

RELIGION AND POWER: COMPARING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN POSO AND MALUKU

by Angel Damayanti

Submission date: 26-Aug-2022 10:52AM (UTC+0700)

Submission ID: 1887254546

File name: Religion_and_power_APE.docx (68.89K)

Word count: 7002

Character count: 40593

Advances in Politics and Economics

RELIGION AND POWER: COMPARING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN POSO AND MALUKU

Sri Yunanto

(Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta)

Angel Damayanti

(Universitas Kristen Indonesia)

Abstract

Indonesia is a pluralistic country inhabited by Muslims, Christians, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians, with Muslims, hold the majority population. Their adherents live in harmony and tolerance within the democratic political system. However, at the beginning of Era Reformasi, Indonesian people suffered from instabilities, conflicts, and terrorism, capitalizing ethnic, tribal, and religious symbols for political objectives such as those in the religious conflicts in Poso and Maluku. This paper seeks to compare the political landscape of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Maluku and Poso. This research utilizes a qualitative approach with the comparative method and finds similarities and differences of political factors explaining the conflicts. Its similarities were the presence of conflicts amongst social, political, and military leaders at the national and local levels. They used agents provocateur to provoke their co-religionists. However, differences were found in the involvement of student and youth unions in Maluku but not in Poso.

Keywords: Conflict, Religion, Maluku, Poso, Politics

A. Introduction: Background and Significance

Indonesia is a big pluralistic country. Diverse ethnic tribes and religious believers live together in harmony and tolerance. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, in his speech in the Sixth Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations held on 29 August 2014, testified that Indonesia is a country where thousands of ethnic groups have been, for decades, living side by side, in harmony and been able to foster mutual helps in resolving social

problems. International society has recognized Indonesian Muslims, the majority population, as moderate, tolerant, and peaceful.

However, it is not to neglect that tension amongst religious followers and between religious followers, notably between Muslims and Christians, never existed in contemporary Indonesian history. Specifically, at the beginning years of Era Reformasi, religious tensions and conflicts broke up, such as those happened between Dayak and Madura ethnics in Central Kalimantan, Muslim and Christian conflict in Dani, and Arso tribe in Papua where Muslims came there as migrants and Papuan as the indigenous people as well as Muslims and Christians conflict in Maluku and Poso, which this article will discuss. These incidences took people's lives and destroyed their properties and worship places. However, on the other hand, it dotted the peaceful harmonious, and tolerant life of Indonesian people who enjoy the transition of democracy.

Surprisingly, many scholars view that the primary roots of the conflicts in the New Order time and after New Order do not come from diversity and plurality of the people. Instead, they hailed from the weakening of the state as the significant explaining factors of the conflict. Within the pluralistic and diverse characteristic of the Indonesian people, communal conflicts with primordial dimensions remain a severe security threat. Moreover, political events such as general elections that Indonesia experienced would trigger such conflicts. Political parties have massively used religious and other primordial brands to discredit their rivals, such as in Maluku and Poso conflicts.

Significance of the study

Religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso have now been over, despite terror threats and attacks in Poso and the vulnerable situation in Ambon. Nonetheless, the potential of religious conflicts to break up in current Indonesia remain serious. The rising radical movements in many walks of life and the political ups and downs are important factors explaining the potentiality of conflicts (bbc.com 2016) (Note 1). Radical activists or groups with religious, ethnic, and political background capitalize on religious and other primordial issues, known in Indonesian contexts as ethnic, religion, race, and groups (*Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar Golongan / SARA*) to achieve their political, cultural or even ideological objectives. Social, political, and government leaders have extended alerts and reminders to political contestants and their core followers not to

capitalize on primordial issues for political objectives. Capitalizing on these sensitive issues in our diverse, multi-ethnic, and religious society could bring this nation into grave peril. Maluku and Poso conflicts have taught us how political conflicts matter in explaining religious conflicts.

Therefore, discussing political factors or landscape in the religious conflict in Maluku and Poso will be of significance to reflect current political events when certain political contestants might use black or negative campaigns using primordial sentiments, notably religion. Therefore, this article seeks to discuss two things: first, the comparison between the nature of the conflicts in Maluku and Poso, which cover their escalation and de-escalation, casualties, and second, the comparison of the political landscape of the conflicts in the two locations. We will analyze the similarities and differences of the conflicts and their political factors.

B. Conceptual and Theoretical Notes

1. Religious conflict

This research uses three central concepts; religious conflict, political landscape, and a weak state. The concept of conflict connotes positive and negative meanings. In its positive meaning, conflicts can be in the form of constructive competition. In its negative meaning, as used in this article, *conflict* is defined as a type of competition to win overvalue, power, or status, yet materialized by physical attacks in terms of injuring, attacking, or even killing their adversaries to meet un-negotiable goals of the two or more parties (Panggabean in Trijono 2004). (Note 2) Religious conflicts, as Horowitz asserts, can also be analyzed within the concept of ethnic conflict as it is rooted in the ascribed group's identity such as caste, nationality, language, tribes, and religion (Sukma in Snitwongse, Kusma and Thomson 2004, and Trijono 2004). (Note 3) However, this article defines religious conflict by modifying that of developed by Zulfan Tadjoeidin, who categorizes religious conflict or violence as a type of communal conflict, that is, violent attacks between two religious groups, driven by religious motivation characterized by the capitalization of religious symbols (Tadjoeidin, 2013) (Note 4).

2. Political Landscape

From the Architectural terminology, the political landscape here means all visible features or characteristics of the political dynamic surrounding the Maluku and Poso conflicts. Therefore, in understanding the political landscape, this article first discusses the most important political change, commonly termed *reformasi*, democratization, or democratic transition. Theorists like Samuel Huntington (1991), Jack Snyder (2003), O'Donel, and Phillip Schmitter reminded that democratization produces promises for changes and improvement for a better life. However, it is often marked by the weakening state, characterized by instability, violent conflict, and potentials of revolution in which leaders of the conflicting groups are compromising to reach political equilibrium. A *weak state* is vulnerable in mobilizing security apparatus to cope with the situation. (Lay 2009, Huntington 1991, Snyder 2003, O'Donel, Schmitter & Whitehead). (Note 5). The state cannot function its protection role to their people who suffer from social, economic, political, and security problems, with the two latter serving as the dominant factors (Patrick 2006) (Note 6). The political dimension of the weak state refers to the inability of a state to bring the conflicting parties to social or political consensus to solve the conflict. The vulnerable control of the state over the conflicting groups will cripple the state and sometimes de-legitimize central government (Buzan 1991, Laitin and Brubaker 1998 and Damanik 2003) (Note 7).

C. The Comparison between Religious Conflict in Poso and Maluku

1. The comparison of the Nature of Conflict

This article theorizes the Poso conflict into two periods, before the Malino agreement (1998-2002) and after the Malino agreement (2002-2007) or even until today. The categorization of the Poso conflict into two periods is crucial as before, and during the Malino agreement, the communal conflict happened between the Muslim and Christian communities in Poso. In contrast, after the Malino agreement, communal conflict shifted to asymmetric conflicts in terms of terrorism using Islamic brand targeting at Christian areas, groups, and later at security apparatus, notably police officers. The two periods of the Poso conflict are then divided into 5 phases as laid out in the following table 1.

Before Malino agreement		
Phase	Period	Brief description
1	1998-1999	-Fighting between Muslim and Christian youths in Poso escalated to the mobilization of Christian militia from Tentena and Muslims militias from Parigi Moutong to Poso. -The segregation of the Morowali region from Poso.
2	April- May 2000	- The mobilization of Muslim and Christian Militias from Poso increased - Christian Church Association (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah) and Muslim associations in the conflict started to involve
3	May, 2000- June, 2001 (Retaliation period)	- Christian militia massively attacked Kilo Sembilan Pesantren, which killed 70 Muslims - The conflicts spread to all regions, which segregated Muslim and Christian areas, -Islamic organizations like MUI, Al Khairat, and Muhammadiyah started to involve - Terrorist groups came to Poso
4	July 2001	- Christian fighters from Tentena attacked Muslims in Poso, which killed 14 Muslims in Buyung Katendo - Laskar Jihad and other Muslim militias arrived in Poso - Malino agreement
- After Malino Agreement (www. Epi.edu.2009) (Note 8)		
5	2001 Terror Period	- Communal conflict relatively decreased. - Sporadic terror attacks targeted to the Christian community, Christian leaders, and Christian facilities broke up, and now the attacks shifted to government officers (Police).

Poso conflict has taken 2000 people's life, wounded 183,000 and caused 425,000 refugees, burned down 3,492 Muslim houses, three government offices, ten churches, and seven mosques.

The Maluku conflict occurred from 1999 to 2004 and differentiated between Central Maluku (Ambon Conflicts) and North Maluku. The two conflicts have been regarded as the worst communal conflict after the New Order time as communal or collective actors dominated it. Terror attacks in terms of bombing have become a strategy of attacks done during the conflicts. Maluku conflicts can also be phased into five, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Phase	Period	Brief description
1	1999/ Ied Mubarak Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Ambonese hoodlums or gangsters from Jakarta arrived at Ambon - Muslim started to fight with Christian youth in Batumerah and Mahardika and then escalated to Haruku, Saparua, Ceram, Buru, Sanana, Manipa, Tanimbar and Tual. - Conflict between Kao Ethnic (Muslim) and Makian Ethnic (Christian) with support from Muslim Ethnic from outside Ternate broke up in North Maluku
2	June 1999-April 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violence in Ambon broke up, Muslim militia burnt down Silo church - Muslim attacked Christian in Tobelo, North Maluku - North Maluku province was segregated from Maluku province
3	2000-2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Laskar Jihad and other paramilitary groups arrived at Maluku - RMS declared its secession agenda - The government enacted Civilian Emergency Status (Darurat Sipil).
4	2001-2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The government took strategic measures such as establishing integrated Batalyon to discontinue the conflict - Malino Peace agreement was initiated - Jafar Umar Thalib, Laskar Jihad leader, and Alex Manuputy, RMS leader, were arrested.
5	2003-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The conflict deescalated - The government revoked civilian Emergency in Maluku and North Maluku.

Maluku Conflict had taken 2000 people in Central Maluku and 2.500 in North Maluku, caused more than 250,000 as refugees, wounded 1,349 in Maluku and 2,004 in North Maluku.

D. The Political Landscape in Poso and Maluku Conflicts

1. The National Political Landscape

Explaining social conflicts, including Maluku and Poso conflicts in the beginning reformasi in Indonesia, should discuss political dynamic at the national and local levels as, according to some political leaders and scholars, the nexus between them is clear. The national political powers which were pointed out as contributing actors to the conflicts at its outset were Cendana or Suharto cronies and elements from military police officers, which then used agent provocateurs. President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) called the elements

‘the hand of Evil which created violence to ruin the nation and delegitimize government’. The Minister of Defense in Gus Dur Administration, Juwono Sudarsono, explicitly pointed out that Suharto Cronies masterminded the conflict. They used Ambonese hoodlums to protect their interests. (Aditjondro in Salampesy and Husain, 2001) (Note 9).

1.1 Political Conflict in the Habibie Time

Poso and Maluku's conflict broke up almost at the same time. They commenced in 1998 - 1999 though their de-escalation was somewhat different. These years were known as the beginning reformasi, being marked by the stepdown of Suharto on May 21th 1998, and then succeeded by Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie (BJ Habibie), his former vice. As a former Suharto loyalist, Habibie had a dilemma on whether to provide full support to Suharto prosecution to fulfill reformist expectations or repaying political favors he owed from Suharto during his former service with him. Habibie tried to play the game in a dilemma. He hired solicitor general Andi Ghalib to do a favor to Suharto. However, Ghalib stopped the allegation of corruption to Suharto, arguing that shreds of evidence were insufficient ([http. National Tempo](http://NationalTempo.com) 2004) (Note 10). On top of that, he was not enthusiastic in hunting the grey status of the wealth of the Suharto family, nor did he take legal measures to clarify their legal status of corrupted items ([http. members tripod](http://members.tripod.com) 2018) (Note 11).

Habibie's reign was considered a weak government. During 15 month-administration, he inherited the split of security forces and the conflict between the National Axis and the Habibie or Muslim Axis at the political civil society level. Habibie faced political maneuvers by Megawati's so-called 'rainbow nationalist groups,' which challenged his leadership. The group rallied in the streets to topple Habibi. In addition, the axis sponsored the established student movement FORKOT and FAMRED. Both the movements radically rallied in the street to demand his resignation. In addition to this, Habibie also lacked international support (Suaedy 2000, Hasan 2002 and Simanjuntak 2002) (Note 12).

To challenge political pressures maneuvered by the National Axis, Habibie supporters formed the Habibie axis or Muslim axis, comprising Islamic political parties and Islamic organizations. It also received support from "green generals or Muslim general who occupied structural position during Suharto's last term (Suaedy 2002 and

Hasan 2002) (Note 13). Sponsored by high-rank police and military officers, the Suharto family and cronies Muslim axis established civilian security forces (Pengamanan Swakarsa/PAMSWAKARSA) to challenge FORKOT and FAMRED (Note 14), whom they alleged as communists and deserve killing. On the contrary, the students' movement accused the PAMSWAKARSA of pro status quo (Aditjondro in Salampesy and Husain 2001). (Note 15). The forces received training skill from the Army special forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus/Kopassus) (Simanjuntak, 2002) (Note 16). On top of that, the Suharto family also formed the other militias from nationalist backgrounds called *Kelompok Merah* (Red Group).

1.2 Political Conflict in the Wahid Time

Through tough competition between the Nationalist and central axis groups, Abdurrahman Wahid took presidential office, succeeding BJ Habibie on 21 October 1999. Like his predecessor, Wahid also faced multiple political conflicts with different characteristics. While the political conflict in Habibie's time was more sectarian between Muslim (Habibie Axis) and Nationalist (Megawati Axis), conflict in Wahid Time was more political. Political pressure from the Nationalist Axis withered after the stepdown of Habibie and the appointment of Megawati as the Vice President pairing with Wahid.

This research classifies political conflict in Wahid Time into three; with the Suharto Family, former supporters of the Central Axis, and military and police. The conflict between Wahid and Suharto family had been long taken place since Suharto was in power. While, who at that time, served as an executive leader (Ketua Umum PB) of Nahdlatul Ulama, frequently criticized Suharto policy in defending the poor or marginalized people.

Conversely, Suharto tried to topple Wahid from NU leadership and replaced him with his man, yet unsuccessful. The conflict between Wahid and Central Axis started when political leaders of the Axis were disappointed with a unique political maneuver of Wahid at the beginning of his administration. While dissolved **Ministry of Social Affairs** (Kementerian Sosial) and **Ministry of Information** (Kementerian Penerangan), **arguing that the function of the two Ministries would be transferred to the regional** government. While also replaced two cabinet members from central Axis; Jusuf Kalla of Golkar Party and Hamzah Haz of PPP Parties. Because of this, Wahid had been accused of breaking their

political contract. Wahid's maneuver stimulated the anger of leaders of the Central Axis. This situation led to political instability until the end of Wahid reign (Nasir 2004) (Note 17). The nexus between the National political dynamics and Maluku conflict was evident when the anger of the leader of Central Axis to Wahid was manifested in supporting public sermon in Monas Square to wage national jihad by defending their fellow Muslims in the Maluku conflict and demanded Wahid, whom they consider as weak, to stop the conflict. Otherwise, the sermon would demand DPR to topple Wahid from the Presidential position. While policy to solve Ambon was unacceptable, he delegated the responsibility to his vice, Megawati, and let the conflicting parties in Ambon solve their conflicts themselves (Suaedy 2000) (Note 16).

The conflict between Wahid and leaders of the military and police began when Wahid sought to exercise objective and subjective control over the military and police by replacing the solid military leaders and police leaders with their men. To implement his strategy, Wahid sacked high ranks army generals, using the allegation of TNI's past human rights violations as a card to push the generals to leave their power (Anwar 2002 and Nasir 2004) (Note 18). Unfortunately, Wahid's strategy to put the military under control failed. TNI and Polri refused to obey his command. TNI perceived Wahid as having interfered them too far, uprooted him from TNI history, which positioned TNI, notably the Army, as one of the pivotal political powers. Finally, President Wahid's trial to put TNI under civilian control was not materialized (Nasir 2004) (Note 19).

The accusation worsened conflict between Wahid and legislators to Wahid for swindling Bulog Money, and Brunei Aid Money generally called "Bulog Gate and Brunei Gate". The conflict ended with the impeachment of Wahid from the presidential position replaced by his vice, Megawati, who enjoyed support from multi-political power comprising from her own Party PDIP, former Wahid coalition of central Axis, TNI, and Polri.

The disappointed elements within the military used Laskar Jihad as a "political bullet" to shoot Wahid. The deployment served as a proxy military and received no barriers from security officers and politicians, albeit rhetoric. Local Muslim paramilitary also warmly welcome the presence of LJ as it would strengthen their position (Hasan 2008, Azca, 2004) (Note 20). The influential role of TNI in masterminding the conflict in

Maluku was evidenced by the role of the retired one-star general Rustam Kastor, Ambonese Muslims, who confessed as LJ advisors. He stayed in Yogyakarta, a home base of LJ, monitored recruitment of LJ militia and supervised LJ training in Bukit Manjul Bogor prior to their deployment to Maluku (Kastor, interview 2011) (Note 21).

E. The Local Political landscape (belum)

1. The Political Landscape in The Poso Conflict.

Important points to note in the previous discussion is the nexus between political conflicts in Jakarta which produced agent provocateurs and the political tension between multi-political powers and Wahied which provide political context to the deployment of LJ in Maluku and to Poso as well. The political rivalry along confessional lines happened prior to the Poso conflict. It extended from the rise of political Islam, pioneered by Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesi (The Muslim Intellectual Association Of Indonesia/ ICMI) , at the national level. The sectarian politics, which fuelled political competition between a Bungku Muslim candidate, Arif Patanga who contested the regional head against Christian Pamona candidates Yahya Patirol and Drs Pelima in 1994-1995. Despite the tension, the result was still fine as Patanga, who won the contest, accommodated Patirol as his secretary (Sangaji,2007) (Note 22).

This research classifies political conflicts amidst Poso religious conflict into two; first, conflicts between Muslim politicians and Christian Politician, supported by their respected leaders of their religious organizations. The demise of Arif Patanga administration was followed by another conflict between a group of Muslim politicians such as; Abdul Muin Pusadan, Abdul Malik Syahadat, Damsyik Ladjalani, Akram Kamaruddin, Mas'ud Kasim and Ismail Kasim who competed for political positions against Christian politicians; Eddy F. Bangkudapu, Yahya Patirol and former military officer Colonel Muljadi. Receiving strong back up from Governor of Central Sulawesi, Pusadan triumphed the regional head of Poso. The governor was a former leader of HMI and had a close link with Islamic militant groups such as Laskar Jihad. He also received covert support from former Golkar strongman, also, Habibi man; Arnold Baramuli (Damanik, 2003) (Note 23). Arif Patanga and Abdul Muin Pusadan shared same background. They hailed from the same ethnic group, Bungku and served as ICMI local leaders. The

problematic consequence of this primordial succession destroyed power sharing with Christian leaders from Lori, Pamona and Morias, prominent ethnics groups, who regarded themselves as being politically marginalized by the national political scenario sponsored by ICMI leaders. This situation led the conflicts as respected leaders of the conflicting groups hired agent provocateurs to provoke people for conflicts (Komnas HAM, 2005, Agus, 2011 and Aditjondro..) (Note 24) . The tension was then worsened by the demand of local religious leaders which demand the government to take four measures: releasing Aghfar Patanga (Muslim Leaders) who got detained for allegedly provoking people into conflict, replacing Yahya Patiro,(Christian figure) who occupied the position of secretary of regional head of Poso, with Damsyik Ladjalani and replacing Kapolres (Kepala Polisi Resort/Head of Regional Police) of Poso. Otherwise they would burn one mosque and one church amidst Patanga tribunal (Damanik,2003) (Note 25)

Likewise, Christian organization like PGI echoed the defensive stance to Christian victims, especially when they were killed, but had minimum role in discontinuing the conflict at the grass-root level. Muslim and Christian leaders blamed one-another and relied the quick solution of the conflicts fully on the government. After Malino Peace agreement they increased their trust to the government in maintaining peace in Poso, but the situation in the grassroots level was the other way around. In the view of human rights activists, the decreasing role of religious leader in preventing the conflicts was to impress on the national and international community that Poso conflict was not religious one (Agus, 2011) (Note 26) .

Second, Poso conflict was also triggered by the segregation of Poso into three regions; Poso, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una. The creation of the three regions stimulated Muslims discontent as they were reduced to minority in the three segregated regions. It failed to improve people welfare as it only stimulated the competition of local Christian and Muslim politicians in occupying new political positions (Karnavian, 2008, Mashad and Yustiningrum, 2005) (Note 27) .

1.2 The Political Landscape in The Maluku Conflict.

The political landscape of Maluku conflict can be theorized into four internal political rivalries: first, conflict between leaders of political parties and social organizations. Conflict in the political parties and social organizations took place between

Paartai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle/ PDIP), symbolized in red color *viz a viz* Islamic political parties and Golkar party, symbolized by white color. In Maluku the organizational structure of PDIP is dominated by Christian figures who became strongmen of Christian militant groups. While the pivotal figures from Islamic community served as leaders of Islamic parties and Islamic organizations, such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council / DDII), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Indonesian Clerics Council / MUI) Muhammadiyah, and the Masjid Al Fatah Foundation. The leaders failed to halt the escalation of the fighting between Muslim and Christian in Ambon spilled over by the gangsters from Ketapang, Jakarta (Hasan, 2008, Van Klinken, 2007 and Suaedy, 2000) (Note 28).

At the operational level, the interest of Muslim group, as previously discussed, was effectively echoed by retired one-star general, Rustam Kastor. The conflict was intensified by adversarial perception between Christian leaders and Muslim leaders. Christian leaders regarded the conflict as “a big national plot” targeted at destroying Maluku as the national center of Christianity in eastern part of Indonesia (Papilaya in Kleden and Julaman 2000) (Note 29). Christian leaders also pointed out additional supporting facts triggering the conflict namely segregating Gorontalo from Manado, segregating North Maluku from Maluku, the migration of non-Christian inhabitants to eastern areas of Indonesia aiming at accommodating Muslim community (Salam) and improving their economic life in Gorontalo and North Maluku. In the same time, it would weaken the power of Mollucan Christians (Serani) who, as they felt, as the most educated Christians in Indonesia. This scenario became trial project before being developed in other parts of Indonesia.

On the contrary Muslim leaders, as voiced by Rustam Kastor, reject the accusations that Maluku conflict was rooted in the economic disparity between Bugis Buton Makasar (BBM) ethnics and native Christians and the transformation of bureaucracy which sidelined Christians. Instead, it was rooted in movement of secessionist group of Republik Maluku Selatan (The South Maluku Republic/ RMS), which was dominated by Christian activists. Allegedly receiving support from the The United State of America (USA), this group sought to separate Maluku from Indonesia, while other Christian groups sought to purge Muslim community from Maluku (Papilaya in Kleden and Julaman 2000) (Note 30)

. The USA was suspiciously to plan Maluku Island as its Military base that would replace its base in the Philippines. the USA sponsored RMS which later would cooperate in developing its military base (Kastor, Interview 2011) (Note. 31).

During this time rumors that Megawati, of PDIP, supported Christian groups and Habibie, the leader of Golkar and ICMI as well, supported Muslims groups circulated in the militant grass roots groups (Hasan, 2002) (Note.32) As the results Golkar activists attacked the house of PDIP leader, John Maliola which at that time being used for commemorating the attack of Jakarta PDIP office in July 1997. Many speculated that the reason behind the attack was the frustration of Golkar politicians for loosing the party influence against PDIP which controlled 53% of electoral votes in Maluku (Van Klinken, 2007) (Note 33).

Second, conflict between social and political leaders in Maluku which was suspiciously supported by national political elites erupted along with the conflict between government leaders Governor Saleh Latuconsina and the military regional commander over the implementation of President Wahied instruction to enact civilian emergency status. The governor complained over the insubordination of military commander to the governor who assumed full responsibility on the implementation of civilian emergency status. The conflict between governor and provincial military commander escalated amidst the tension between Muslim and Christian bureaucrats in the local government (Manuputi and Watimena in Trijono, 2004) (Note 34) . The rise of ICMI during the last term of Suharto tenure which resume to reformasi time provided powerful support to Muslims bureaucrat to take over the leadership position of Christian bureaucrats, who had been for decades, dominating the leadership. The transfer of domination also received support from Muslim governor, also with ICMI background. Political tension flared when Christian bureaucrats kept defending their position in Ambon Mayor and Pattimura University (Bertrand, 2004) (Note 35)

Third, the conflict in bureaucratic level took its seeds in the leadership rivalries in the student organization in Pattimura University. Muslim students organization such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Islamic Student Association/HMI), Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Islamic Student Union of Indonesia/PMII), Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association/ IMM) worked together to

challenge the Nationalist and Christian student universities, Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia (The Nationalist Student Movement/ GMNI) and Persatuan Mahasiswa Kristen Republik Indonesia (Christian Student Union /PMKRI). Allegedly benefiting from the corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) practices of Christian university administrators in favor of them, GMNI and PMKRI leaders took control over students unions in the campus. Leaders of Muslim student organizations felt being marginalized or treated unfairly, despite their proven competencies (Ex Combatant, Interview, 2011) (Note 36) . Unfortunately, because of poor strategy, Muslims organizations such as Badan Imarah Muslim Maluku (BIMM) did not provide sufficient support to the development of career of Maluku Muslim youths (Kastor, Interview, 2011) (Note 37)

Forth, Before the conflict, there was a shift of domination in leadership structure of the organization from Christian Mollucan activists to Muslim Mollucan activists with HMI –MPO background which also affiliated to Golkar. This rivalry served as an extension from the rivalry in the student union in Pattimura University and preceded the shift of domination from Golkar Party , which was powerful in the New Order time, to PDIP as the new leading political power in the Reformasi. The domination of HMI-MPO in the KNPI leadership triggered the exodus of KNPI activists with nationalist and Christian background from Golkar Party to PDIP (Ex Combatant, Interview, 2011) (Note 38) . Out of conflict in Central Maluku, conflict also broke out in North Maluku (Van Klinken, 2007) (Note 39) . Conflict in North Maluku was rooted in two political causes. First, the Christian minority refused the segregation of North Maluku to New District of Malifut whose majority population was Muslims. The Christian were worried that they would loss control over the new regions implicated to the difficulty in the evangelization project as it would receive full back up from political Islam sponsored by ICMI (Bertrand, 2004) (Note 40) . On the contrary North Maluku Muslims accused Christians would develop the new region as the biggest center of evangelization in the region (Ex Combatant, Interview, 2011) (Note 40) . Second, the competition between Sultan of Ternate and Sultan of Tidore to win the governor position in the new province of North Maluku. The former relied his support on Christian inhabitants in North Halmahera, while the later got support from Makianese Muslim inhabitants in central and south Halmahera. On top of that, the two

Sultans also competed to control the influence over Australian gold mining projects in Halmahera.

E. Conclusion

Indonesia is a pluralistic country where diverse ethnics, tribal groups and religious adherents live in peace and harmony. However, Indonesia also experiences conflicts, violence, terrorism and tensions amongst religious followers. This research is about the dark dots of Indonesian history. It seeks to analyze similarities and differences of conflicts intertwined with terrorism in Maluku and Poso in two things: the nature of the conflicts and terrorism and political dynamics explaining the conflicts. This article uses two concepts; religious conflict and the landscape of political conflict as frameworks to analyze the collected data. It borrows the concept of religious conflict developed by Horowitz and Tadjudin who look conflicts from their negative perspective in terms of attacking and injuring between two religious followers. While in analyzing the nexus between political conflicts and religious conflict, this article combines theoretical frameworks developed by Samuel Huntington (1991), Jack Snyder (2003), O' Donel and Phillip Schmitter who have long alerted that conflicts, violence and revolution have become negative by product of initial political democratization.

Using comparative method with collecting data from document, news and interviews, this research has come to conclusions that Poso and Maluku conflicts share similarities and differences. First, they broke up in stages of escalation. Second, the government has initiated peace agreement, called Malino agreement to solve the conflicts. In Maluku conflict, Malino agreement, relatively de-escalated the conflict. In Poso conflict, Malino agreement shifted the conflict from communal to asymmetric or terrorism which took place until to day.

As far the nexus between the conflicts and their political explanation is concerned, this research also find similarities and differences. They were similar in that both conflicts happened amidst the national political conflicts during Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid time and relatively de-escalated in the Megawati Time. Habibie reign was burdened by the residuals of Suharto past misconduct, the split between Muslim Axis associated with him *vis a vis* nationalist axis associated with Megawati. The Islamic politics was institutionalized by the presence of ICMI and Golkar.

Two-year Wahied reign was very dynamic and tense as Wahied was in conflict with Suharto Family, Central Axis, his former supporter of and with military and Police. Conflict with Suharto family was an extension of their previous conflict during the new Order time . Conflict with Central Axis was resulted in the disappointment of its leaders with Wahied unique political maneuver. While Conflict with military and Polri leaders was rooted in Wahied intention to exercise subjective and objective control over the security institutions, by replacing their leaders who were not of his preference. The local political landscape explaining Maluku and Poso conflicts also share their similarities and differences. They are similar in the followings; first, they both experienced conflicts between Muslim political and social leaders. Political leaders in the two conflicting regions competed for political and bureaucratic positions. Muslim political leaders received back up from ICMI and benefited from Golkar influence. Second, the two conflicts were also contributed by regional segregation or later known as regional autonomy,

On the contrary, this research also finds differences in the political explanations. First, while the conflict between Muslim political leaders and Christian political leaders in Poso circulated in Golkar Party with the support of leaders of Islamic parties, political conflict in Maluku took place between Muslim Politician with ICMI and Golkar background *vis avis* Christian politicians associated with PDIP. Second, Political conflict in Maluku was also triggered by conflicts between leaders of Muslim and Christian student organizations and bureaucrats to win leadership in Patimura University and continued to rivalry between Muslim and Christian youth leader to occupy KNPI leadership, while such conflict was not found in Poso religious conflicts.

References

- Aditjondro, G. J. (2001). *Di balik Asap Mesiu, Airt mata dan Anyor Darah di Maluku*, In Zairin Salampessy & Thamprin Husain (ed), *Ketika semerbak Cengkih tergusur Asap Mesiu*. Jakarta: TAPAK Ambon.
- Azca, Muhammad Najib. (2004). *Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management,
- Buzan, Barry. (1991). *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, Barry. Weaver, Ole and Wilde, Jaap De. (1998). *A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Damanik, Rinaldy. (2003). *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso: Menggapai Surya Pagi Melalui Kegelapan Malam*. Sulteng: PBHI & LPS-Ham.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. (2002). Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia. *Indonesia*, vol.73.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. (2008) *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*. Jakarta: LP3ES & KITLV.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Laitin, D David & Brubaker, Roger Brubaker. (1998). Ethnicity and Nationalist Violence, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol.24.
- Lay, Cornelis. (2009). Kekerasan atas Nama Agama: Perspektif Politik", *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, vol.13. Isu.1
- Donnel, G.O & Schmitter, C. (1986). *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, in O'Donnel, Schmitter, & I. Whitehead, eds., *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Nasir, Muhammad. (2004). *Konflik Presiden Versus POLRI di Era Transisi Demokrasi*. Jakarta: Pusat Studi Politik Madani Institute.
- Panggabean, Syamsu Rizal. (2004). *Approach to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution*, in Lambang Trijono, eds. (2004), *The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in South East Asia: Cases and Resolutions*. Yogyakarta: CSPS Books.
- Patrick, Steward. (2006). Weak States, Global Threats and U.S. National Security: A Research and Policy Agenda", *Washington Quarterly*, vol.9.

Snyder, Jack. (2003). Terj. *Dari Pemungutan Suara ke Pertumpahan Darah: Demokratisasi dan Konflik Nasionalis*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, Huntington 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,

Suaedy, Ahmad et.al. (2000). *Luka Maluku: Militer Terlibat*. Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi,

Sukma, Rizal. (2005) *Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution*. In Snitwongse, Kusuma & Thompson, W. Scott, Eds., *Ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS,2005), Trijono, Lambang, 2004.*The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in South East Asia: Cases and Resolutions*. Yogyakarta: CSPA Books.

Tadjoeddin, Muhammad Zulfan, (2013). Educated But Poor: Explaining Localized Ethnic Violence During Indonesia's Democratic Transition, *International Area Studies Review*, Vol.16, no. 21

Notes:

Note1.https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/02/160218_indonesia_radikalisme_anak_muda. accessed 25 August 2018 and Adje Suraji, Ancaman Radikalisme <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/11/24/08520891/ancaman.radikalisme>. Accessed 25 August 2018.

Note 2. Panggabean 2004, *Approach to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution*, in Lambang Trijono, eds.,*The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in South East Asia: Cases and Resolutions* Yogyakarta:CSPA Books, pp.56-57

Note 3. Sukma 2005,*Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution*.In Snitwongse, Kusuma & Thompson, W. Scott, Eds., *Ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS,2005), pp.1-41, Trijono 2004, Ibid.p.4.

Note 4. Tadjoeddin 2013, "Educated But Poor: Explaining Localized Ethnic Violence During Indonesia's Democratic Transition",*International Area Studies Review*, Vol.16, no. 21, pp.24-49.

Note 5. Lay 2009, "Kekerasan atas Nama Agama: Perspektif Politik", *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, vol.13. Isu.1 , pp.1-18. Huntington 1991,*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*,(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, pp.121-124. Snyder 2003, Terj, *Dari Pemungutan Suara ke Pertumpahan Darah: Demokratisasi dan Konflik Nasionalis*, (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, p.4., G.O'Donnel& C. Schmitter 1986 , *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, in O'Donnel, Schmitter, & I. Whitehead, eds., *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-11.

Note 6. Patrick 2006, "Weak States, Global Threats and U.S. National Security: A Research and Policy Agenda", *Washington Quarterly*, vol.9, pp.5-6.

Note 7. Buzan 1991, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 66–67, Laitin and Brubaker 1998, "Ethnics and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol.24, pp.4-37, Damanik, 2003, *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso: Menggapai Surya Pagi Melalui iKegelapan Malam*, (Sulteng: PBHI & LPS-Ham, pp.11-14.

Note 8. In the Malino Peace Agreement 1 the warring Muslims and Christians came to consensus on 10 articles: stopping the conflict, enforcing law and order, rejecting foreign intervention and civilian emergency status, respecting one another mutually, stopping betrayal and letting victims of the conflict to come back to Poso, returning all belongings and properties to their owners, helping IDPs to return to their homes, promoting tolerance to Muslim, Christian and other religious adherence in practicing their faith, working hand in hand with government in the recovery and rehabilitation programs (www.upi.edu.2009)

Note 9. Aditjondro 2001, *Di balik Asap Mesiu, Airt mata dan Anyor Darah di Maluku*, in Zahirin Salampessy & Husain (ed), *Ketika semerbak Cengkih tergusur Asap Mesiu*. Jakarta: TAPAK Ambon, pp.147-154

Note 10. Nasional Tempo, 25 Maret, 2004, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/41026/soeharto-koruptor-terkaya-di-dunia>, , accessed, 25 August, 2018

Note 11. http://members.tripod.com/kkn_ghalib/galibtempo1.htm, accessed 25 August 2018.

Note 12 . Suaedy, et.al 2000, *Luka Maluku: Militer Terlibat*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, pp.48-51. Hasan, 2002 "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia", *Indonesia*, vol.73, pp.160-164., Simanjuntak, 2002, *Premanisme Politik*, (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi,, p.62.

Note 13. Suaedy. Ibid. Hasan, Ibid

Note 14. FORKOT stands for *Forum Kota* (city forum) while FAMRED stands for *Forum Aksi Mahasiswa Untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi* (Forum of Student Action For Reform and Democracy). Both were radical nationalist student movements, which arose in the early years of *reformasi*. Their pragmatic mission was demanding Habibie's resignation from the presidential office, arguing that Habibie was the leader foremost in defending the *status quo* of Suharto's era.

Note 15. Aditjondro. Op Cit.

Note 16. Simanjuntak, 2002, Op.Cit.

Note 17. Militia groups which had close connections with the Suharto family were Satgas Tebas and Laskar Putih. Members of the Nationalist Militia "red group" were Satgas Wirapati, Satgas Sember nyawa, Pasukan Banteng Tengkorak, Satgas Pasopati, Dewaruci (whose

members are 66 retired Navy force), Pasukan Bela Mega and other militias who joined PDIP, numbering 50 thousands (Simanjuntak, *Premanisme Politik*), pp.60-62.

Note 17. Nasir, 2004, *Konflik Presiden Versus POLRI di Era Transisi Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Pusat Studi Politik Madani Institute, pp.142-143.

Note 18. The long lists allegation of past Human Rights Violation were : the massacre of civilians in Santa Cruz, East Timor, the assassination of the labor activist Marsinah in East Java, the assassination of a journalist in Jakarta, the homicide of protesters demonstrating against the construction of the Kedung Ombo and Nipah dams, the killing of Muslim activists in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, the heinous military operations against the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) fighters, and the abduction of student activists during the later years of the New Order regime Anwar, 2002, *Wahied Versus Militer: Studi Tentang Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Era Transisi*, Jakarta: Grasindo Nasir, 2004. Op. Cit.

Note 19. Nasir 2004. Ibid.

Note 20. Hasan. Op. Cit. Azca, 2004. *Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia*: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, pp.444-445.

Note 21. Interview With Brigadir General TNI (retired) Rustam Kastor, ex Commander of Korem XVII/Trikora, Advisor of Laskar Jihad, in Ambon, 2 April 2011

Note 22. Sangaji 2007, *Aparat Keamanan dan Kekerasan Regional Poso*, in Henk Schulte Nordholt & Gerry van Klinken, eds., *Politik Lokal di Indonesia*: Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, p.5.

Note 23. Damanik. Op.Cit.

Note 24. Komnas HAM. Op.Cit, Agus. Op.Cit and Aditjondro. Op. Cit.

Note 25. Damanik. Op.Cit

Note 26. Agus. Op.Cit.

Note 27. Karnavian, 2008, *Indonesian Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso*; Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama. pp.374-375, Mashad and Yustiningrum, 2005. *Negara dan Masyarakat dalam Resolusi Konflik Poso*, in Syafuan Rozi, *Resolusi Konflik di Ambon dalam Hubungan Negara dan Masyarakat dalam Resolusi Konflik di Indonesia, Kasus Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku, dan Maluku Utara*: Jakarta: LIPI. pp.45-88.

Note 28. Hasan. Op. Cit, Van Klinken. Op. Cit and Suaedy, Op.Cit

Note 29. Papilaya, 2000, *Persepsi Lokal tentang Konflik dan Kekerasan di Ambon- Persepsi Protestan*, in Ignas Kleden & John Julaman, eds., *Laporan Seminar: Timur dan Barat di Indonesia, Perspektif Integrasi Baru*. Jakarta: The Go-East Institute pp.50-52.

Note 30. Papilaya. Ibid.

Note 31. Kastor, Interview. Op. Cit.

Note 32. Hasan. Op. Cit.

Note 33. Van Klinken. Op.Cit

Note 34. Manuputi and Watimena, 2004, , *Konflik Maluku*, in LambangTrijono., et.al. *PotretRetak Nusantara: Studi Kasus Konflik di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: CSPA, pp.147-148

Note 35. Bertrand, 2004, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.118-119.

Note 36. Interview With Combatant in North Maluku, Interview, 20 December 2011.

Note 37. Interview with Kastor, Op. Cit.

Note 38. Interview with Ex Combatant. Op. Cit.

Note 39. Van Klinken. Op. Cit

Note 40. Interview with ex Combatant. Op. Cit

Note 41. Interview with ex Combantant. Ibid.

RELIGION AND POWER: COMPARING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN POSO AND MALUKU

ORIGINALITY REPORT

2%

SIMILARITY INDEX

1%

INTERNET SOURCES

1%

PUBLICATIONS

1%

STUDENT PAPERS

MATCH ALL SOURCES (ONLY SELECTED SOURCE PRINTED)

1%

★ Submitted to Universiti Sains Malaysia

Student Paper

Exclude quotes On

Exclude matches Off

Exclude bibliography On