbers of terrorism actions lately, in terms of both quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently, show the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution. The law remains debatable and the capability still needs to be proven. Yet, it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this paper suggests that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence *per se* but mainly in the preventive program. The police is still lacking in surveillance, although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by predicting as well as collecting information of the potential

⁵⁴ “Kemampuan Intelijen Indonesia Memprihatinkan” (The capability of Indonesian intelligence is a concern”) accessed from http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/76874-kemampuan_intelijen_indonesia_memprihatinkan

⁵⁵ “Ansyad Mbaai, Peredam Glombang Radikalisme” (Ansyad Mbaai, The Absorber of Radicalism Wave) accessed from <http://www.intelijen.co.id/wawancara/1313-ansyaad-mbai-peredam-gelombang-radikalisme>

bombings such as those which happened in Bali last March,⁵⁶ and the government is about to launch counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures.⁵⁷ Their failure lies in the preventing the spread of the Jihadist ideology, which justifies the use of violence to achieve their goals.

Amongst Southeast Asia countries, Indonesia suffered the most from JII attacks. This is because JII originated from Darul Islam that aimed to establish Indonesian Islamic State.⁵⁸ Although this movement was defeated when Indonesian government executed the leader, Kartosuwirjo, in 1962, his ideology was still embraced and developed by his followers, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. Both of them were Yemeni descendants, used to be committees of Al Isryad, which is one of modernist movements in Indonesia, and later became founder of JII.⁵⁹

Sungkar and Baasyir coupled with their cadres had spread the ideology of Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia through *dakwah* (preaching) either in the Mosque or in their cell groups meeting. They also published 'Jihadist' books and built *pesantrens* and *madrasah* (Islamic schools) with their ideology.⁶⁰ In accordance with their strategy, JII has ultimately introduced the ideology and to gain sympathy and support from the public. The latter comprises financial support, logistic and human resources. Consequently, it is difficult to predict how much of this ideology has spread and

⁵⁶ Polri: Jaringan Teroris Hendak Rampok Toko Emas Money Changer di Bali” (Indonesian Police: Terrorist Network is about to steal Jewelry shop and money changer in Bali) <http://us.news.detik.com/read/2012/03/18/233400/1870431/10/polri-jaringan-teroris-hendak-rampok-toko-emas-money-changer-di-bali?nd992203605>

⁵⁷ “Counter-Terrorism Get Legal Boost,” accessed from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/18/counterterrorism-get-legal-boost.html>

⁵⁸ Greg Fealy, “Half a Century of Violent Jihad in Indonesia: A Historical and Ideological comparison of Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.) *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myths and Realities*, (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2005), pp. 15-32.

⁵⁹ Solahudin, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-77. See also Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 125-128 and Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), pp. 48-50.

⁶⁰ Solahudin, *op.cit.*, pp 240-245.

influenced the people, mainly in rural areas in West and Central Java, as this region used to be a base for DI.

Although the government, through BNPT, has conducted de-radicalization program to detainees⁶¹ and seminars to prevent the radicalism in universities,⁶² it cannot entirely stop the terrorism acts so far. To some extent the program is also rejected by Islamic movements, including Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in Solo.⁶³ The government may use the ex-jihadists and *ulamas* to de-radicalize the terrorists. However the acts of terrorists keep on occurring. This is not to say that the de-radicalize program run by the government fails. Yet, the government misses the point.

III.5 The Future Challenges of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia

As mentioned earlier, a homeland security strategy involves a concerted national effort of state and local government who act in accordance with private sector and individuals. Similarly, Rohan Gunaratna confirms that to effectively combat the very current terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must conduct a comprehensive strategy.⁶⁴ This implies, firstly, that terrorism cannot be managed solely by hard approaches but needs soft approaches. This also suggests that all elements of a nation should cooperate to protect their national interest and internal security, particularly in dealing with terrorism. Eventually, for an effective counter-terrorism measurement, government must conduct a holistic and interconnected action

⁶¹ Tito Carnavian ‘Terrorist Rehabilitation: Indonesia’s Experience,’ in Report on International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, Singapore: RSIS and RRG, 24-26 February 2009.

⁶² ‘Kerjasama BNPT – Perguruan Tinggi Dorong Aparat Intelijen Masuk’ (Cooperation between BNPT and Universities encouraged intelligent agency to enter campuses” <http://www.intelijen.co.id/warta/1654-kerjasama-bnpt-perguruan-tinggi-dorong-aparat-intelijen-masuk-kampus>

⁶³ ‘5 Ormas Islam tolak proyek deradikalisasi eks teroris’ (5 Islamic movements reject de-radicalization to ex-terrorists) accessed from <http://us.news.detik.com/read/2011/12/19/100222/1794200/10/5-ormas-islam-tolak-proyek-deradikalisasi-eks-teroris>

⁶⁴ Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Introduction: Change or Continuity?’ in *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17.

against terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-formative to the post-destruction phase.

So far, the Indonesian government has conducted two approaches of counter-terrorism strategy. In addition to Densus 88, the Indonesian government has also formed a national agency, namely BNPT, to eradicate terrorism in a 'softer' way. The government accommodated this agency with President Decree No. 46/2010 regarding the creation of BNPT and its tasks. As mentioned in the decree, BNPT is primarily in charge to formulate a policy, strategy and program in eradication of terrorism, which includes prevention, protection, and de-radicalization. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the "soft" counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi government. It is called 'soft' as the Saudi government involves other ministries rather than merely security forces. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, explains the three interconnected programs of counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare.⁶⁵

In so doing, the Indonesian government should activate all her resources. This ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other ministries that are needed in this program involve education, religion, psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting detention of terrorists, prevention of the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the detainees and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist in re-entering the society.

In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of Education who runs a lecture and program throughout schools from a very basic to

⁶⁵ Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy," in *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Program*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 97, September 2008), pp. 1-25. See also Rohan Gunaratna, "De-radicalization Programs around the World", in *Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration*, March 2010, pp. 7-8.

university levels as the majority of the extremists in Indonesia are young people. This program contains education and warning about the dangers of extremism as well as the impact of terrorism and violence. This also promotes nationalism that will prevent any violence that is based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”. Further, in particular events, the government may distribute books, pamphlets and other materials regarding the program to enlighten students’ parents and families. The government and schools should also take some steps to combat recruitment and deployment of the radical ideology within the school. This usually comes from deviant teachers or senior students who exploit their time with students by discussing issues out of their courses such as politics as well as religions and subsequently spread hatred.

Ministry of Religions should also run the same program in *pesantrens* and *madrasah* (Islamic schools). Moreover, they need to supervise books and other materials that are used in these schools and take a decisive action on Salafi Jihadists books. This is especially important as the police have just found books about conducting jihad in Tangerang, West Java.⁶⁶ In addition, they need to engage respected and moderate Ulamas to spread the non-violence ideology such as loving, caring and peace of Islam through *dakwah* (preaching). They may also involve the ex-jihadists, such as Nassir Abas to join this program and share their experience.

As for the rehabilitation process, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers, and hold dialogues with arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The cleric should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel that they are being humanized and thus communicate openly. The government should

⁶⁶ “Police found ‘jihad’ books and explosive powder in raided house,” accessed from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/30/police-found-jihad-books-and-explosive-powder-raided-house.html>

also engage ex-JII members who have higher authorities and are more respected by the other members, so they may be heard by detainees.⁶⁷ Once the higher ranking JII members change their worldview, as an outcome of this communication, it will provide greater opportunity to other members to respect and follow his instruction. Further, the psychological and social division is responsible to determine what support to give to the prisoners and their families who may need help during and after release to society. Similarly, the clerics should remain in contact with the ex-prisoners so the former jihadists may continue to study with the *ulamas*, who were counseling them in prison.

In the aftercare program, the Indonesian government needs to facilitate the lives of the detainee when he returns back into life in society. The government may put them into a specialized rehabilitation care center for a certain time prior to their return to a 'normal' life. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether to release a candidate. The government should also provide skill training and job opportunities to ex-jihadists so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments.

In addition, there is a growing trend for Islamic radical groups to utilize social media to spread their ideology and recruit their potential cadres. They also share the same grievances about a corrupt and injustice government, which is the foundation to

⁶⁷ Hasibullah Satrawi, "Deradikalisasi Berbasis Ideologi," (Deradicalization based on Ideology) accessed from <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/10/29/03584393/Deradikalisasi.Berbasis.Ideologi>

their ideology.⁶⁸ Therefore, role of Ministry of Communication is needed here to supervise the activities in social media. Moreover, law enforcement together with wholeheartedly efforts to increase the social and economic welfare as well as education arguably reduces the concern of potential supporters and sympathizers.

All of these programs ultimately are carried out as a holistic and interconnected strategy. The conduct of this strategy certainly needs cooperation and coordination from all elements of this nation. As mentioned in President's decree, BNPT will take responsibility for this. This effort may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate all programs, needs a greater budget, takes a longer term⁶⁹ and deals with Indonesian democracy political system.⁷⁰ However, with a strong political willingness from government, involvement of all state's elements and inter-governmental cooperation, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which essentially pays respect to the law and human rights, may prevail.

⁶⁸ Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, "Social Media and Terrorism in Indonesia: Enhancing or Diluting its Appeal?" in RSIS Commentaries no. 051/2012, 22 March 2012.

⁶⁹ Kumar Ramakrishna, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ Syahdatul Kahfi, "Memberantas Terorisme, Menjaga Konsolidasi Demokrasi: Sebuah Dilema?" (The eradication of terrorism and protection of democracy is a dilemma?) in *Terorisme di tengah Arus Global Demokrasi* (Jakarta: The Circle for Contemporary Political Studies, 2006), pp. 277-287. See also Kofi Annan, "A Global Strategy in Fighting Terrorism," accessed from <http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html>

IV

Conclusion

Despite its lack of coordination, Densus 88 has arguably succeeded to raid the terrorists' safe house, arrest the bombing perpetrators and, to some extent, prevent the upcoming attacks. Yet the government fails to eradicate terrorist group's ideology, so called Salafi Jihadism, which is the foundation of their actions, and prevent the spread of it. Therefore, it is essential for all elements of this nation to cooperate in stopping and countering terrorism. The Indonesian government should put an effort to carry out soft counter-terrorism, as carried out by Saudi government, which interconnects prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program. This effort should be combined with the hard counter-measurement of Densus 88. Consequently, BNPT should coordinate not only among the security agencies but also the related Ministries, local authorities as well as public which are involved in the program. Essentially, in this reform era, the Indonesian government should conduct a holistic and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and this is in such way to respect the law and human rights of Indonesia.

This is to suggest that, firstly although Indonesia is about to launch counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive strategy. This is in the sense of preventing the spread of jihadist ideology, which legalizes the use of violence to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination within security officers and with other agencies as well as with public in their counter-terrorism strategy. So far, Densus 88 have arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror and killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. This might be an outcome

of a good work of intelligence combined with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88.

The decrease numbers of terrorism actions lately, both quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently show the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution. The law remains debated and the capability still needs to be further proven, yet it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this argues that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence *per se* but mainly at the preventive program. Although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by predicting and collecting information of the potential bombings such as happened in Bali last March, they still lack of surveillance to the spread of the ideology.

This ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other ministries that are needed in this program involve the education, religion, psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting apprehension of terrorists, prevention the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the ex-jihadist and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist re-enters the society. Secondly, this also suggests that terrorism cannot be managed solely by hard approaches but mainly need soft approaches. So far, the Indonesian government has these two elements. In addition to Densus 88, the government has also formed a national agency, namely BNPT, which arguably conducts a softer approach to counter-terrorism. With regards to “soft” approaches, BNPT may look at the counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi government.

In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of Education coupled with Minister of Religion who runs lectures and programs throughout schools and religious schools to educate and warn students from a very early to university level about the dangers of extremism and the effects of terrorism and violence. This also promotes the nationalism to avoid any violence based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”.

The rehabilitation strategy is carried out to rehabilitate and reeducate terror perpetrators and supporters, religiously and psychologically. For this, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers to have a dialogue with arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The cleric should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel being humanized and thus communicate openly. Prisoners who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process are transferred to after rehabilitation center, to facilitate the transition back to society. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether a candidate is possible to release or not. Assistance remains provided after a detainee is released from the care center. This is in locating a job and receiving other benefits.

The government should provide job opportunities so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments. Thirdly, for an effective counter-terrorism measurement, Indonesian government must conduct a wholly and interconnected action against terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-formative to the post-destruction phase.

The conduct of this strategy may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate the program, takes a longer term, needs greater budget and has to deal with Indonesian democracy political system. However, with a strong political willingness from government and involvement of all state's elements coupled with inter-governmental cooperation, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, essentially with respect to the law and human rights, may prevail.