INDONESIA SOUTH AFRICA: A SOUTH - SOUTH PARTNERSHIP IN THE MAKING

INDONESIA – SOUTH AFRICA: A SOUTH-SOUTH PARTNERSHIP IN THE MAKING

A COMMEMORATIVE BOOK
CELEBRATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
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Trade Promotion Center, Johannesburg, were extracted by Prof. Haron (Chapter Ten) from its official website (http://www.itpcjohannesburg.com/).

Speaking about photographs, we also record that all the photos and diagrams used in this text were duly accredited, including the artistic works of Mr. Moh. Rikza, an Indonesian graphic designer, through the logo design that appears on the cover of this book; if any figure was not rightfully recognized, then we apologize. Lastly, we wish readily state that a few of the ideas that we reconstructed and inserted in our postscript were drawn from Rajiv Bhatia; the latter is a Distinguished Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies unit at India’s Gateway House (https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-south-africa-relations-the-way-forward/).
Remarks by H.E. Retno L.P. Marsudi  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia

Indonesia’s bonds with Africa has been established a few centuries past as is evident from historical and archeological research. We, however, are aware that there is a need to strengthen our ties. To this end, when the New Asian – African Partnership (NAASP) was declared during 2005 Asian – African Summit in Jakarta, we considered that a good start, as we look forward to the future, where Indonesia and African countries are committed to advancing and developing together. In this context, during the past few years, Indonesia has geared its foreign policy to consider Africa as one of the potential non-traditional markets.

On this note, I would like to reiterate Indonesia’s genuine commitment to be part of the development in Africa, while likewise, Indonesia also wants Africa to be part of the development in Indonesia. Indonesia could become a credible partner for African countries by ensuring mutually-profitable economic cooperation between itself and as many African countries as possible. With the purpose of strengthening and intensifying the relations between Indonesia and Africa in mind, we organized two significant events in the past two years. The Indonesia – Africa Forum (IAF) and the Indonesia – Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID) were set up respectively in 2018 and 2019.

We should underline, however, that the Republic of South Africa stands out among African countries with which Indonesia has had diplomatic ties for at least 25 years. Our two nations have historically always have close affinity. Indonesia had strong empathy for the liberation struggle since the 1955 Bandung conference that among others was attended by two African National Congress (ANC) representatives. We never shied away from supporting the liberation movements during those years. When the President Nelson Mandela was sworn into office as South Africa’s first democratically elected head of state, Indonesia was there to provide whatever assistance it could.
Since 1994, Indonesia and South Africa has remained faithful to one another as partners in diplomacy. This has been demonstrated through the role shared in various international forums, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), G20 and as fellow Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. While trade relations need to be improved to advance the progress of our partnership even further, we see that taking place in the years ahead. Although ASEAN remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, we will see to it that our ties with South Africa grow manifold. Herein lies the significance of the two countries’ commitments announced through the Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful and Prosperous Future, which was agreed on 2008.

In closing, I would like to thank the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Pretoria for initiating this project in commemoration and celebration of the relationship between our two nations. This edited work, which contains contributions from Indonesians and South Africans, is a wonderful project that offers critical reflections on our bonds, which was forged 25 years ago and going even stronger. I trust this book will be a good reference for Indonesia – South Africa bilateral relations.

I thank you and I hope you enjoy reading the book.

Jakarta, 6 January 2020

Retno L.P. Marsudi
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FOREWORD

Struggle Solidarity That Seeks Shared Prosperity: Indonesia and South Africa’s Bond

Ambassador Salman Al Farisi

Our Common Struggle

Indonesia and South Africa share an unshakable bond forged on the battlefield of the struggle against oppression. We are proud of a partnership that fought the viciousness of slavery, colonialism and apartheid. Our histories became entwined when Dutch invaders seized both our lands and subjugated our peoples. At the time, our independent entities in South East Asia came to be named by the colonial power and its private companies as the Dutch East Indies centred around Batavia.

The Dutch of course bizarrely named the land at the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope. Both our peoples put up fierce resistance. That resistance was, however, stymied by superior European armaments. The flame of resistance continued to burn in the hearts of our people and the on-going revolts in both our lands. Since the mid-seventeenth century, Indonesian slaves at the Cape fought shoulder-to-shoulder with other Asian and African slaves as well as the indigenous Khoi and San peoples.

We remain grateful to the indigenous people of South Africa who embraced our brothers and sisters as their own granting them succour at times of strife. Not only do we have a shared history of political struggle, but our bloodlines also merged in the rich diversity of the South African people notably the community that has come to be known as Malay at the Cape.

Out of the adversity of slavery and colonialism came unintended yet positive consequences. Indonesian scholars, religious leaders, artists and royalty enslaved or imprisoned by the Dutch carried with them to the Cape the rich traditions of learning as well as the Islamic faith.
Early Figures, Ties and Texts

Our history books record that in 1693 Shaykh Yusuf from Makassar (Figure 1) was exiled to the Cape for his part in Banten Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa’s resistance to the Dutch invasion. A township of that name on the Cape Flats remains as homage to Shaykh Yusuf. The longstanding penal colony of Robben Island as well as the mainland is dotted with kramats (sacred centres) such as that of Shaykh Yusuf that are homage to this indelible shared history.

Over the past century, scholars from both our countries and further abroad have demonstrated that the Afrikaans language is a product not of the Dutch colonisers but the oppressed black peoples. We also take pride in the record of the Qur’an having been written from memory by notables from our community at the Cape; and we are humbled by the fact that some of those theologians that were exiled and whose forebears came from our lands contributed substantially towards the evolution of the Afrikaans as a language long before it became an official language of South Africa; their Arabic-Afrikaans manuscripts bear ample testimony to that.

Our Anti-Imperialist Stance

When the flames of anti-colonial resistance started to burn again in the early twentieth century, Indonesian and South African revolutionaries were to again act in solidarity in the quest for our mutual freedoms. We participated in anti-imperialist conferences of various sorts in different parts of the world.

The best known of these in South Africa’s liberation history is of course the 1955 Bandung Conference hosted by President Sukarno. The twenty-nine African and Asian countries, some of which had become independent by this time represented 1.5 billion people or 54% of the world’s population at the time. While the conference was organised in partnership with fraternal nations, it was a deep honour and privilege for Indonesia to be the host.

The Bandung Conference added fuel to the flame of revived resistance to colonial rule. Most of the countries represented in Bandung were soon to win their independence. The last of those was of course South Africa which made the defeat of apartheid a bitter-sweet victory. It is important to note
that the solidarity among Asian and African nations and the spirit of the Bandung Conference are still alive and were reinvigorated in 2015 during the 60th Anniversary of the Asia Africa Summit in Bandung, the same city like it was in 1955 (Figure 2).

**South Africa: From Celebrating its Silver Jubilee to Madiba’s Batik Shirts**

As South Africa celebrates the silver jubilee of its freedom, Indonesia is delighted that this year (2019) also marks 25 years since we established the diplomatic relations with South Africa and opened our embassy in the country. South Africa opened its embassy in Jakarta in 1995 and we were pleased to receive the then Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo for the official inauguration of the mission there in 1997.

No tribute to our firm diplomatic relations can go without reference to President Nelson Mandela. We were linked to Indonesia in the early years of our freedom. Following his release from prison in 1990, Nelson Mandela made several foreign tours, meeting supporters and politicians from various countries, including Indonesia. It was during his first visit to Jakarta, Indonesia, Mandela received a souvenir Batik shirt from then President Soeharto. Mandela eventually made the Batik shirt his trade mark outfit for international gatherings and events (Figure 3). Some of Mandela’s Batik shirts were designed by Indonesian Batik Maestro, Iwan Tirta. In South Africa on the other hand, the South African designer Desre Buirski was responsible for Mandela’s iconic Batik shirt apparel clothing which has come to be known universally as the Madiba shirt.

As Indonesians we can only be proud that one of our national dresses has come to be so closely identified with one of our closest partners in the world community of nations. Bilateral relations between Indonesia and South Africa are on firm foundations and we cooperate in many international treaties and councils.

**Afro-Asian Partners: Looking Ahead**

South Africa is Indonesia’s largest trading partner in Africa. We are especially keen for this relationship to grow. The spirit of Bandung was
essentially about South-South partnership and trade. We believe there to be great complementarities in our economies. We remain keen to share scientific expertise and are encouraged by scholarly exchanges that have been taking place largely unprompted by our governments. While manufacturing is a large part of both our economies, we are keen to grow other sectors like tourism, beneficiation of raw materials and green technologies.

We are confident that going forward into the next twenty-five years that our political, trade and people-to-people diplomacy will serve to strengthen our formidable shared history and contribute to mutual prosperity. We congratulate the South African government and people on the celebrations of twenty-five years of freedom and democracy as well as the opportunity to be hosted in this remarkably country during the past quarter century.
Cape Muslims

Shaykh Yusuf al-Makassari: A Founding Father

Figure 1: Shaykh Yusuf from Makassar

Bo-Kaap: Early Cape Malay Residential Area

Figure 2: Bandung 2015

Bandung 2015
Figure 3: Madiba and Batik

Madiba and Indonesian Batik Shirts
TANJUNG
Sebuah Puisi oleh Taufiq Ismail

Kepada Saudara-saudaraku di Cape hilang berabad,
demikian selamanya

Apa arti Afrika bagiku, begitu aku bertanya sendiri
Suatu malam pada minggu ketiga Syawal ini
Langit jernih dan bulan sabit di atas Desa Pandan
Apa makna Afrika kawasan selatan bagiku dalam perjalanan
Aku bersimpuh sunyi di lantai masjid kampung Pandan
Kipas angin telah berhenti berputar dan panas terasa menekan
Penerbangan di atas benua yang mendebarkan
Ada hutan raksasa dan ada sayup-sayup savanna
Ada hippo, ada rhino lalu kawan burung flamingo
Gundukan emas debu intan tanah menyilaukan bumi
Dan kulihat darah bersembuhan di sela-selanya
Lalu gemuruh kaki berlari, tambur berdentuman
Kudengar deru angin barat pada layar yang berkibar
Kapal dari Tanah Rendah di Tanjung turun Jangkar
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC
Kudengar hyena dan wildebeest meraung di belantara luas
Kulihat darah berserakan di atas logam dan batu-batuan
Kudengar bunyi angin timur pada layar yang berkibar
Kapal dari Khatulistiwa di Tanjung turun jangkar
Turunlah Syekh Yusuf di benua selatan
Lelaki pemberani yang menjalani pembuangan
Pemikir dalam sunyi yang mengguratkan tulisan
Ditakuti ketika memimpin pertempuran
Ditakuti ketika sudah jadi tulang-belulang
Ya Syekh, apa gerangan gumam zikirmu?
Yang sepanjang butir tasbihmu gemerlapan selama 300
Rata di atas dua samudera, mendaki langit lapis berlapis
Ada hyena dan wildebeest meraung di belantara luas
Ada ceceran darah, bertabur, kering dan basah
Tibalah Tuan Guru dari pulau sangat jauhnya
Lelaki pejuang yang menjalani pembuangan
Di dalam ingatannya tersimpan 30 juz Al-Quran
Dari jemarinya mengalir makrifah sebagai tulisan
Simaklah muridnya di madrasah Dorp Street bernyanyi:
“Alief dettis a, alief bouwa ie, alief dappan oe ;
a, ie, oe
Bah dettis bah, bah bouwa bieh, bah dappan boeh
bah, bieh, boeh
Ta dettis ta, ta bouwa tie, ta dappan toe
ta, tie, toe…”

Wahai Tuan Guru, apa gerangan wirid zikirmu?
Senjata rahasia di benua buangan sejauh ini
Bersama rombongan orang seperjalanan ini
Beribu-ribu, berperahu, menyandang takdir misteri
Kemilau tasbih 200 tahun menyeberangi dua samudera
Melayangi tujuh lapis langit bagaimana aku mengukurnya
Melata terbungkuk, menyeret berat logam belenggu
Ditiup angin timur ke benua ini
Samudera yang menghanyutkan nasib
Lewat abad-abad gemuruh dengan cakar yang perih
Kudengar raungan hyena dan wildebeest di belantara
Kulihat bercak merah, berserak dan basah.

Tanjung
Kuala Lumpur, Maret-April 1993
THE CAPE

A Poem by Taufiq Ismail

to my long-lost sisters and brothers in the Cape

What does Africa mean to me, I ask myself
One night on third week of Shawwal
The Sky is clear, a crescent on Desa Pandan
What is South Africa to me, I ask myself
I sit silently on the floor of Masjid Kampung Pandan
The fan stops circling, the heat starts pressing
Flying over a throbbing continent
Hippos, rhinos and flamingos
Gold and diamonds shining through the earth crust
With Blood spurting in between
Do I hear people stampeding, drums beating?
Did I hear west wind slapping the wide sails?
Ships from the Low-Lands in the Cape threw anchors
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC
I hear hyena and wildebeest roar in the savannas
I see blood painting the gold slabs and diamonds
I heard east wind howling on the flapping sails
Equatorial ships in the Cape threw anchors
Did I see Shaykh Maulana Yusuf stepping on this continent?
Courageous, exiled thousand of miles away
A thinker in complete silence, writing his books
Feared when he commanded battles
Feared when he became skeletons
Ya Shaykh, what is your zikr?
Shining beads of tasbih 300 years across the oceans
Now hyena and wildebeest roar in the savannas
Now Blood spurting, scattering, wet and dry
Did I see Tuan Guru Coming from far away waters?  
A Fighter for independence in exile  
In his cerebellum 30 juz of Al-Quran  
In his fingers ma’rifah flowing beautifully  
Did I hear his murid in Dorp Street madrasah singing  
“Alief dettis a, alief bouwa ie, alief dappan oe  
a, ie, oe  
Bah dettis bah, bah bouwa bieh, bah dappan boeh  
bah, bieh, boeh  
Ta dettis ta, ta bouwa tie, ta dappan toe  
ta, tie, toe…”

Ya Tuan Guru, what is your zikr?  
Shining beads of tasbih hundreds of years across the horizons  
Along with your people on the ships  
Thousand of them, sailing bearing the mystery of taqdir  
Stooping, chains, dragged, heavy on the crying earth  
Wind from the east blowing to this continent  
Oceans drifting the destiny  
In the midst of hyena and wildebeest roaring  
In the midst of blinding slabs of gold and sandy diamonds  
I see red wet stains, blood keeps spurting

The Cape  
Cape Town (translation), 22 April 1993
INTRODUCTION

Indonesia and South Africa’s Ties: Capturing an Evolving Partnership

Muhammed Haron and Ardhya Erlangga Arby

Indonesia and South Africa share a similar history of oppression and subjugation under colonial powers. Indonesia was colonized for more than 300 years and went through many ordeals in achieving its independence. Therefore, Indonesians could empathize and relate easily to the South African oppressed masses’ struggle for liberation against apartheid. The Indonesian government assisted their struggle within its capacity as a developing nation. And it always voiced its unstinting support in various international fora and organizations that it participated in and that it supported.

The relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of South Africa, prior to the latter have transformed itself into a democratic state, began on 10 February 1994 with the opening of the Liaison Office of the Republic of Indonesia (LORI) in Pretoria. Subsequently, the opening of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of South Africa began with the signing of the Joint Communiqué of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations by each of their Permanent Representatives at the United Nations on 12 August 1994. With the signing of the Joint Communiqué, the status of LORI was then upgraded to the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia; the Ambassador as the Head of Mission of the Republic of Indonesia led this. Meanwhile, South Africa opened its Embassy in Jakarta on 17 January 1995.

Reflecting upon the Partnership: Three Elements

When thinking about the cordial relations that exists between the two countries, then three elements that are always recalled. The first is Shaykh Yusuf’s struggle in the late 1600s against the VOC as well as his banishment to Cabo de Goede Hoop in South Africa (Jaapie 2018). In commemorating this historical event, South Africa Post Office and Indonesia’s PT Pos jointly
launched on 15th October 2011 a series of five stamps commemorating Shaykh Yusuf’s tangible contributions (van Niekerk 2011). The second is the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference; two South Africans, namely the South African Indian Congress’ Mr. Ahmad Cachalia, and the African National Congress’ Mr. Moses Kotane attended it; they were invited as observers (Acharya 2016). The third is Nelson Mandela’s special attachment to Indonesia through his love of ‘Batik’ clothes that came to be branded as ‘Madiba’s shirts’ in South Africa (Grant and Nodoba 2009).

Over the time, diplomatic relations between the two countries grew and developed into a strategic partnership. A Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful and Prosperous Future between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of South Africa was signed. This was duly done by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and South African President, Thabo Mbeki the on 8th March 2008 during President Yudhoyono’s state visit to South Africa.

On this occasion, the two countries also reaffirmed their commitment in strengthening partnerships between Asian and African countries through the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in which Indonesia and South Africa acted as Co-Chairs. As we consider their commitment and their partnership in NAASP as well as other organizations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), we should state that their participation in these should be assessed; we should pose the questions: How they fared as co-chairs in these projects? Who the drivers were that brought about the necessary changes? And, who assisted in achieving some if not all of the objectives that they had in mind?

Answering these and other questions would assist the socio-political and economic leadership in both countries to have a fair idea of the extent of their partnership and which challenges they need to overcome to expand and reinforce their relationship in these and other related organizations.

Sustaining the Relationship: Three Critical Issues

Now before we briefly reflect on this Jubilee Celebration text’s contents, we would like to make a few pertinent comments. The one is to stress the
need to support the two countries’ bilateral relationship that has been ongoing for 25 years; and the other is to sustain it as the years unfold. These should be considered as they work towards realizing their respective visions and various goals. By doing so, it is indeed hoped that the current connections will transform into a concrete South-South one; a bond that is no ordinary consensual association but one that is strategic on a regional as well as a global level.

The one issue is that one should evaluate is the amount of literature that has been produced over this period; literature that shows the nature of the relationship that had been developed over this period. In this regard, as we scan the published bibliographies of both Indonesia and South Africa, we wish to say that we are astounded at the paucity of material that covers the existing ties. Actually, those that dealt with the relationship failed to offer deep and substantial insights into the ties that have been forged.

So here, we need to ask a few hard questions and some of these are: Why have scholars in both countries neglected to research and assess these two countries’ political and economic relations? What are the reasons for the lack of scholarly outputs over the 25 years? Who should be blamed for not having undertaken the necessary studies that showed the developments and outcomes on different levels? And where are the institutions that should have taken up this significant challenge?

Though we do not intend to answer each of these questions, we raise them to underline the fact that in this area the academic institutions should have taken the lead in researching South-South matters generally and bilateral relations of member states particularly. Let us turn to the existing academic institutions in both Indonesia and South Africa and ask: Are there institutes/centres at any of the existing universities where there are specialists in Indonesia-South Africa relations? The answer to this question is simple ‘No’; since this is the case then the second issue is that it should be given immediate attention. Here both countries’ political leadership should see to it that, at least, two of their academic centres should shift their focus to these bilateral ties. The respective governments should set aside funding to train individuals from their countries to respectively specialize in Indonesian
and South African affairs. On top of that, they should also create a fund that contributes towards research to enhance the relationship.

And this brings us to the third issue and that is that the governments should seriously consider establishing independent think tanks or in setting up centres at their universities that would be able to produce studies and research that advance their respective national objectives and with their respective regions within their sights. At present and as far as is known, no such centre or institute exists, and it becomes imperative for governments to seriously consider this, if they indeed want to see the deepening and strengthening of a strategic partnership.

We are of the opinion that these institutions along with the trained experts would be contributing in a positive manner towards the production of relevant knowledge that will not only enrich their understanding of their relationship but that would result in an enhanced rapport. Having shared a few thoughts, we now turn the focus to the current text and reflect briefly on its contents. But prior to doing that few ideas about the jubilee celebrations should be in order.

**Commemorating the Relationship: The Jubilee Celebration**

Apart from Indonesia and South Africa having been appointed as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the period 2019-2020, the two countries should seize the moment to rejoice their diplomatic relations that began during 1994; it is for the latter reason that the two celebrate their jubilee anniversary. This being a special relationship that spans a quarter of a century, the time has arrived for the respective countries’ diplomats, specialists in international relations and a host of others to take a time in reviewing their connections. It also affords both a chance to reflect critically on their past and together they can consider ways of looking ahead; but for this to happen one must examine the past and assess the failures and successes of this relationship.

While we know that both countries have had a long relationship, we want to reiterate that not much scholarly works – except for popular pieces in the media – appeared to evaluate it. In the light of this shortcoming, it was decided to kick-start this process by bringing together a few thought leaders
– who hail from different backgrounds from within these two countries - to undertake the task of offering short insightful reflections.

The purpose of the work is to contribute towards an understanding and an appreciation of the dynamic and evolving relationship between these two countries in the South; in addition to this and since there is a paucity of material on this theme, this edited text sees itself as a stimulant for scholars who have an interest in this relationship. It would want these scholars to engage energetically with the theme and to produce a substantial work that critically evaluates the two countries’ ties over the past two and a half decades, and in the process, they should reflect on their current relationship.

**Recording the Ties: This Publication**

To this end and considering the above matters, the Pretoria-based Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Embassy initiated this project. It decided to publish this commemorative book to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia and South Africa, and to assess their relations as two nation-states from the South. The current text thus consists of a compilation of writings from a number of contributors who mainly come from Indonesia and South Africa; they consist of experts that are familiar with international relations/political science, diplomatic relations, history, economy and they include diplomats, academics, community leaders, government officials, business people, and journalists.

**Its Objectives and Beneficiaries**

This book is a compilation of valuable and informative writings about the relations between Indonesia and South Africa. It is hoped that this commemorative edition can be a source of information for those who are interested in broadening their knowledge about the relations between the two countries. Therefore, this text should be viewed as a non-commercial book and it should be of interest to, among others, Government Officials; Diplomats; Political Analysts; Academics; Historians; Businesspeople; Students; and the Public at large.
It’s Organization

The book is divided into four parts with each containing complementary chapters; the first evaluate ‘Political and Diplomatic Relations – The State Actors’, the second considers ‘Events and Institutions: Binding the Partnership’, the third focuses on ‘Economic and Trade: Advancing the Connections’, and the last reflects on ‘Non-State Actors.’ It opens by acknowledging those who contributed to this edited text and recognizing the remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Her Excellency Ms. Retno L.P. Marsudi.

Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Honorable Salman Al Farisi’s previously published Foreword was used as an entry point into this celebratory publication. The basic reason being that he captured many of the key elements that bind the relationship between Indonesia and South Africa; and since he covered a variety of inter-related ideas, which have also been touched upon by other contributions throughout this publication, it was thus considered an appropriate piece.

Prior to this Introduction, which is self-explanatory, the editors included a poem by the well-respected award-winning Indonesian poet, Taufiq Ismail; the latter had come on his maiden voyage during April 1993 with a Malaysian delegation that was led by Tans Sri Professor Drs. Ismail Hussein to the Cape; the poem somewhat captured the ties between our regions.

After the Introduction, the first part with its concentration on Political and Diplomatic Relations – The State Actors opens with Siswo Pramono’s chapter; he discusses Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Engaging with Africa, and herein he also skimpily reflects on its policies towards South Africa. Teuku Faizasyah offers the reader a broad overview of the two countries in his informative chapter Indonesia and South Africa: Building A New Generation of Partnership. Ambassador Dr. Hilton Fisher whose chapter South Africa and Indonesia: A Brief Assessment of Their Relations covers related elements that ties in with both Pramono and Faizasyah’s chapters. Compared to the three chapters, Professor Dirk Koetze looks at the early relationship by narrating the Birth of a Diplomatic Relationship: (through) Mandela’s personal ties and Indonesia in which he elaborates on aspects that Ambassador Al-Farisi describes in his Foreword.
The backdrop in part one clears the way for the text to shift the focus to a few celebratory **Events and Institutions** that **binds their partnership**; the contributors offer critical insights into the way the ties, which have developed between Indonesia and South Africa, were cemented. Professor Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo’s chapter provides a critical reflection by *Rethinking the Bandung Conference in an Era of ‘unipolar liberal globalization’ and movements toward a ‘multipolar politics’*; it is an established fact that this historical event has been pivotal for the two countries. Dr. Arifi Saiman turns his attention to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to demonstrate to what extent *Indonesia - South Africa: Truly Co-partner in the Indian Ocean Region*. He offers rich insights into IORA and the role of these two nation-states. Complementing Dr. Arifi Saiman’s important chapter Professor Muhammed Haron considers a few aspects that look at *South Africa and Indonesia: Two States Compared*. Like some of the other essays, he too describes institutions that connect the two countries.

Since one cannot discuss the relationship between the two without factoring in their **Economic and Trade** that **advances their connections**, the text evaluates these aspects. In this section, Mr. Ebrahim Patel, who has had personal Indonesian experiences, talks about *Business Indonesia: Prospects for South African Companies*; he shares some significant insights that guides South Africans who wish to undertake business in Indonesia. Mr. Moses Mudzwiti, however, addresses the ties from a different angle in his *Indonesia counts South Africa among leading African partners*. Thereafter, Muhammed Haron describes the *Indonesia Trade Promotion Center Johannesburg: Luring Companies, Marketing Products*; this is a centre that has functioned and that continues to operate as an important conduit since its inception to solidify the existing bonds.

The book rounds off with its emphasis on the contributions of **Non-State Actors** in **enhancing their relationship** in the international relations arena. Muhammed Haron returns to the *Early Communal Connections (circa 1650s-1850s): (that connects) South Africa’s Kaap de Goede Hoop and Indonesia’s Batavia*. Herein he reflects in some detail upon the ties that were accidentally forged by the VOC. Shaykh Muttaqin Rakiep’s essay on his father’s *Quest after Ancestral Roots: Al-Haj Nurel Erefaan Rakiep’s (1922-*
2005) Story gives a different dimension of international relations; and the same applies to Shaykh Ridwan Rylands’ essay (co-authored with one of the editors). The latter is, however, a personal reflection that interrogates Shaykh Ridwan Rylands and Prof. Dr. Hj Tutty Alawiyah: Creating Networks, Forging Ties. The final chapter in this section is by Mr. Zeinoul Cajee; he tells us about AwqafSA’s collaborative efforts with Indonesian institutions to promote Awqaf work; Cajee’s essay evaluates AwqafSA: Its Relations with Indonesian Institutions. Shaykh Shahid Esau’s essay (co-authored with one of the editors) narrates the Muslim Judicial Council’s Indonesian Ties: Recording its International Profile. The book closes with a poem by Shaykh Luqman Rakiep that reflects on his father’s historical 1993 journey; it clearly homes in on a relationship that falls in the non-state actor sector. This edited text then closes with a Postscript: Looking Ahead penned by the Editors.
PART ONE

Political and Diplomatic Relations – The State Actors
1. Introduction

In its second term, President Joko Widodo’s government will be all out to in fostering economic development. President Joko Widodo’s vision on economic development has been reflected in the set of priorities of the Indonesian foreign policy.

Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi, in her introductory speech on “The Priority of Indonesian Foreign Policy 2019-2024”, delivered on 29th October 2019, has elevated economic diplomacy at the top of agenda. And economic diplomacy is sustained by two pillars: commercial diplomacy and development cooperation. Africa is a case in point. Indonesia has successfully organized Indonesia-Africa Forum in 2018.

In 2019, again, Indonesia organized Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue. Both were organized in Bali. When the Minister elaborated her foreign policy priority, Minister Retno maintained that,

“…Indonesia state owned companies and private enterprises would continue to engage Africa in the realm of trade on goods and services, as well as investment, in particular in infrastructure and construction business…”

Beyond business, during Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue, Indonesia reiterated its commitment to improve the quality of the long-established development cooperation with Africa. It is in Indonesian and African common interests that business and development cooperation should go together. In Indonesian perspective, Africa would assume a strategic role in the evolving global landscape.
2. New Global Landscape: East Asia, North America, Western Europe, and Africa

The continent remains the same, but the order is changing. As indicated in Figure 1, global economy is now sustained by three competing pillars. Calculating from the data available in the World Bank in 2018, East Asia, as represented by RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) region, provides the largest aggregation of combined GDP, which is about USD 27.3 trillion, with a total population of 3.5 billion. Most of this population is in productive age. This gigantic economy is sustained by rapid industrialization, driven by industry 4.0. However, as indicated in Figure 1, this rapidly growing region, or at least in some of its part, from time to time, still suffer from political fragility (as marked by yellow color).

The second largest pillar is North America, or as known as NAFTA region, with a combined GDP of USD 23.3 trillion, and with a total population of 0.5 billion. The region is politically stable (as marked by green color). The third largest pillar is European Union, with a total GDP combined of USD 18.7 trillion, and with a population of 0.5 billion, which is mostly aging. As indicated in Figure 1, Europa Union represents the most sustainable political entity in the modern world (as marked by blue color).

As, on the one hand, North America is blessed with energy resources, of which the U.S. is now the net exporter of energy; on the other hand, the heavily industrialized East Asia (the RCEP region) and European Union both suffer from energy scarcity. While energy efficiency and renewable energy are being vigorously pursued in both East Asia and European Union, the importation on energy and other natural resources is a *conditio sine qua non* for the survival of their industry.

Then comes Africa. In terms of fragility, Africa largely remains unstable region (as marked by red color). Nevertheless, this is a continent full of all potentials. As indicated in Figure 2, Africa represents a strategic source for global energy security and food security. IMF predicted that African economy will grow by 4.3% in 2020. Its middle class counted for 382.8 million (World Bank 2018) with a labor forces predicted to be 1.1 billion in 2034.

According to the Brookings think tank, about 60% of African total population are young (www.brookings.edu). The future of Asia and Europe will increasingly be dependent on Africa, for energy and natural resources.
As such, both Asia and Europe need to form a new partnership with Africa and help the continent to develop and stabilize.

3. Africa: from Frontier to Emerging Market

As indicated in Figure 3, most of the fast-growing emerging market are in Asia, chief among others are Indonesia, China, Philippines, and India. Their economy grows in 2016-2020 by about 5-8% annually. While the fast-growing frontier markets, are mostly located in Africa, chief among others are Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Mozambique. Their economy has grown in 2016-2020 by about 5-8% as well. With such a trend, there is a high expectation that, soon the African fast-growing frontier markets will reach the status of emerging markets.

Many countries in Asia has anticipated such a possibility. Therefore, an early engagement to Africa, to build trust and partnership with them is, for Asia, strategically important. Many countries in Asia have intensified their relations with Africa. Strategic forums such as China-Africa Summit, Japan-Africa Summit, India-Africa Forum Summit, India-Africa Strategic Dialogue, Indonesia-Africa Forum, Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue, Malaysia’s Langkawi Dialogue, and Vietnam-Africa International Forum flourish. Thus, in Asia, all eyes are now looking west to Africa; all economies are also acting westwards towards Africa. Moreover, all, too, raise the same question: how far has African political stability been improved?

4. Is Africa Stabilizing and Developing?

An interpretation of United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2015-2017 indicated that 43% of internal conflicts worldwide is in Africa (PACIS – PADA, 2017). The data extracted from Humanitarian Data Exchange have also indicated that violence-based displacements in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly from 2007-2017 have increased. Figure 4 indicates this trend.

The figure indicates that if the color of the bubble is blue, then the displacement is due to natural disaster; if the color is orange, the displacement is due to political violence. In fact, most displacement in Sub-Sahara Africa is due to political violence. The African Union’s policy on Silencing the Gun, however, gives some hopes for the better prospect of
peace in the vast continent.

With peace, comes stability; and with stability, comes more opportunities for economic development. Figure 5 indicates how McKinsey’s African Stability Index pinpoints countries’ growth and risk profiles. According to McKinsey, southern part of Africa enjoys more stability rather than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, for instance, South Africa, as the second largest economy in the continent after Nigeria, is blessed with a more stable environment, even though she is still qualified as “slow grower.” While Nigeria’s economic growth is a bit higher than South Africa, but its environment is also less favorable since it is in the conflict prone region of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is then qualified as vulnerable grower. However, many African countries are now considered as stable growers such as Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia.

Despite of the somewhat complex qualification of growth in Africa, recently Indonesia has managed to have a better access into African markets. As previously elaborated, this year Indonesia organized Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue. The dialogue has resulted in projects worth USD 822 million. The distribution of such projects is the depicted in Figure 5.

The other positive development in Africa is the increasing Africa’s intra-regional trade as indicated in Figure 6. The conclusion of African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) will provide impetus for the further improvement of intra-regional trade.

Indonesia has also learned the role of European Union (EU) in Africa. The EU is a partner in doing business in Africa, as it concerns the global value chain. As depicted in Figure 7, the largest investors in Africa (for FDI Projects) are still EU member countries. The proportion of EU FDI projects is 33%, while U.S. is 18% and China is barely 8%.

On the question of entry points into Africa, Indonesia should consider the strategic importance of South Africa. As indicated in Figure 8, the World Bank has provided a measurement of Logistic Performance Index (LPI), which indicators consist of: customs, infrastructures, international segments, logistics competence, tracking and tracing, and timeliness. South Africa has an LPI of 3.38, which is considerably high, and comparable with those of Indonesia and India. As such, for Indonesia, South Africa represent a good entry point towards African markets. Commercial diplomacy aside, it is now time to explore more on development cooperation.
5. Development Cooperation

On 18th October 2019, Vice-President Jusuf Kalla inaugurated the instalment of Indonesian Agency for International Development (Indonesian AID). However, Indonesia’s commitment to support and promote development cooperation has dated back for decades.

The establishment of Indonesian AID reflects the commitment of the Indonesian Government in supporting world development, especially in reducing poverty and social inequality. The scheme includes grants to foreign governments and institutions. To date, the Government of Indonesia has initiated no less than 1,000 technical cooperation programs within the framework of South-South Cooperation in three main areas, namely development, good governance, and the economy.

Africa is a focus for Indonesia’s development cooperation. From 2006 to 2019, more than 1,200 people from Africa have participated in various South-South Cooperation organized in Indonesia. The programs are either individually organized by Indonesia or implemented in triangular basis. Foreign donors, such as Islamic Development Bank, UNIDO, US Aid, CSSTC, supports and contribute to the implementation of the program. The development cooperation programs offered to Africa includes agriculture, water management, health, family planning, poverty eradication, microfinance, education, fishery, custom and quarantine, peace and democracy, good governance, and SDGs. It is an everyone’s hope that development cooperation can strengthen the foundation of Indonesia – Africa ties.

6. Conclusion

Indonesia has established long and multifaceted ties with Africa. In the modern time, the Indo-African ties reached an ideological peak during the decolonization period, with the convening of the 1955 Asian – African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.

By the end of Cold War, international relations have materialized into a new global landscape, as the world moved into the new millennium. This new era is characterized by the rise of Asia. Soon, it will be followed by the rise of Africa as well. It is thus now time for Asia and Africa to re-establish ties in the new context. Africa is now, again, a priority for the foreign policy of countries in Asia, including Indonesia.
Figure 1. The Three Pillars + 1 Story

Three Pillar + 1

Source: Fund for Peace, 2018, processed by PADA

Figure 2. Potentials in Africa

Source: Compiled by PADA from various sources: IMF, World Bank, Brookings
Figure 3. Africa from Frontier Market to Emerging Market

GDP Growth Rates: Frontier, Emerging, Developed Markets


Figure 4: Africa’s Violence

Africa: Question of Violence

Source: https://data.humdata.org/visualization/decade-migration/
Figure 5. African Stability Index and Potential Center of Growth in Africa

Africa’s Centres of Growth

Source: McKinsey’s African Stability Index, modified by PADA

Figure 6. Africa’s Intra-Regional Trade (In million US dollars)

Africa’s Centres of Growth

Source: UNCTAD, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx
Figure 7. FDI Project in Africa

Africa: Its FDI

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in Rank vs. 2016</th>
<th>FDI Projects</th>
<th>Proportionate share</th>
<th>Year-on-year change</th>
<th>Proportionate share</th>
<th>Jobs created from FDI</th>
<th>Jobs per project: 0000s</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBM database, 2017; FDI Markets.

Figure 8. Logistics Performance Index 2018

Global Logistic Performance

Source: World Bank
CHAPTER TWO

Indonesia and South Africa: Building A New Generation of Partnership

Ambassador Teuku Faizasyah

1. Introduction:

When I first arrived in South Africa in 2003 accompanying the late Ambassador Nana Sutresna for a brief visit to promote Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), my heart was filled with joy. Alas, I had finally fulfilled my dream to visit a country with so much historical connection with Indonesia. By the early 17th century, South Africa’s Cape of the Good Hope or Tanjung Harapan as it is referred to in the Indonesian language served as a transit point for the Dutch mercantilists in their long voyage to the “spice islands,” today’s Indonesia. Indonesia and South Africa share a similar fate of having been occupied by the Dutch mercantilists and in the case of Indonesia, it was later on under the Netherlands. Both were able to unshackle the tyranny of colonial oppression. Indonesia seized its freedom in 1945, four decades earlier than South Africa. The general election in South Africa in 1994 marked the rebirth of the country and an end to apartheid.

During these decades, long international campaigns against apartheid were underway and Indonesians faithfully sided with their oppressed brothers and sisters in South Africa. Throughout these years, the holders of Indonesian diplomatic and service passports carried a traveling document stamped with “not valid to travel to Israel and South Africa”. The stamped signified, and remain valid to this day, Indonesia’s commitment to fulfil constitutional obligation to help eradicate colonialism from the earth’s surface. After the collapse of apartheid, the remaining legacy of colonialism continues with the occupation of Palestine by Israel that has also been described as an apartheid state.

This essay is structured into two parts. The first part looks into areas of common interest and interlinked cooperation in the political sphere between Indonesia and South Africa. The second part attempts to highlight areas for
an enhanced bilateral cooperation, which I refer to as ‘new generation of partnerships’ between the two countries.

2. Long Years of Intertwined Destiny and Interests

For many present day’s younger generation, the history of annexation, colonization, imperialism, and apartheid would seem distant. Growing up in a digitalised world, they are connected to every corner of the world - spurred by the advancement of information technology and enhanced further by a plethora of social media platforms. Connectivity becomes the norm; collaboration beyond border is feasible; and consequently, times and distances become less abstract.

It is somewhat ironic that the sea voyage in the late 16th century to search for colony helped connect three continents - Europe, Africa and Asia. Unfortunately, it was an undesirable connectivity; one in which the weaker ethno-cultural communities (that is, in Africa and Asia) were subjugated by the stronger ones (that is, Europe).

2.1 The Early Period: The Cape’s Melayu Community

In the case of Indonesia and South Africa, the Dutch that connected the two. Traces of intermingling of the two nations could be found in the Western Cape Province; a region that became a resting place for Indonesian freedom fighters such as Sheikh Yusuf and Tuan Guru as well as their devoted followers.

They were exiled far away from their home - centuries old Sultanate of Banten; the Province of Banten in today’s Indonesia - because they were campaigning and fighting for freedom against the colonial power. When they were in the Cape, they introduced some Malay words into Afrikaans language and spread Islam. They were the forbearer of a community known today as Cape Malay.

After South Africa embraced freedom following the election in 1994, some of the Cape Malays travelled to Indonesia to trace back their roots. The Cape Malays help bridged the two countries from a religio-cultural perspective. Surely, such people to people relations provide the two countries and their respective governments with a good foundation to
establish multi-sectors of cooperation and cooperation; this is not only in the political realm where it is a necessity as there are so much areas of interests but also in the socio-cultural and economic spheres.

2.2 The Asia-Africa Conference and the ANC Connection

Actually, political cooperation is central in Indonesia and South Africa relations. At the seminal Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, the African National Congress (ANC) sent representatives; on that occasion, that delegation’s table was decorated with its own South African’s flag. From then on, the Indonesian government lend not only political support, but it also provided financial backing to the ANC during their campaigns for freedom over many decades.

In 1990, Indonesia was among the few countries visited by Nelson Mandela as the ANC’s Chairperson. During the visit, President Soeharto provided financial support for the ANC’s planned electoral campaign. On another visit to Indonesia during 1994, Nelson Mandela raised the issue of East Timor to President Soeharto, particularly the plight of East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, jailed in Jakarta’s prison. In retrospect, his inquiry as a friend of Indonesia was proper as East Timor (known as Timor Leste after gaining independence) had never been colonised by the Netherlands.

On a related by minor note, Indonesia had no historical claim toward East Timor as it was colonised by Portugal. In 1975, Indonesia intervened and incorporated East Timor as part of Indonesia when a state of fear, confusion and tumult were prevalence there, and at a time when the global landscape was marked with the Cold War. As a successor state of a Dutch colony, Indonesia’s inherited territories from West to East of the archipelago - from Sabang in Aceh to Merauke in Papua.

2.3 The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership

In early 2000, when Indonesia wished to recalibrate its relations with Africa and searched for partners, Indonesia approached South Africa. The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) served as a vehicle to
revamp Indonesia’s relationship with African countries. Since the founding of NAASP in 2005, Indonesia has been collaborating with South Africa as co-chairs of NAASP.

Although the NAASP gave more focus on economic sectors, as a strategic framework it cannot delink the issues of economic and social development with political issues. In fact, one of the three pillars of NAASP is political solidarity, particularly with Palestine in its efforts to unshackle the occupation by the Israeli military forces.

Either bilaterally or through NAASP, Indonesia and South Africa must intensify collaboration to end the dehumanization of the Palestinians by the implementation of apartheid kind of system by Israel in the occupied territory. Realizing the two-state solution wherein Israel and Palestine can live side by side in harmony serves as the common objective for both Indonesia and South Africa.

Africa is not a monolithic continent. It is so diverse in terms of cultural and ethnic identities, be it from Western to Eastern Africa and from Northern to Southern Africa. Yet they all share similar story line of having been colonized, having struggled for independence and, at one point, became pawns or proxies during the armed conflicts in the Cold War era. Many countries in Asia also shared similar stories.

Interestingly many Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea and Vietnam are veterans of Cold War and they were able to transform rapidly their socio-economic foundations. They developed faster than other Asian countries and the majority of African countries. Other Asian countries such as Japan and China became economic powerhouses, and they even serve as engines for regional and global growth.

NAASP was designed to apply in the context of Africa, the lesson learned from Asia’s success in promoting development and economic progress. It is far from a dictate or top-down process, as it is more like a peer group partnership process to empower others and provide capacity to develop skills and increase economic capacities.

Any government needs a capacity to provide basic needs as well as to stimulate economic empowerment and welfare to their citizens. They need to ensure greater predictability within the political domain, infuse political
stability and consequently create more space for a mutually beneficial cooperation beyond borders.

For a nation to survive and progress, political stability and national cohesion is necessary. Failure to achieve this prerequisite condition for development will hamper progress and leave those nations behind. Regretfully, armed conflicts within national border still prevalence across Asia and Africa. This circumstance has further limited government’s capacity to generate hope to their people.

It is somewhat ironic that in an era where peace-keepers’ roles remain relevant, some developed countries gradually cut their contributions towards multilateral organizations. This tendency will jeopardise the United Nations in advancing their primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.

Therefore, the international community needs to renew their resolve for greater solidarity towards the plight of the less fortunate nations, among others by helping them build economic opportunities. The key word is to provide the people and nations with hope.

This is where NAASP, as a platform for Asia-Africa’s cooperation, finds its resonance as they generate positivism and hope.

3. A New Generation of Partnership

The newly transformed Indonesia - following political and economic reform in late 1990s - finds comfort in developing partnership with South Africa. The two countries share similar transformative experiences into a democratic system of governance; South Africa from an apartheid and Indonesia from an authoritarian system.

A democratic system of governance allows both countries to accelerate socio, economic and political progress as they are now having surplus of positive energy. In the past, the energy was spent more in maintaining political order through the adoption of a strong hand tactic.

By extrapolating their democratic experiences, Indonesia and South Africa can help generate positive energy and stimulate positive change in terms of governance at a regional level. For some years now, Indonesia organises Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) as a platform for governments in
Asia-Pacific to exchange experiences in their democratic experimentation. The intention is to allow participating countries to learn from one another best practices in governance. This is also in consideration that there is no single perfect model of democratic system of governance; each has their own advantages and disadvantages. Based on Indonesia’s democratic experiences - although the process sometimes is slow and at times messy - the governing system allows more transparency, predictability and political participations. Hence, the system contributes positively to stability.

Indonesia and South Africa also share similar interest to affect positive change, both at bilateral and regional levels. Together with other like-minded countries, they can help nurture homegrown and regional capacities to manage disruption because of sudden change. There are many factors that triggered change - ranging from the force of nature to man-made disasters, such as armed conflict as well as failure to deal with poverty and diseases. Majority of nations and even the well-endowed ones have difficulty to respond promptly to earthquakes and tsunamis. When a nation is left with no means after such calamity, civil disobedience and chaos often arise. The outbreak of Ebola, for example, left many governments in Africa and their affected communities paralysed. Likewise, the avian flu that struck some Asian countries had precarious implications for their economies such as an outflow of tourists. Their economies were further weakened when some governments issued travel warnings that automatically affected the inflow of visitors.

In the health sector, Indonesia and South Africa should promote the creation of a global system that allows less advantages countries greater access for affordable medicine and vaccines. Reformation in the health sector and creating a more just system is urgent, considering that major drugs companies have monopoly on medicines based on the patent rights. Dealing with traditional and non-traditional threats, including new forms of security challenges posed by cybercrime is necessary. Both countries need to work together in enhancing their respective capacities and capabilities to counter these threats. It cannot be denied that communal extremism and the rise of identity-base chauvinism, including white supremacy and Islamophobia pose a threat to harmonious relations among nations.
Both Indonesia and South Africa are pluralistic countries that experienced discrimination and subjugation under the colonial powers. Therefore, the two countries can speak with confidence on the importance of embracing equality and harmony among different cultures and faith.

4. Postscript

Bilateral relationships between Indonesia and South Africa are founded upon many similarities, including historical background, national building process and commitment towards the fate of those less fortunate nations across the globe.

Fast forward, the new generation of partnership will be steered by the new band of intellectuals, diplomats and prospective leaders from Indonesia and South Africa. They are the ones who have more say on how to chart the next chapter in the bilateral relations.

In the wake of constant change in the global milieu, they will have to observe the lessons learned from the existing bilateral relations that make future projection of possible areas of cooperation; and this is by anticipating different sets of scenarios regarding various challenges and opportunities.

The intention of this essay was to trigger explorative thinking among the future leaders of Indonesia and South Africa on the course of actions that they can do together to address the present and future challenges.
CHAPTER THREE

South Africa and Indonesia:
Brief Assessment of Their Relations

Ambassador Dr. Hilton Fisher

1. Introduction

2019 ushered in 25 years of formal diplomatic ties between South Africa and Indonesia. Whilst these 25 years have been good ones, there has been a much longer history between the two countries – most likely an unintended consequence of Dutch colonialism.

This article intends to explore in brief the important historical links between South Africa and Indonesia. It will also make brief reference to the role that Indonesia played during the apartheid years in South Africa and the immediate aftermath in 1994. In addition, it will of necessity consider current areas of collaboration and delineate future possible areas of cooperation.

2. Historical Ties

Historical ties between South Africa and Indonesia were at first premised on religious and cultural ties that arose because of the banishment of Sheikh Yusuf (d.1699) from Indonesia. Sheikh Yusuf a Goa-born nobleman fought alongside Sultan Agung of Banten in the war against the Dutch. Sheikh Yusuf had twice been arrested by the Dutch and had escaped on each occasion. He was promised a pardon by the Dutch, so he handed himself over. The Dutch broke their promise of a pardon and banished him and his followers first to Colombo, Sri Lanka and then to the Cape of Good Hope.

The Sheikh arrived in Cape Town with an entourage and was allocated a farm called Zandvliet, which is today known as Makassar. In an unintended way the Dutch, when they banished Shaykh Yusuf to the Cape, introduced the Islam to Cape Town. Shaykh Yusuf died in Zandvliet (modern-day Macassar) and his shrine has been a place of pilgrimage ever since. Indonesia cultural, religious relations therefore date back to 1694 when Sheikh Yusuf
and his entourage were banished to Cape Town. This constitutes 325 years of ties.

Prince Abdullah bin Qadi Abus-Salaam (d.1805) was another Indonesian who was banished to the Cape in 1780 from the Kingdom of Tidore in Indonesia by the Dutch. He was incarcerated on Robben Island where he transcribed two copies of the Holy Qur’an from memory. He was popularly called Tuan Guru (mister teacher). These are but two examples of Indonesians being banished to the Cape by the Dutch. The descendants of these people still live and worship in and outside Makassar.

The Dutch seem to be a common denominator between South Africa and Indonesia. It is for this reason that there are many words in Bahasa Indonesia that can be traced back to the Dutch language roots. Afrikaans that was similarly impacted upon by indigenous languages can be defined as an “old” Dutch. There seems to be strong evidence that the first book published in Afrikaans in the Cape was a theological text.

3. Indonesia in Africa

Indonesia has historically supported the struggle for freedom in South Africa. A phrase that Indonesians often use during diplomatic events is “friendly countries”. Indonesia deems this phrase to be extremely significant. South Africa is one of those “friendly countries” and has been deemed so for the last 25 years. Indonesia did not deem South Africa to be “friendly” when apartheid was at its height, hence it did not have any diplomatic relations with the country. This foregoing is exemplified by the fact that Indonesia severed diplomatic ties with South Africa in response to a 1962 United Nations resolution. The Indonesian Government severed diplomatic and commercial relations and announced the closing of Indonesian ports to apartheid South Africa. This solidarity with the progressive forces in South Africa would last until the formal re-establishment of diplomatic ties 25 years ago.

Indonesia’s ties with Africa and its determination to break with colonialism were given credence when it hosted a conference – the 1955 Bandung Conference – when 29 African and Asian countries met. The Bandung conference was a significant bulwark against colonial rule.
Indonesia continues to show a keen interest in Africa with its hosting of the Indonesia-Africa Forum (2018) and Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (2019). The fact that the African Union was represented at a high level at the Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue shows that there is an appetite on both sides to ensure mutual cooperation.

Former President Nelson Mandela visited Indonesia in 1991 and 1994. It is popularly claimed in Indonesia that Mandela was introduced to the batik shirt in Indonesia. President Mandela revelled in his batik shirts meeting kings, queens and the elite of the world in them. On a reciprocal visit to South Africa by President Soeharto in 1997, the first by an Indonesian President, President Mandela noted that “...history and morality...” require South Africa and Indonesia to play an integral part in resolving conflicts, promoting peace, promoting stability and encouraging democracy through regional and international fora. These are prophetic words, the tenets of which are today being implemented by South Africa and Indonesia through cooperation in, among others, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

4. Indonesia and South Africa: Towards a Partnership

Indonesia views South Africa as a strategic partner in Africa. There are synergies to be identified between the economies of South Africa and Indonesia with the obvious areas being tourism and cultural exchanges. Indonesian culture in Cape Town is evident in the names of the people, the food, the religion and the language. Deeper integration is possible through South Africa being able to sell its high quality halal products, fresh produce and agro-processed goods into the Indonesian market. Other areas of cooperation that could be beneficial to both countries include investment in infrastructure, technology exchanges to enhance the 4th Industrial revolution and people-to-people exchanges.

South Africa and Indonesia also share strong ties on the multilateral front. South Africa and Indonesia are both currently serving two-year terms as elected members in the UNSC, where there are many areas of convergence, including inter alia, seeking a resolution in Palestine, climate change, peacekeeping and gender-related matters. South Africa and
Indonesia additionally share platforms such as IORA and G-20 to name but a selected few. Additionally, South African and Indonesia play very important roles in continental and regional bodies such as the African Union and ASEAN, respectively.

Having sketched the indelible history between South Africa and Indonesia, one could argue that this indelible history should forge the foundation for future co-operation. There are “blood ties”, there are religious ties, there are economic ties (albeit limited) and we share similar ideals in the international body politic. How do we harness these similarities to the common benefit of our peoples?

South Africa and Indonesia entered into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in March 2008 when Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met. Additionally, President Jacob Zuma conducted a State visit to Indonesia in 2017 during which South Africa and Indonesia signed the Plan of Action 2017–2021 for the Implementation of the Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful and Prosperous Future between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. It complemented the previous document that was signed during 2008.

This is a comprehensive plan that is being implemented through concrete initiatives between the two countries. The opportunities for cooperation between South Africa and Indonesia abound. It is time for concrete action. The positive signs are there!
CHAPTER FOUR

Birth of a Diplomatic Relationship: Mandela and Indonesia

Prof. Dirk Kotze

1. Introduction

For many South Africans, Indonesia is not well known. The older generation might remember the Bandung conference in 1955. Persons in the Cape Peninsula, who are descendants of slaves brought by the Dutch East India Company to the Cape, have a much closer association with the country. Food connoisseurs know about the strong historical association in the form of dishes like bobotie, which are today regarded as truly South African. Most of the members of the Muslim community in the Western Cape are also primarily descendants from Indonesians. President Nelson Mandela appreciated these historical, religious and political connections and visited Indonesia four times, twice as President.

President Mandela’s iconic status even today motivates persons to find some or other memory or evidence of how they related to him. Many have a photograph taken together with him, or his signature or can tell a story of a personal experience with him. States also wanted to claim his friendship or his attention. The South African/Indonesian friendship and diplomatic relations in the 1990s were still very new during the Mandela period, and both countries were trying to find their feet in the process. This chapter concentrates on the role that President Mandela played in these relations.

The discussion will briefly concentrate on President Mandela’s diplomacy and how a new South African foreign policy unfolded. Indonesia’s place in these dynamics will then become more apparent. It is followed by a focus on President Mandela’s status in Indonesia after his period as president has come to an end. In 1997, two state visits happened between the two states and President Mandela’s formal addresses at both events are analysed. It is followed by a brief discussion of Mandela’s initiatives regarding Timor Leste. Finally, Indonesia was responsible for a very important characteristic of President Mandela’s appearance, in the form of the “Madiba” batik shirts.
2. Mandela’s diplomacy and foreign policy

The victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994 in the first
democratic election did not only determine who the new government
would be, but it also enabled a new post-apartheid constitution to be
implemented. Very important in this respect, was President Mandela’s task
to introduce South Africa to the international community after years of
international isolation, sanctions and active opposition by the different
anti-apartheid movements. With many states, South Africa as a state had
had no experience of diplomatic relations. It included Indonesia. The ANC
had official representatives in several countries before 1990, but that could
be regarded, at best, as quasi-diplomatic relations.

President Mandela dominated from the start the new South African
diplomacy. As an iconic figure, he was able to forge diplomatic friendships
often by unconventional means. Often is was more a product of Mandela’s
personality and the fact that so many leaders wanted to be seen with him,
and not so much about formal international relations or foreign policy.

South African foreign policy in the 1990s went through a radical
transformation. Before 1994, the South African government’s relations were
primarily with the West, a few Latin American states and pariah states like
Taiwan, as well as Israel. After 1994, Africa, Eastern Europe and most of Asia
became prominent partners. States despised by the West, like Cuba, Libya
and North Korea as well as the Palestinian territory and Western Sahara
were treated as South African allies, mostly because of the ANC’s historical
fraternal relations.

Foreign policy principles also changed: promotion of human rights
and democratization became policy-directing values; multilateralism in
the UN was promoted but a restructuring or “democratization” of these
international institutions was at the same time propagated; and a close
association with the global South and developing countries. Promotion of
peace and development and therefore South Africa’s active involvement in
conflict situations, emerged as a central feature of the Mandela policy. Like
with most states, trade diplomacy was valued as a key policy objective, but
the Mandela administration could not produce the expected results in this
respect quick enough.

From a policy point of view, Indonesia found a place in the new policy
as an Asian state, as part of the global South and a continuation of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), as a developing state, and as a state with cultural
and religious associations with South Africa. Economic bilateral relations would be most important in the initial period, because together with the economic successes of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and others, they developed into a model of economic growth for South Africa. Later, the notion of a “developmental state” became popular in the South African government.

The basis for bilateral diplomatic relations was laid in the process of South Africa redefining its identity as a state in the global context. South Africa widened its global loyalties to include a close association with Africa, with the global South, with the developing world, and with the emerging markets. In the process, its reliance on the West was toned down. Indonesia’s state identity in global terms appeared to be similar as South Africa’s and that constituted an attractive basis for their bilateral diplomatic relations. In the early years of this relationship, President Mandela saw the opportunity to induce his own personality into this relationship.

3. President Mandela’s Legacy in Indonesia

The International Nelson Mandela Day (18 July) is often celebrated in Indonesia. Mandela also served the purpose as link between the ANC and Indonesia. In 2013, the spokesperson of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed: “Indonesia’s staunch support to [the] anti-apartheid movement was highly respected by Nelson Mandela that made him visit Indonesia in 1990, soon after he was released”. Indonesia’s support for the anti-apartheid struggle of the ANC is emphasized on both sides: by the Indonesian state when they celebrate Mandela’s life, and by Mandela and the ANC after 1990. Indonesia traces this support to the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, attended also by ANC leaders.

The notion of liberation is taken one-step further, and it is presented as a common experience on both sides. The fact that Indonesian leaders were sent to the Cape during the Dutch colonial period, such as Sheikh Yusuf of Makassar, and their burial places are regarded as South African heritage sites, created a mutual link to the liberation struggles on both sides, though in time, they were more than two centuries apart.

At the time of the International Nelson Mandela Day in 2017, the Indonesian government, representatives of the international community and civil society organizations focused on the “Nelson Mandela Rules”, the
short for the “UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”. It formed part of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) discussion of these rules that were already adopted in 1955 as the global standard for prison management in UN member states. Mandela’s 27 years of imprisonment motivated the UN in 2015 to name them the “Nelson Mandela Rules”. The Indonesian meeting acknowledged Mandela’s positive impact on criminal justice, equality and universal human rights. At this event, the UNODC gave a presentation on the rules and the Office’s cooperation with the Indonesian government to ensure that these rules are implemented. Even after Mandela’s death in 2013, his legacy is used to influence states like Indonesia and to promote human rights. The legacy of Mandela’s relationship with Indonesia and the principles of his foreign policy are therefore still felt.

President Mandela’s relationship also experienced controversial moments. During the apartheid period South Africa developed sophisticated military weapons manufacturing systems but external markets for them were restricted by the international sanctions movement. When the ANC assumed government power in 1994, President Mandela’s administration used its diplomatic means to seek new markets for these military products. However, at the same time, the Mandela foreign policy principles of respect for human rights and peaceful resolution of conflicts applied to the arms industry. In practical terms it meant that states involved in armed conflicts or internal violence could not purchase “offensive” weapons from the South African industry – they were restricted to weapons for “defensive” purposes. This policy also affected Indonesia.

With President Mandela’s state visit to Indonesia in July 1997, he was asked whether South Africa would sell arms to Indonesia in view of the Timor Leste conflict. In response, he confirmed that South Africa would do it, but only arms for external, defensive purposes. At the same time, he insisted that he would not put pressure on the Indonesian government over Timor Leste. South Africa had been criticized since 1991 for not publicly admonishing President Suharto’s human rights record and Indonesia’s relationship with Timor Leste. President Mandela, however, was cautious, because of Suharto’s long time support to the ANC.

In diplomatic style, President Mandela acknowledged the problematic situation in Timor Leste but he took the view that it would be unacceptable for him to take advantage of the diplomatic friendship to prescribe to
Indonesia what to do. Typical of the Mandela foreign policy to use South Africa’s experience of dialogue as his point of reference, he encouraged Indonesia and Timor Leste leaders to engage in dialogue.

Mandela’s approach to Timor Leste had been in the spotlight since his release from prison in 1990. Human rights groups campaigned to use Mandela’s international status as a former political prisoner and anti-apartheid leader to promote human rights in Suharto’s Indonesia. The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign wrote a letter to President Mandela in September 1994 at the time of his second visit to Indonesia. “As a world-renowned personality who enjoyed the benefits of international solidarity in ending South Africa’s acute human rights violations and securing your own release from political imprisonment, you will surely heed our plea that you should take the opportunity to make your views known to your Indonesian host”.

4. Mandela & Suharto’s State 1997 Visits

A state visit is a very formal diplomatic event and it indicates that the two states involved want to either formalize new bilateral agreements, strengthen bilateral relations or reaffirm the importance of their relations. In this case, two state visits between the Indonesian and South African heads of state occurred in the same year, 1997 (Figure 1). For the purpose of this discussion, the focus is on Mandela’s speeches at both events.

During the first one in July, President Mandela delivered his formal speech at a state banquet in Jakarta four days before his 79th birthday anniversary, while President Suharto visited Cape Town at the end of November 1997. The fact that the two visits were so close to each other was very exceptional. It possibly indicates how urgent it was for President Suharto to reciprocate the Mandela visit to him in Jakarta.

President Mandela commenced his official address by emphasizing the importance of Southeast Asia for South Africa. It should be noted that prior to 1994, South Africa’s diplomatic relations with states in Asia was very limited, and mainly with Taiwan. Japan maintained economic relations with South Africa, notably in the automotive industry, but not official diplomatic relations. Mandela’s emphasis on the region’s importance for South Africa was articulated in the form of its “shining economic example and inspiration for what we have set out to achieve in our own country”.

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The ANC’s macro-economic development model in 1994 was encapsulated in its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Two years later, in 1996, the Treasury and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki announced a new policy, namely Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). While the RDP adopted a statist approach to development within a social democratic framework, GEAR was publicly categorized as a neo-liberal approach. Mandela’s address therefore happened in the context of this policy change, which had been severely criticized by the political Left. The Asian economic example was, however, not a neo-liberal one but the “developmental state”, which is more closely aligned to the RDP, and in the 2000s openly embraced by the ANC government.

The second point in President Mandela’s address was to refer to Indonesia’s principle of “unity in diversity”. He observed that the country’s geographical diversity (many islands), huge population and many languages constitute a spectacular diversity. He admired the progress made by Indonesians in unifying this diversity. Such a drive towards unity while protecting the diversity was and still is the objective in South Africa. (It was later adopted as the motto of the official South African coat of arms). Diversity in the South African context has a controversial history, because the apartheid dogma used it as a basis for separation and discrimination.

Mandela’s mandate to establish a unified, post-apartheid state, which is not dominated by a majority, was uppermost in his mind when he delivered this address. In this respect, it should be noted that his address was delivered in the middle of the period of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It was also in the middle of the period during which claims by former owners for restitution of their land could be lodged. Mandela was, therefore, amid tackling with the reconciliation and nation-building processes when these observations about “unity in diversity” were made.

Steeped in a history of liberation, President Mandela highlighted the experiences shared by both countries. He said: “The many graves, or kramats, in the Cape of religious leaders from the Indonesia Archipelago bear witness to the rich heritage we share. Amongst those banished to the Cape by our common colonizer were some famous resistance leaders as Tuan Yusuf, Tuan Madura and Tuan Guru, who are deeply revered by our people”. The relevance of this is that by 1997, South Africa’s international relations were very much influenced by the ANC historical alliances and friendships.
Foremost in the mind of Mandela was to forge formal relations with those who shared a history of liberation with the ANC or who supported it. In the process, President Mandela accumulated a status as the late 20th century’s symbol of liberation and human rights.

Mandela’s presidency was also at the time during which he used diplomatic means to publicly thank states for their support to the ANC’s liberation struggle. With this address, he did the same to Indonesia. “I expressed our gratitude to you during my previous visits to your country. … It is my privilege to do so again on this first South African State Visit to Indonesia”.

Another theme in President Mandela’s address had been about development. South Africa and Indonesia share the status of developing states as part of the global South. In this context, President Mandela referred to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), thereby identifying another commonality between the two states. The Bandung conference in 1955 was the forerunner of the NAM, formed in 1961. The ANC associated itself with the NAM and included its objectives in the Freedom Charter. For Mandela it held the significance in 1997 that because South Africa would host the next NAM summit, he was already encouraging support for that summit.

Throughout the past 25 years, South African bilateral diplomatic relations have relied extensively on bilateral trade relations. The same applied to the relations with Indonesia. President Mandela acknowledged the fact that in 1997 Indonesia was already one of most important trading partners of South Africa in Southeast Asia. It amounted to a multiplication of growth of four-times within four years. President Mandela referred also to the second Africa-Asia Forum held in Bangkok, as a multilateral instrument to promote trade between the regions.

Four months later President Suharto arrived in Cape Town on his state visit to South Africa. It was the first state visit of an Indonesian president to the country. The fact that the visit was to Cape Town emphasized the historical links between the two countries, and the fact that descendants of Indonesians, and their religious and cultural legacies have become an integral part of the Cape Town area. It was therefore not unexpected that in his official address at the state banquet in honour of President Suharto, President Mandela referred to the “parallels that bind our two country [sic]: our shared colonial heritage; our struggles for freedom; our common
heroes, cultural and social ties; and our common endeavor to better the lives of our peoples”.

President Mandela took this sentiment further by stating, “the liberation of South Africa from apartheid was a victory shared with all those who helped us through the darkest and most painful period of our history”. In this respect he referred to “the selfless actions of our friends”, which included Indonesia. In this manner, President Mandela not only acknowledged Indonesia’s support for the ANC, but also solidified his mantra of promoting liberation in all parts of the world. It enhanced his authority to call for resolving the issues in Palestine and Western Sahara – in the case of Timor-Leste he was more ambivalent and did not address it directly.

In congruence with his foreign policy to address peaceful resolution of conflicts, he used the opportunity to state that South Africa had a responsibility to reciprocate the international support for the anti-apartheid struggle by playing its part in the resolution of conflicts and promotion of peace, stability and democracy. It became known as Mandela’s values-based foreign policy. It also laid a foundation for him to become directly involved in mediation processes in Burundi and Libya, and for talks with the Palestinians. At the same time, it justified his limited involvement in the Timor-Leste issue, though he did not refer at all to it in this address.

President Mandela linked his promotion of peace and democracy to his view of a global order, which will reduce disparities between the developed and developing worlds. These remarks revealed Mandela’s ambition to work towards a global dispensation in which South Africa and other developing countries will play a much more prominent role. Of relevance for this address, was his view that bilateral relationships (like the one with Indonesia) could provide “a firm foundation for joint efforts to influence world developments towards our shares [sic] goals”. As much as his release from prison changed the political future of South Africa, Mandela ostensibly saw the opportunity to strengthen the global South or developing world and thereby “democratize” the global order. Though not stated explicitly in these terms, his address could be interpreted in such a way.

This line of reasoning was supported by references to two institutions in which both Indonesia and South Africa played a role. The first one was the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). President Mandela did not see the association only as a form of cooperation, but also as a mechanism with the
potential to unite states surrounding the Indian Ocean. His emphasis was on trade and not on other forms of cooperation, and President Mandela foresaw “vibrant inter-regional trade”. He therefore did not present it as potentially one region but as a multilateral organization and as “a paradigm for the countries of the South to serve their economic and trade interests”. Again, President Mandela put it in a global context as a mechanism, which could assist in establishing “equitable international economic relations”. Cooperation with Indonesia he viewed as an opportunity to promote his vision of enhancing the international prominence of the global South and thereby establishing a more equitable global economic order.

The second institution was the NAM. Mandela had had an interest in NAM during 1997, because South Africa was earmarked to become the next chairperson of this grouping until early 2003 (when Malaysia had to take over). South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Department in 2006 looked back at this period and noted that “South Africa sought, as Chair, to adhere to and advance the principles first enunciated at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung that led to the establishment of the Movement”. The link with Indonesia was therefore obvious, and in his 1997 address, President Mandela expressed the wish to draw on Indonesia’s experience with the NAM. It is less of an economic or trade formation but more concerned with global political dynamics.

Repeating his view expressed in July, President Mandela lauded Indonesia’s example of economic development and committed South Africa to learn more from that experience. He appreciated Indonesia’s ability to improving access to basic amenities and its macro-economic strategy for investment, employment and growth. Mandela saw a link between these achievements and the potential for deeper friendship and a common commitment to finding peaceful solutions for problems in both states. Mandela reiterated his willingness to play the role of mediator in this respect: “I wish once more to underline the willingness of our country and myself personally to lend a helping hand where such may be required, within the context of multilateral institutions”. This remark could be interpreted as a willingness to become involved in the Timor-Leste issue, but on behalf of a multilateral organization like the UN.

Other state visits between the two countries were conducted in 2008 and 2017, but the two visits during the Mandela presidency were prominent events and created a close relationship of cooperation in several areas. In
the next section, President Mandela's involvement in the Timor-Leste issue is briefly discussed.

5. Mandela and Timor-Leste

South Africa's liberation history and Indonesia's anti-colonial history have been mentioned earlier. For President Mandela it involved also Timor-Leste. During his visit in 1990 to Indonesia, he went to Bandung in memory of the 1955 conference. During that visit, he raised the issue of self-determination for Timor-Leste.

During his next visit to Indonesia in 1994, Mandela refused to raise the human rights issue in Indonesia even though his foreign policy emphasized promotion of human rights and democracy, as mentioned earlier. A year later, Mandela revealed that the ANC had received significant financial assistance from Indonesia for its 1994 election campaign. A Fretilin delegation led by José Ramos-Horta, visited South Africa in September 1995 on the ANC's invitation. President Mandela gave them the assurance that the Indonesian financial donation to the ANC would not prevent the South African government from addressing the matter of Timor-Leste. Diplomatic decisions are often complicated by choices between a principled position and support for friends or relationships. When South Africa had to vote, therefore, in April 1997 in the UN Human Rights Commission about Indonesia and Timor-Leste, it abstained. Raymond Suttner, the parliamentary chairperson of the portfolio committee on foreign affairs, criticized this issue from this within the ANC. (Later, he was appointed as the South African ambassador to Sweden).

During the July 1997 visit, President Mandela did not discuss the Timor-Leste situation with President Suharto, but asked him to meet Xanana Gusmão, the Timor-Leste leader, who was imprisoned in 1993. Initially, the President refused because he regarded Gusmão as a common criminal. When Mandela told him that many also regarded him as a common criminal, Suharto arranged the meeting. According to reports, Mandela put pressure on Gusmão to terminate his conflict with Indonesia and rather participate in negotiations. Indonesia and Portugal were already engaged in talks about Timor-Leste and the UN has been involved in the matter since the 1970s. In the same period, President Mandela met the Portuguese President, Jorge Sampaio, about the matter.
After the July state visit, President Mandela addressed an official letter to President Suharto. It was inadvertently delivered to the Portuguese and not to the Indonesian ambassador in Pretoria. Before it could reach President Suharto it was leaked to the Portuguese weekly, *Expresso*, and published. In the letter, Mandela called for the release of all political prisoners, including Gusmão. The diplomatic fall-out of this event was that President Mandela expelled the Portuguese ambassador from South Africa, though the Portuguese government did not reciprocate. The harm in trust caused by this event, however, meant that President Mandela could not continue to engage the Portuguese government in the Timor-Leste matter. The Indonesian government also did not respond to Mandela’s letter.

Both Mandela and Suharto departed from their offices before the Timor-Leste matter was resolved.

### 6. Mandela’s Indonesian Batik Shirts

The “Madiba shirt” has become one of the signature features of President Mandela. A few months after his release, in October 1990, he was introduced to the Indonesian batik shirt when President Suharto gave it to him as a gift. He went on to wear it until his death. Many of them were products of the Indonesian designer, Iwan Tirta. During his state visit to Indonesia in July 1997, President Mandela made a point of it to wear the batik shirts. Indonesians saw Mandela’s batik shirts as a tangible symbol of the relationship between Indonesia and South Africa.

The impact of Mandela’s popularization of these shirts on Indonesians was very important. Former Vice-President Yusuf Kalla reportedly said: “Nelson Mandela made our batik better known internationally” and: “He dared to wear batik in the UN chamber. If it was me, I would hesitate to wear batik and speak in the UN General Assembly, but he did not”. Mandela’s example encouraged Indonesians to wear it themselves.

Several South African designers were inspired by the Indonesians designs and presented their own products to Mandela. Some competition and myths developed amongst them about who can claim to be Mandela’s main designer. One of them was Desré Buirski Nash who reportedly gave him a black-and-gold-fish-print shirt when he visited a Jewish synagogue in Cape Town in 1994. She continued to send him around 150 shirts. Her background was in the Californian fashion industry where she became...
involved in more informal men’s fashion, such as the Hawaiian “Aloha shirt”. For the Mandela shirts, she used a tailor from Bali.

Another designer was Sonwabile Ndamase from the Vukani label, who started designing shirts for Mandela in late 1990. He was the designer of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and her daughters, and they introduced Mandela to him. According to Ndamase, Mandela’s suits were too heavy for him and he wanted more comfortable clothes. The designer therefore proposed to him more breathable fabrics appropriate for formal and casual wear, and useful for all types of situations. In the process, it enabled Mandela to create a specific identity with his fashion. “The shirts, invariably in bright colours and strong graphic patterns distinguished him at a distance”, according to Ndamase.

At the time of Mandela’s death in December 2013, the fashion magazine GQ South Africa published an article under the title “The Madiba Shirt”. They repeated the notion that with these shirts Mandela stood out and became more visible (like the signature outfits of Mao, Fidela Castro, Nehru or Yasser Arafat). It should be noted that as a tall but slender-built man, Mandela was physically also easy to see. Mandela’s fashion style, according to the magazine, gave him an appearance of independence and individuality. He was not bound by the conventional protocol of formal, Western suits. It can be added this independence was not only at a personal level in terms of his own fashion style, but also as a choice symbolic of the global South or Asia, and not Western. The fact that he declined an offer by the fashion designer Giorgio Armani to dress him, underscores this sentiment.

The batik shirts include Mandela’s endorsement and acknowledgement of traditions, especially the Indonesian tradition of wearing batik, but extended to include African influences in his shirts. One can think of the similarities with the men’s shirts made in West Africa. In Mandela’s case, the shirts’ Indonesian origin also refers to the Cape Town communities with roots in Asia.

President Mandela adopted his own protocol of when he opted for the shirts and when he was wearing formal black suits. At his presidential inauguration in 1994 and for formal events in Parliament, such as his election as president or his state of the nation addresses, he was dressed in suits. Otherwise, he preferred the batik shirts.
7. Conclusion

President Mandela has laid the foundation of the Indonesia-South African bilateral relations. The fact that formal diplomatic relations were established in 1994 ensured that South Africa’s relations with the Asian region was not completely dominated by its relations with China. (Formal diplomatic relations were only concluded three years later when Mandela’s “two Chinas” policy reached a dead-end.) Like with most other countries, trade relations dominate the bilateral relations, but Mandela managed to concentrate also on many other aspects.

The symbolism of the global South and the Indian Ocean as a common denominator between the two states had been elevated to a high level in the bilateral relations. Sharing histories of Dutch colonialism, liberation processes and a non-aligned global position encouraged Mandela to view the relationship with Indonesia not only as bilateral one, but also as a friendship. This was a unique feature of Mandela’s diplomacy, which his successors could not manage to emulate.
Figure 1: President Mandela and President Soeharto

Madiba and Suharto
PART TWO

Events and Institutions: Binding their Partnership
CHAPTER FIVE

Rethinking the Bandung conference in an Era of ‘unipolar liberal globalization’ and Movements toward a ‘multipolar politics’

Professor Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo

1. General introduction: issues and objectives

This is not a historiographical study of the Bandung Conference. This article is essentially a reflection on the Bandung Conference, which is framed within its historical and ideological constructs as defined by its final declaration. It is not an empirically and historically tested and verified factual work. It focuses more on interpretative significance of the conference in relationship to goals of the non-alignment movement (NAM). However, the reflection is intended to project its significance beyond April 1955 within neo-global liberalism.

This work is divided into 6 sections: the first part is this general introduction; the second heading is about the concepts of unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity; the third section is on the Bandung Conference within a historical context; the fourth section is on the Non-Alignment Foundation of the Conference in a historical context, the fifth section deals with the final declared resolutions of the conference; and the last section is on rethinking the Bandung Conference: where to go from here?

Rethinking is both about reconceptualization and re-contextualization of the significance of the Bandung Conference and its policy implications in the 21st century. It is about questioning its claimed relevancy, identifying its potential in a new regionalist and globalist discourses, and examining its embodied vision of progress. In the rethinking, we should also identify and examine the contradictions as part of analysing social phenomena.

Since the Bandung Conference of 1955 in Indonesia, which set up the motion for new international cooperation between Africa and Asia during the colonial and post-colonial eras, many studies have been published, many
conferences have been organized and some scenarios have been developed with the objectives to understand and project further the significance of the new needed solidarity between Africa and Asia. However, it is still relevant to interrogate its objectives and its agencies in order to go forward in the 21st century and beyond.

Furthermore, the Bandung Conference was essentially an international event. As part of international relations’ paradigms, it can be examined as being part of the nation-states’ projects in Africa and Asia.

My main goals in this paper are:

(1) To interrogate the main objectives and the mission of the Bandung Conference in 1955 in its historical and political context;
(2) To identify the claimed political values associated with these objectives, especially those related to its solidarity base;
(3) To assess broadly the issue of whether or not the goals of the Bandung Conference in 1955 are still politically and economically relevant in a world politics that is dominated by unipolarity claims and trends, which are reflected in global liberal capitalism as the only single system that has real practical power;
(4) Finally, to imagine a new spirit of Bandung in replying to the questions of what should be done? Where to go from here? And what kind of solidarity is needed between Africa and Asia?

Largely, I am interested in understanding, through the study of the Bandung Conference as a political discourse, whether or not the nature of the imperatives of the global liberalism adopted by all the nation-states in Africa and Asia might allow the revival of the spirit and ideals related to the Bandung Conference. It is in interrogating the objectives of the Bandung Conference and its agencies that we might be able to project what role the spirit and ideology associated with the Bandung Conference can be instrumentalized for building new solidarity.

The world of the European colonialism and imperialism was supposed to function effectively on a unilinear way of thinking, unilinear societal organizing and unilinear governing systems. The world or political changes, either through revolutions or evolutions should be moving toward one
direction. Thus, because nothing should be random from the above way of thinking and acting, we can predict the behaviours or actions of all the members of societies, including their states and citizens. Despite minor differences in the ways this linearity (viewed mainly through the prism of the question of adaptability) was perceived and implemented through various forces of domination and the control, the normative agreement was that modernizing world of tomorrow should be better bureaucratically, economically, politically and militarily.

However, it should be noted that the processes of political decolonization did challenge structurally, functionally, or historically in many cases the linearity arguments and propositions of the European colonialism. For instance, the approach of the so-called scientific colonization that the Belgian colonial power used, as part of this linearity to rule the Congo, was defied by the objective Congolese conditions and people’s struggles against imperialism (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Studies of modernization and economic development based on the Rostowian logic and the so-called naturally defined stages were conceived as Westernization (Rostow 1971); (Hoselitz 1971); (Huntington 1968); (Apter 1965). Becoming Western or European was projected as the ultimate aim of modernization paradigms though this did not happen in most colonized countries.

Within the hierarchy of world values, the European values were perceived to be ranked the highest and superior to others. However, based on ramifications of the political and social struggles, the power of the information technology, the functioning of both state and regional capitalisms, the current political remapping of the world with its dynamics does not fit any longer the nature of the mission of, and the goals associated with, the power of small Iberian European nation-states (Spain and Portugal) in the 15th and 16th centuries when they created the old political mapping. The so-called new world was created based on powers of God, Gold and Glory (GGG). The contradictions within these 3 forces and imperatives of each are also creating new possibilities or alternatives for change within their own rules and practices in order to either survive or be more effective and expand.
2. Concepts of ‘unipolarity’, ‘bipolarity’ and ‘multipolarity’

The main objective of the Bandung Conference tends to support the claims related to multipolarity in which ideology and geo-politics play an important role in re-mapping the world. Can the claims related to self-determination, political decolonization, decentralization, non-alignment, and independence be effectively advanced in a world, which is dominated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) dictum of Adam Smith’s principle of invisible hand with its main elements, which include free trade, liberalization, and competition among the economic actors?

Concerning the evolution of a teleological world, it should be noted that in the past 600 years or so the world system (nation-state, international political economy, and financial, economic, military, social and political organizations) have evolved toward unipolarity. Unipolar world tends to be philosophically deterministic. Unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems are about the mechanisms and processes of the location and distribution of power in the world.

The concept of unipolarity is both an ideological concept, as well as an analytical concept. It is about constructing the world and explaining and understanding it. It has been operating on a linear way of thinking and analysing the world. This way is perceived as the best as compared to other perspectives. This so-called the best way has an absolute value. It embodies the notion of the survival of the fittest. Modern nation-state inherited through European traditions and practices the values of the capitalist economy and its free market (or as mentioned earlier the invisible hand of Adam Smith) and liberal democracy with its individual rights express the values of unipolarity. However, this contemporary ‘unipolar evolutionism (especially its militaristic dimensions that are commanded by the United States through the Washington-Consensus) is being challenged by various movements toward some interpretations of multipolarity.

Since the end of the 20th century, the capitalist economy has been operating more forcefully toward the controlled dynamics of both regionalism and globalism. While capitalists at the regional levels have tendencies to advance some national and cultural interests in the process of making their surplus or acquiring and protecting their capital, the globalists
tend to see the world more on the perspectives of the so-called free market. The free market principle determines what people sell and buy and what they produce. Regionalism is more associated with geo-politics and history than globalism, which has claims and tendencies of promoting ‘universalism’ from a perspective of a world without borders. Regionalists are more sympathetic to economic protectionism even if the actors who advocate globalism like United States also use protectionism as an instrument of advancing their national or class interests.

While capitalist regionalists accept the existence of other poles of influences in other parts of the world as they are defined politically, economically or culturally, the globalists emphasize universal human values as defined by the market and individualism. Furthermore, bipolarity is a complex phenomenon that explains dualism. On the one hand, in the history of Western civilization, especially that of classical Greece, the body and the mind were always divided as the reason ought to conquer the irrationality of body, but on the other hand, ideologically political bipolarity of the Cold War era was a challenge to the “monistic” European civilization.

Bipolarity was defined ideologically, militarily, economically and culturally. It shaped local/national political behaviours and relations of nation-states and political actors in such way that the process of creating and supporting a complex system of clientelist regimes and patronage of hierarchy of powers was ideologically justified. Nevertheless, it was generally viewed as a short-lived phenomenon. However, I claim that the demands for multipolar politics and its multiculturalism that have political agendas have been gradually rising in various forms in every region of the world, or continent.

It is self-evident that, since the end of Cold War era, which is characterized by the brutal collapse of the formal bipolar politics, which was manifested itself in ideological struggles between the West, represented by the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its alliances, world politics has been advancing many elements of multipolarity. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 and the rise of the new Russian federalism is also the symptom of this multipolarity.
In May 2011, the World Bank published a report called *Multipolarity: The New Global Economy*. According to the World Bank, emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, Indian, China, and South Africa will induce clear signs of change in the socio-economic power relations (World Bank 2011). Multipolarity is a measurement of the distribution of power concentrated in several poles of power, those poles being the great powers. BRICS are projected as becoming great powers along the United States and the European Union. In short, the South-South agenda is to project the creation of a multipolar world. Thus, multipolarity is about a system of multiple global and regional powers, which exist simultaneously. It is about the dispersal of powers, the rise of new club of powers, and the new reconfiguration of trade, financial and economic activities at regional level. Global financial institutions are becoming effective statecraft challenging the nation-state sovereignty.

Furthermore, more reflective dimensions of the multipolarity can be noted in the rise of China with its ideology of socialism with the market economy (or the state capital-ism), the new role of Russia in its world politics, and the consolidation of the European Union, despite its internal weaknesses on the question of national politics, the gradual redefinition of the role of politics of the Economic Community of the West African States, the new role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in promoting political and economic cooperation and regional stability and in defining the current economic crisis and economic position of its members, the building of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), to cite only these few illustrations.

I use and define the concept of multipolarity to be part of both a regular evolution of global capitalism as well as a ‘protest’ paradigm that is challenging both unipolarity and the old déclassé bipolarity. However, while the call for it is intensifying through indigenous, labour, social, women, youth and popular organizations and movements, its ideological basis is at the best hybrid. It is so because the forces associated with multipolarity (as we are using it) have not been able to interrogate sufficiently the nation-states. In many ways, it has also been challenging ethno-culturalism or culturalism of the state through civil societies but not the structures of the power system.
Calls for multipolarity underline political and economic decentralization of the world resources and their better management, and a fair distribution of these resources. It calls for more people’s participation in the reconstruction of their economies, which implies that it puts more emphasis on building communities rather than ‘idolatry’ of individualism. It also requires values of multiculturalism, diversity and universal humanity. In international system, it calls for the reconceptualization and establishment of new international partnership/cooperation based on the win-win theory. Regions and nation-states that are doing well economically are those, which have also capacities to negotiate. In a nation-state, it calls for the development of social welfarism and the implementation and respect for the laws of the ecology.

By and large, a multipolar perspective implies the coexistence of several equally used and respected spaces or locations of power with similar value systems. It can be advanced through dialogical relations between the subject and object of learning. It implies: (1) Multiculturalism (a movement toward intra-intercultural dialogues within every society); (2) Articulation of the centrality of humanism, development and democracy as the key elements for the foundation of a political life with the emphasis on human, progress and social security; (3) Challenges to the hierarchy of the vertical values of power system that is based on militarism, and oligopolistic and monopolistic tendencies and traits of the nation-state and its international political economy; (4) Democratization of the nation-state and its economic system, and society; And (5) finally, building of a common unity of purposes between the public and the private.

Furthermore, the multipolar perspective, which I am proposing should be inspired by 4 laws of ecology. The first law of ecology is that everything is connected to everything else; the second law is everything must go somewhere; the third is nature knows best; and the fourth law is that there is no such thing as a free lunch (Smith 2009: 2–3).

As part of the protest paradigm, multipolarity should make the management of the current international system more difficult and the achievement of liberal global stability more problematic. In short, in social sciences, it requires the combination of inter-disciplinary and multidisciplinary methodologies and a critical theory, and at the political
level it requires multilateralism at every level of state-societal relations, including horizontal social relations.

3. The Bandung conference within a historical context

3.1 General issues about the conference and its main objectives

Many major works have been produced and published on the Bandung Conference, to cite only a few such as: Kahin, McTurnan (1956); Nazli (1969); Mackie 2005; Seng and Amitav (2008); McDougall and Finnane (2010); Lee (2010). Most of these studies have underlined positive energy that derived from the conference toward the development of new way of thinking in terms of Africa-Asia relation and their collective relations with the European-American powers. They also projected the impact of this conference in economic and power relations between what became to be known as South-South relations. I am interrogating the nature of its claims and project, its pragmatism, and its potential to challenging the dominant system.

The conference produced a different kind of scholarship about Africa-Asia where small and big powers or countries were given an opportunity to be equally listened to. Bigger and most powerful countries like China or India did not impose their positions on smaller countries. My contribution is to project its impact both at regional and global levels.

Thus, le fait accompli, from 18 to 25 April 1955, the Prime Ministers of the group of five states: Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Indonesia, India and Pakistan, organized a meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss the themes and problems of economic co-operation, human rights, self-determination, the problems of dependent people, and the promotion of peace (Ampiah 1997:39). Egypt was also an active member of the organizing committee located outside of Asia.

This conference was a historic meeting in which political leaders and foreign ministers of 29 Asian and African countries gathered on the initiative of the leaders of the Third World at that time, including Premier Chou Enlai (China), President Achmed Sukarno (Indonesia), Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Prime Minister U nu of Myanmar, and Sir John Kotelawala of Sri Lanka.
One of the main issues raised is about the “political vision” embodied in the declarations of the conference. The question of “political vision” also implies the existence of an ideology or an ideological principle, or norms. However, historical facts indicate that based on various political locations and historical backgrounds of the participants, the Bandung Conference could not be intended to produce a consensual political ideology, which would have been incorporated into the national party politics of any nation-state.

As this author argued elsewhere: “One cannot fully or comprehensively understand the dynamics of the nation-states, the policies, politics, and their international relations without linking them theoretically and empirically to their ideological base. The Nation-state is essentially an ideological construct and a self-motivating entity” (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005:152). Although it would be difficult to systematically demonstrate that the non-alignment has been a common accepted ideology among the participants of the conference, it is also equally difficult, based on historical facts and the nature of alliances that took place after the conference, to argue persuasively that it was not an ideologically based forum.

The Conference’s main objectives were summarized in what Ampiah stated:

The conference was organized to promote the highest aspirations of the peoples of Asia and Africa; that is, positive life chances for the disadvantaged nations of the international community. These ambitions were to be further channelled into an articulate and coherent ‘third force’ in a world supposedly frozen into two camps by the Cold War. …The one underlying theme that ran through the economic, cultural, and political objectives of the conference was a sense among the members, irrespective of their ideological orientation, that they would not be trapped with their experiences as ‘dependents’ or appendages of colonialism. This was clearly expressed in the conference’s universal declaration that ‘colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end’. Essentially, the spirit of the conference hinged on the determination of the member states to preserve their newly won freedoms and to reach out for more through their persistent opposition to colonialism and imperialism, as
well as through a systematic attempt to advance the economic well-being of the people they represented, thereby questioning the essence of the UN (1997: 39–40).

The issue of anti-colonialism was also central, as its sentiment was the foundation of this Afro-Asian alliance.

### 3.2 Political actors, their agendas within their historical contexts and the significance of the conference

The agenda for holding an Asian-African Conference was gradually negotiated among its organizers on the initiative of Ali Mohammed of Pakistan. The vision was not shared by all at once. It is not clear what interests he had in Africa and on Africa and what concrete factors motivated him to start this initiative. There was no collective regional interest in Africa at the time. As George McTurnan Kahin stated:

Indonesia’s idea originating primarily with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. At first his proposal was to invite only the Afro-Asian group within the United Nations, and it was with this in mind that he introduced the idea to the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan at their meeting in Colombo at the end of April 1954. Initially only Pakistan’s Mohammed Ali was enthusiastic; Ceylon’s Sir John Kotelawala was willing to go along but India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma’s U Nu, while both nodding polite approval of the idea, and were sceptical of the feasibility and value of holding such a conference. Not until his trip to New Delhi in late September 1954 did Sastroamidjojo win Nehru’s full acceptance of his proposal (1956:2).

What criteria used to invite the participants? Why some countries in Asia and Africa invited but others were not? An attempt to answer these questions takes us to discuss the nature of the new international order and its contradictions at the time. According to Kahin:

All the countries in Asia and Africa, which have independent governments, should be invited. However, “minor variations and modifications of this basic principle” were made and the invitations were limited to 25 specific countries as follows: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Federation, China (not Formosa), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam (North), Vietnam (South) and Yemen. It was further stated that “acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country” and the Prime Ministers also emphasized that “the form of government and the way of life of any country in no way be subjected to interference by another”. They were certain striking omissions from the list of countries invited: North Korea, South Korea, Nationalist China on Taiwan (Formosa), Australia, New Zealand, Russia (which is at least in part of Asia), Israel and the Union of South Africa. While the basis for these omissions were politically obvious, there were never any official reasons given (1955:2–3).

There were more than 2,000 delegates, journalists and observers who attended the meeting. The African region had the smallest number of delegates from Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya and Sudan. The Egyptian delegation was led by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. That of Gold Coast/Ghana (only 3 members) was led by Kojo Bastio, Minister of the State.

As indicated earlier, there were all together 29 nation-states represented at the conference. In addition to the Prime Ministers who were the conveners, foreign ministers and many delegates from African colonized countries and many parts of Asia also joined the conference. The conference was well popularized and publicized. In that year, in Africa, only Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were independent countries.

The case of Japan as a unique power-actor should be underlined. The invitation of Japan to the Bandung Conference was a product of international political dynamism in Asia. This conference is widely known as the arena of the union of newly independent Asian and African countries that hoisted the flag of anti-colonialism.

Although Japan became occupied by the American and allied forces, it was an imperial power in Asia not long back before the conference. In addition, the delegates talked about a ‘third way’ while Japan was already located in the ‘first way’ associated with capitalism led by the United States. Thus, it is clear that Japanese delegates had some difficulties locating themselves in the discourse of the conference.
Despite the reluctance to accept the invitation, the Japanese delegates attended the conference after being persuaded by the United States to do so. “The proposal of the invitation was made by Pakistan with support of Ceylon, but also a certain amount of contention from others” (Ampiah 1997: 41). As a result, in a strange or awkward way, Japan came back to Asia through a gradual implementation of many dimensions of the Bandung Conference.

In reality, this conference was strongly coloured by the bipolarity of the Cold War system in which Asian countries of liberal camp defended against offensive move by communist or neutral countries like India and China. India tried to call China to the conference. On the contrary Pakistan, who was in the liberal camp and opposed to India, schemed to invite Japan, an important figure as anti-communist, in order to put a check on the India-China leadership in this conference. Japan tried to survive this difficult situation by the passive political stance but her existence itself had already become an important part of international politics regardless of her intentions.

It should be also emphasized that in Asia at large, the political situation was still very tense, volatile and extremely complex at the time of the conference as C. P. Fitzgerald, who also attended the conference, wrote:

From north to south, there are four major trouble areas in the Far East: Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and Malaya. The Korea problem has been solved—or shelved—in manner highly unsatisfactory to both parties in Korea, yet in all probability for a long time to come. Formosa remains acute, Indochina threatens renewed danger, and Malaya smoulders on. In each case, behind the immediate local conflict is the factor that makes these troubles significant for the world at large, growing power of China and her alliance with Russia. The West has wished to impose settlements of these issues which took no account of China, and the attempts has failed everywhere failed; for where settlements or partial solutions have been achieved it has been in each case necessary to abandon the pretence that China does not exist and come to term with Peking. The example of Bandung, where China was accepted, and where useful negotiation between China and her inimical southern neighbours proved, cannot in the future be ignored (1955:114).
For instance, Burma (Myanmar) gained its independence in 1948, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1948 and Indonesia proclaimed independence earlier on 17 August 1945, but it took 4 years of diplomatic negotiations and armed resistance against the Dutch to recognize its independence on 27 December 1949. India won its independence in 1947 with non-violence but there was a bloody struggle between the Muslims and Hindus which was instigated, inspired and supported partially by the divide and rule principle of the British colonial political strategy. Pakistan separated from India by the British signing a peace treaty with India in 1947. Thus, British colonial administration was forced to “abandon” its former colonies of India, Burma and Ceylon after a combination of armed struggles and negotiations. The rise of the communist movement in Malaya was fully supported by China. China had both Russia and Japan in its political mind and its definition of security. Britain did not admit that a “foreign Asian power” could have a strong influence in its former colony (op. cit.: 116).

In addition to nationalism, what were other important objectives pursued in the conference? The conference created a new possibility, new arena, for Japan to deal with the fear of socialism in the region. The spirit of nationalism associated with the conference engendered new dynamics between Japan and China. It should be noted that China was very influential to all-over South-East Asia, partially because of the nature of its revolution, namely people’s revolution, and partially also because of the existence of extensively scattered Chinese Diaspora. Most of these Chinese groups were obviously not Maoists or Marxists, but they had a strong cultural nationalism, which made them attached to the mainland. China came to the conference with attitudes and strategies not to antagonize anyone or to show any moral and intellectual arrogance, which generally is associated with any revolutionary socialism and its superiority complex. According to C. P. Fitzgerald, paraphrasing Chou Enlai (Zhou Enlai)’s keynote speech: “The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel.... There is no need at this Conference to publicize one’s ideology and the political system of one’s country.... The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek common ground, not to create divergence” (1955: 113).
The Conference offered a new departing ideological definition about the existing capitalist system and its main agency, the state. Politically, it also created an allied resistance to the United States’ uni-polarity and monopoly. As Samir Amin indicated: “The real obstacle to the United States hegemony came from the Afro-Asian national liberation movement. The countries in these regions were determined to throw off the colonial yoke of the nineteen-century. Imperialism has never been able to make the social and political compromises necessary to install stable powers operating to its advantage in the country of the capitalist periphery” (1994:28).

The United States’ unipolarity and monopoly did not last for a long time. These two phenomena were located during the Cold War era, especially between the 1950s and the 1970s. However, with the rise of many new actors in world politics, the advancement of deregulation in the world market and the competition based on Euro-dollar and petro-dollar, the U.S. unipolarity started to be challenged by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. In relationship to the dynamics of the Bandung Conference, the resistance to the U.S. was based on the intent and motivation to search for new development models in Africa and Asia. The coalition of purposes among new political actors produced a new movement within the United Nations system with China as its vanguard. Thus, the resistance became more ideological than anything else.

4. The Conference’s Significance

What was expected from this conference? And what was produced from it? Africa and Asia are not culturally, politically and historically monolithic societies. African and Asian delegates did not go to Bandung with the same agendas and expectations.

The ways these nation-states were going to gain their independence, their political location in international relations, the level of their socio-economic development and the level and quality of the struggles toward the independence are some factors that influenced the discourse that took place in the Bandung Conference and beyond. But participants had a commitment to have common resolutions.
The conference is, therefore, recognized as a symbol of unity and rapprochement amongst the Asian and African States. It took place in the middle of Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union, the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the continuous march of Western colonial powers in the countries within the Global South, despite the rise of the various forms of nationalist and popular resistance to Western imperialism.

For many, this conference historically became the cornerstone of the African-Asian solidarity, despite the reality of the economic and political domination from the Global North and the structural weaknesses of the countries and states in the Global South, especially in Africa. Since the 1950s, regular African-Asian summits have been contributing to revive the spirit of Bandung and encourage the creation of a new partnership between African and Asian states and countries.

The significance of this conference has to be looked at gains from regionalist and nationalist perspectives. The collective agenda should support the nationalist political projects. Yet, regionalism and nationalism without a strong political vision can lead to social conflicts and power struggles.

The leadership of the conference was divided between India, which had adopted its liberal democracy model, Indonesia, which had articulated its nationalism under Sukarno, and China with its communist revolutionary dogmas. However, it should be noted that Zhou Enlai of China displayed a moderate and conciliatory attitude that tended to quiet fears of some anti-communist delegates concerning China’s intentions. The outcome of this conference set up a motion that consolidated the relationship between Africa and Asia through NAM.


The Bandung Conference promoted solidarity in developmental policy and political decisions among the countries in the Global South (African and Asian) through the emerging Non-Alignment Movement. This grouping later constituted the foundation of the group of 77 in the United Nations.
As Samir Amin stated: “If I define Bandung as the dominant characteristic of the second phase of post war period, it is not from any “third wordlist” predilection, but because the world system was organized around the emergence of the Third World” (1994:14).

The Bandung Conference has generally been recognized as a forum in which its political actors initiated the motion of NAM from an Afro-Asian perspective. In this author’s view, this conference was, in terms of its ideological and policy claims, and its international relations’ implications, perhaps the single most important Afro-Asian Conference in the 20th century.

The establishment of NAM in 1961 was intended to begin the process of actualizing solidarity and cooperation among all nation-states, which were willing to join a block of interests called the Global South. For instance, on the principle of “ideological neutrality” and cooperation, ASEAN was formed on August 8, 1967 by the representatives of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia in order to deal with the sub-regional economic and political issues within the spirit of finding a common ground to address them. It declared its non-alignment position in 1971.

Within the United Nations, the Group of 77 was formed to pursue nonalignment as a way of consolidating strong ties among the states, which were either formally colonized by the Western powers or those with economic and political characteristics of the Global South. The G77 countries are a group of more than a hundred less industrialized countries, which set up as a counter-lobby to developed G7 countries (Adams 2001:89). As of 2001, the group was constituted of 128 countries.

In the decade of the 1950s, several African countries gained their nominal independence namely, Libya (1951); Sudan (1956); Morocco (1956) and Tunisia (1956). In the same period, the war of liberation was being waged in Algeria. In 1957, Ghana gained independence from Great Britain in the euphoria of pan-Africanism of Kwame Nkrumah with a strong cooperation of Nasser of Egypt who also was articulating pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. The case of Ghana was highly popularized–partially because of Kwame Nkrumah’s charisma and his pan-African perspective on Africa and also because Ghana was the first country to gain independence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Between 1956 and 1973, the non-alignment solidly emerged within the United Nations system as a new solidarity group among the countries in the Global South. The solid participation of Africans in its conferences is an indicator of how African states adopted this movement as part of their national agenda. For instance, in every single conference whether it was in Belgrade in 1961, Cairo in 1964, Lusaka, in 1973, or Havana in 1983, the African delegates constituted almost half of the total number of the delegates (Ebodé 1999:82). In the last conference before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the members of the non-alignment in September 1989 in Belgrade, it was clear the movement was losing its fuel because of internal conflicts and the force of polarization of the Cold War era.

In the 15th summit of the NAM held in Cairo in Egypt in July 2009 President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was elected as the President of the movement. Indeed, his election reflects the lack of seriousness and commitment among its members to consolidate the movement’s momentum in order to deal effectively with the marginalization of its members in the functioning and political hierarchy of the world system. Mubarak was the strongest ally of the United States, the champion of this type of capitalism, as it was reiterated through the current financial and economic crisis.

The 16th summit of NAM was held on August 26–31, 2012 in Tehran with the leaders from 120 countries. Iran is not Egypt. It is a strong partisan of a multi-polar world politics. On June 14, 2014, while many leaders were preoccupied about the World Cup in Brazil and the situation in Ukraine, the G-77 summit took place in Bolivia. It celebrated the 70th anniversary of the non-alignment. This grouping counts now 134 members. Russia is being invited to join this organization.

The final declaration called for a new world order for living well and it supports the 8 Millennium Development Goals as defined by the United Nations. They also intend and plan to eradicate poverty by 2030. President Evo Morales of Bolivia went far as to request the suppression of the Security Council of the United Nations. In short, the Bandung Conference was held when the colonial alignments were gradually breaking down in some parts of Asia. However, the United States, China and Russia were struggling to re-establish and/or maintain their interests in the region, while the colonial
alignments were being redefined in South America, especially with the United States’ neo-colonial domination and control in the sub-continent within a framework of “in my backyard policy reasoning” and when also, in Africa, the ideologies of colonial alignments with their regional nuances, were still too strong in most countries.

6. Its Final Declared Resolutions

Despite cultural, ideological, historical and political differences among the delegates, a ten-point “declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation” was adopted, which included the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and principles of the charter of the United Nations;
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
5. Respect of the Right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations;
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of big power; (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations;
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;

Other points of the final resolutions include economic cooperation (trade affairs and nuclear energy), cultural cooperation, human rights and
self-determination, problems of dependent people, other problems such as the existing tension in the Middle East, and the promotion of a world of peace and cooperation.

To actualize these resolutions into the policy arena, the state system was firmly valorised, regional cooperation was encouraged and supported, and the principles articulating human dignity were promoted. On the one hand, statism was going to maintain many dimensions of status quo in the world of the states, and on the other hand, the concepts of cooperation and solidarity, and the values of human rights were intended to advance political and economic reforms.

Nationalism, self-determination, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and the spirit of cooperation were emphasized in this talk. The position of Japan in the new projected international and regional relations was difficult to very clearly read. Japan was still strongly aligned to the United States politics (Japan became the closest ally of the United States after 1952), foreign relations and their international relations. It did not adhere to the ideas of non-alignment. In fact, it was antagonistic to this movement. But at the same time, Japan was obliged to work with countries, which have adopted the non-alignment as their policy guidelines in international relations.

To conclude in this section, it is necessary to recapture the most important elements that are related to the claims and ideas of the Bandung Conference. These points are reflected in the grand ideas of the political leaders in Asia and Africa. The leaders of China, led by Zhou Enlai, articulated socialism not à la Moscou and peaceful relations, those of India led by Prime Minister Nehru expressed liberalism, nationalism and non-violence, those of Indonesia led by President Sukarno articulated nationalism and decolonization, and the emerging leaders in many African countries were pushing for political decolonization agenda with different strategies among which later nationalism, Pan-Africanism, or accommodationism became the most prominent. The opposition against colonialism, neo-colonialism or any imperialistic based kind of policies was probably the most important single consensual position that unified various interests, mobilized human spirit
in envisioning a new and better world system. One of the most important questions is: Could this opposition be forcefully managed and actualized without any concrete and well-defined ideology?

The final speeches and the declarations made cannot escape the evaluation from an ideological canon of geo-political location of the participants. Broadly, non-alignment was de facto an “ideological alignment” of the countries, which were structurally facing similar problems within a bigger framework, oppressed by similar forces and subjected to the same global rules of the games.

It should be noted that the Bandung Conference projected, for the first time, the consciousness of Third Worldism. The term third world was first used as a political category at this conference. The conference’s main figures—Nehru (India), Nasser (Egypt), Zhou Enlai (China)—were already in power. This consciousness led to the movement of global solidarity among the countries located in the Global South. This was a big achievement then. However, within the current global economy, is this movement still relevant in the 21st century?

7. Rethinking the Bandung Conference: Where to go from here?

The Bandung Conference provided an avenue to discuss structural problems of the world and project how their impact in Africa and Asia would be. It gave hope through cooperation and struggle against all forms of oppressive colonial forces. However, it failed to address the question of the structures of the African and Asian states and their relations to the international political economy. Nor did it deal adequately with the issue of the nature of the ideologies of the states in Africa and Asia. Thus, although the symptoms of the problems were well defined, it did not sufficiently clarify what kinds of political societies to be created, based on what kinds of national ideologies, because of the declarations and final resolutions of the conference.

Even during the Cold War era, all the new the financial and economic institutions created after World War II preached the message of unipolarity.
The U.S. is the champion of this unipolarity but at the same time, it talks about free trade, the respect for human rights, and liberal democratic values, and international security, which also are the attributes of multipolar world. Unipolarity was applied through the building of the global capitalism under the supervision and the control of the United States. All the post-World War II global financial and economic institutions supported the centrality of the United States in world affairs. The U.S. is the biggest supporter of most of these organizations. This situation created a strong political clientelism and economic dependence that led to the weakening of the states in the global south. The U.S. viewed and interacted with the rest of the actors in the world from power and control perspectives.

One of the core values of the Bandung Conference was self-determination. It could not be consolidated in a new era without changing the existing power relations between African and Asian countries, on the one hand, and between them and the industrialized countries in new Europe and the United States, on the other hand. But it should be noted that European-United States together represent about 40 percent of the world commercial relations and about 50 percent of the world growth national product. African-Asian relations must challenge these trends and the tendencies of political monopoly, especially when it comes to the issues of international security, and economic and financial megapoly of the global capitalism.

The major questions here are: What kind of power system should the rethinking produce? What kinds of societies, states, and the economies, the rethinking should be able to project for African and Asian societies? What should be the ideological foundation of the new solidarity? And who should do the rethinking?

The role of the organic intellectuals and their relations with social movements and the societies at large is particularly important. No major societal structural changes have occurred in any part of the contemporary nation-states without the engagement of a conscious social class. These intellectuals should challenge the top down approach that has dominated the contemporary political thinking. They are defined as socially engaged individuals. They can engage societies through the acquisition and the
circulation of critical knowledge, or through dialogical relations of Paulo Freire (1978) with other social classes or by national struggles à la Fanon (1963). They should combine the process of knowledge production and political activism in civil societies, grassroots organizations, and professional organizations. They do not only intellectualize about their societies and others, but they also participate in the process of changing those societies in associating themselves with organic institutions and social movements. They should form a vanguard group.

In order to imagine and invent relevant and effective strategies, which African and Asian nation-states and their institutions can use as instruments through which they can challenge the trends of megapoly of global capitalism, first of all, they have to transform solidarity to an effective ideological foundation of their actions. The appropriate question is solidarity for what? The short answer is for building a peaceful and developmental region where poverty eradication is the main objective. Thus, this becomes an ideological construct. Secondly, they must do the inventory of what they have as natural and social assets, and as skills. Thirdly, they must know one another through educational systems and other training programs. Fourthly, they must set up their policy priorities based on their people’s living standards. Fifthly, they must establish strong regional institutions through which decisions can be made collectively. And sixthly, they must deepen their own democracies. Furthermore, their concept of security must be re-defined. It should go beyond militarism. It should include human security, which means the protection of social, political and economic rights, the protection of the eco-systems, and formulation and implementation of policies intended for the elimination of poverty.

I characterize multipolarity to be a ‘contestation’ paradigm that should challenge both unipolarity and the old déclassé bipolarity. The old bipolarity was the major feature of the Cold War politics. The world was divided based on the ideological struggles between the United States and its allies, and their neo-liberalism and the Soviet Union and its allies and their international socialism. This ideological bipolarity shaped the world diplomacy and all economic relations and military alliances during the Cold War period.
However, in the post-Cold War (since the early 1990s), it should be noted that while the call for multipolarity has been intensifying through the rise of indigenous, labour, social, women, youth and popular organizations and movements, its ideological basis is at the best hybrid. It is so because multipolarity as we are using it has not been able to interrogate sufficiently the nature of states and their actions. It has also challenged ethno-culturalism or culturalism of the state through civil societies but not the structures of the power system. In general, multipolarity movements call for political and economic decentralization of the world resources, a better management of world resources and a fair distribution of these resources. They call for more people’s participation in the reconstruction of their economies. In international system, it should call for the reconceptualization and establishment of new international partnership/cooperation based on the win-win theory.

Regions and nation-states that are doing well or better economically are those who have also capacities to negotiate. Here African-Asian solidarity has to produce those capacities based on their new political vision. This solidarity has to produce institutions and people with knowledge and specializations about, and/or on, the region.

Finally, the policies based on new solidarity must be articulated on some specific sectorial priorities. This solidarity should focus on the pursuit of peace and development, as these two interrelated values should be in the center of re-organizing the state and the state-societal relations. Africa, for instance, has the highest density of poverty in the world (about 88 percent). The sectors that should be developed in order to eradicate poverty include law, education, health, rural development, and infrastructures as part of the first steps to be taken that would allow the consolidation, understanding and appreciation of the new African-Asian solidarity at the national level. For this author, new rethinking must produce first a political agenda. Secondly, this political agenda about development must be able to challenge the Washington Consensus — the most important political expression of the claims of unipolarity par excellence, in mobilizing the people against the usage of the social dominant paradigm (DSP). In my view, given the level of the existing economic disparities among the people and the states in Africa.
and Asia, and different levels of development, the invisible hand of Adam Smith’s economic integration is not a suitable tool for the consolidation of this solidarity. They must develop first the state’s welfarism as the foundation of African-Asian solidarity. This is essentially a political issue.
CHAPTER SIX

Indonesia - South Africa: Truly Co-Partners in the Indian Ocean Region

Dr. Arifi Saiman

1. Introduction

Contemporary discussions on international relations have revolved around the world order transformations. Along with the already existing great powers, such as the United States and Germany, in the last few decades, some have emerged as newly emerging powers; Acharya described the term as follows: “The term “emerging powers” recognizes the growing, primarily economic, but also political and strategic, status of a group of nations most, if not all of which were once categorized as (and in some accounts still are) part of the “Third World” or “global South”.” Almost in a similar vein, Leslie Wehner (2017) explains that, “Emerging powers are usually referred to as states whose increasing material capacities and status-seeking strategies may potentially have an impact on the international system and also affect the dominant position of the hegemonic powers therein.”

These emerging powers have been contributing significantly in shaping a new world order particularly in the economic domain, regionally and globally. Matthew D. Stephen, an international relations prominent scholar, argued that, “… the rise of new powers increases the heterogeneity of preferences weighted by power that underpins the international system”. The newly emerging powers as a phenomenon in international relations is, among others, marked by the establishment of economic groupings by newly emerging powers in the contemporary era, such as BRICS and MIKTA; the former stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, while the latter stands for Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia. The impressive economic performance and profound political influence owned by the newly emerging powers serve as the modality to exercise their influential
role in helping to shape and transform the Indian Ocean area into a new regional world order.

As newly emerging powers as well as core countries in the Indian Ocean region, Indonesia and South Africa have been playing a vitally important role in enhancing mutually beneficial cooperation, notably in the economic field at both regional and global levels through their constructive approaches and engagements, among others, within the co-chairmanship in NAASP (New Asian-African Strategic Partnership) and the memberships in IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and G-20 (Group of Twenty) (see Acharya 2015; Lätt and Asiye Öztürk 2009; Mohan and Kapur 2015).

On economic performance, having preserved its domestic (political and economic) stability in the last few decades, the World Bank places Indonesia among the big top economies in the world. Indonesia charts remarkable economic growth in the reformation era. It is clearly reflected in the Indonesia’s GDP per capita has risen from USD 807 in the year 2000 to USD 3,877 in 2018 (World Bank 2018). In 2017, Indonesia has been a member of one trillion-dollar club in terms of its GDP (current price), which reached USD 1.015 trillion.

Meanwhile, since its transition to democracy, South Africa has made significant steps to improve its economic performances. The World Bank projects South Africa’s economic growth in 2019 at 1.3% and accelerating further to 1.7% in 2020 (World Bank 2019). While in terms of GDP (current price) South Africa reached USD 348.872 billion in 2017 (World Bank 2019).

2. Historical Ties and Partnership

Relations between Indonesia and South Africa have existed since the era of colonial power. The arrival of Abidin Tadia Tjoessoep alias Shaykh Yusuf of Makassar, a political exile, in Cape of Good Hope (now Cape Town) on April 2, 1694 by the Dutch ship Voetboeg, marked the close ties between South Africans and Indonesians (du Preez 2018). From that point onward, both nations have demonstrated strong commitment towards social solidarity; this was reflected, among others, in Indonesia’s unceasing support for the African National Congress (ANC)’s struggle against apartheid.
Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and South Africa have officially been established on August 12, 1994 (see Embassy of Indonesia); this was then followed by the opening of Indonesia’s diplomatic representative offices in Pretoria and Cape Town. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries during this post-colonial era marked new era of the two nations’ bilateral relations. During 1990 soon after Nelson Mandela was released, the former Indonesian President Soeharto contributed USD 10 million in cash to him (Parlina and Natahadibrata 2013).

Partnership between Indonesia and South Africa can be traced back to the holding of the first Asian-African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference (AASROC I) in Bandung, Indonesia in 2003 and the second AASROC (AASROC II) in Durban, South Africa in 2004 (Kamel et al 1998). Before going further Kamel et al argued that, “Partnership is a collaborative relationship between entities to work toward shared objectives through a mutually agreed division of labor.” Key to building a meaningful partnership is the specification of the shared objectives pursued; the agreement on the modus operandi to determine an appropriate division of labor to leverage skills and build on synergies and complementarities; and the establishment of mechanisms to assess success and make adjustments. Such is the basis to avoid the twin traps of a “hollow partnership”, or an “inflexible partnership.” However, it must be remembered that the goal is not partnership per se. Partnership is a means to an end. The real goal is the shared objective. Partnership is a tool to reach this goal more effectively, and more efficiently, for the benefit of all involved.”

On April 22-23, 2005, Indonesia hosted the Asia Africa Summit and it was attended by the representatives from 106 Asian and African countries consisting of 54 Asian countries and 52 African countries; it produced several important agreements, among other, is the Declaration on the New Asian African Strategic Partnership (NAASP). Since 2005, Indonesia and South Africa have become NAASP Co-Chairs. Several collaborative projects have been implemented under the NAASP framework, such as NAASP-UNEP Workshop on Environmental Law and Policy in 2006; Asian African Forum on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore in 2007, and the
Cordial relations between Indonesia and South Africa culminated in the first historical event when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership in March 17, 2008. The Indonesia-South Africa Strategic Partnership further strengthened by the signing of the Plan of Action of the Strategic Partnership by the two sides at the sideline of the IORA Summit in March 2017. Indonesia and South Africa have been intensively involved in several regional initiatives as well. One of the most important cooperation is in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

3. Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA): Partnership

Indonesia served as Chair of the IORA from 2015 – 2017, fully supported by South Africa as the Vice Chair. Indonesia’s leadership significantly contributed towards revitalizing IORA as a strategic regional organization. Indonesia introduced “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in a Peaceful and Stable Indian Ocean” as the theme of its leadership. This theme represents the strategic opportunity to deepen cooperation among the member states and focus on initiatives towards peace and stability.

Indonesia’s main priority as chair of IORA underlining the central theme of “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in a Peaceful and Stable Indian Ocean” was (i) produce a strategic, relevant and credible outcome document addressing the geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean; (ii) empowering IORA as consolidated institution; (iii) create business and investment opportunities in the region; (iv) mainstreaming maritime cooperation and (v) enhance IORA awareness on the domestic and international level (through IORA outreach programs). These priorities were further elaborated through outcome documents of meetings held during its chairmanship and for background Information Document IORA one can consult the Directorate of Asia-Pacific and African Intra and Inter-regional Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia that prepared it.

IORA under the Indonesia’s chairmanship and South Africa as the Vice Chair organized several important meetings. Among these meetings were
the 15th IORA Council of Ministers Meeting in Padang in October 2015, the Sixth Biannual Meeting of the IORA committee of Senior Official Meetings in Yogyakarta and 18th Meeting of the IORA Committee of Senior Officials in Bali October 2016. During the meeting in Bali, South Africa made a significant contribution by chairing the core Groups on the Blue Economy and Water (DIRCO, 2018). All these show that South Africa as the then vice chair of IORA contributed significantly in advancing IORA under the leadership of Indonesia.

Coinciding with the commemoration of its 20th Anniversary, IORA held a first ever one-off Summit in March 2017 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Summit produced three important outcome documents: (a) Jakarta Concord; (b) IORA Action Plan 2017-2021; and (c) Declaration on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, which have set the course for strengthening IORA cooperation in the coming years. The IORA Action Plan is intended as a guidance to implement the commitments set in the Jakarta Concord and to guide IORA’s work for the next five years. The IORA Action Plan has set priority sectors to be improved and developed within the period of 2017-2021. These sectors include Maritime Safety and Security, Trade and Investment Facilitation, Fisheries Management, Disaster Risk Management, Academic Science and Technology Cooperation, Tourism and Cultural Exchange, Blue Economy and Women’s Economic Empowerment. With South Africa taking its chairmanship in 2017, it has huge momentum to progress further through programs such as the core group on Blue Economy, the core group on tourism and also women empowerment (Bhatia 2018). These programs were previously mentioned by South Africa to be their priority during its chairmanship.

Indonesia handed over the chairmanship of IORA to South Africa in October 2017. Entering the second year of its term, South Africa stated the theme ‘Uniting the Peoples of Africa, Asia, Australasia and the Middle East through Enhanced Cooperation for Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development’ for their period; these were opening remarks by Honorable Minister Lindiwu Sisulu, (the former) Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa during the 18th Meeting Council of Ministers, Durban, November 2018. Under South Africa, IORA
will be moving forward in progressing areas, such as maritime safety and security, the blue economy, women empowerment and tourism. South Africa is committed to cooperating with member states towards exploring opportunities in achieving these goals.

As Africa’s leading emerging power, South Africa could encourage further representation from fellow African members in various initiatives geared towards development and stability in the IORA region. As noted in the opening remarks of the former South African Foreign Affairs Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, full engagement of the African member states in IORA is heavily encouraged. The further role and involvement of African states and regional organizations to support IORA’s initiatives particularly is vital in progressing on the issues of maritime security and Blue Economy.

Indonesia supported South Africa’s lead through various efforts, such as hosting the IORA High Level Panel on Enhancing Maritime Cooperation for Inclusive Growth in Indian Ocean Region in Bali on 7-8 December 2018. The meeting addressed several priority issues, namely: enhancing intra-trade and investment among members; maritime safety and security; physical regional connectivity; sustainable fisheries management and promoting tourism.

4. Way Forward: Towards a Long-lasting Co-Partnership

Along with the transfer of IORA chairmanship from South Africa to United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the end of 2019, Indonesia will also be completing its role in the IORA leadership Troika. However, it does not mean that Indonesia and South Africa would terminate their partnership in developing IORA. Both countries are fully committed to continue their co-partnership, particularly to help strengthen regional economic cooperation as mandated by the IORA Charter.

The objectives of IORA, as stipulated in its Charter, include among others: (a) To promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic co-operation; (c) To explore all possibilities and avenues for trade liberalisation, to remove impediments to, and lower barriers towards, freer and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment, and technology within the region. Furthermore, Indonesia and South Africa, as well as other IORA
member countries oblige to get the Jakarta Concord and the IORA Action Plan 2017-2021 down to earth. To achieve its objectives, IORA is facing challenges to address. The first is the challenge of economic development gaps. It can be identified, among others, from the gap in GDP and income of the respective IORA member countries as indicated in Table 1 and Table 2.

The second challenge is more on a matter of economic integration as indicated, among others, by the intra-regional trade complementarity. Table 3 shows the Trade Complementarity Index (TCI) by 2013. In general, the IORA intra-regional TCI viewed from export and import activities is relatively low, except for several countries, i.e. India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.

Indonesia and South Africa, as the two countries whose strategic position in the region and in IORA, play a vitally important role as a driving force in enhancing economic cooperation in the region as well as helping to attain the IORA’s objectives, including by engaging the Dialogue Partners. For the record, IORA has 22 member states and 9 Dialog Partners.

The member states include Australia, Bangladesh, Union of the Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. And the Dialogue partners consist of China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America. IORA needs to continuously strengthen closer engagement and cooperation with Dialogue Partners to contribute valuable assistances to support its development.

In addition to its engagement with the Dialogue Partners and in view of IORA countries’ overlapping membership with other sub-regional organizations such as such as ASEAN, GCC, and SADC (see Figure 1), IORA needs to enhance cooperation. It should do so with the said sub-regional organizations as well as the existing financing institutions, such as the World Bank, as the funding sources for particular development projects. It also needs to engage the newly inter-oceanic cooperation platforms, such as the US Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act and the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), as well as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) led by Japan and India, through bilateral or triangular cooperation mechanisms.
In order to accelerate economic integration in the Indian Ocean region, marked by the economic development gaps, IORA needs to introduce ‘unusual’ approach instead of the ‘usual; one in this context. Such approaches come up with the introduction of new economic integration mechanism, such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA), Free Trade Agreements (FTA), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) as illustrated in Figure 2.

Among the aforementioned economic integration types, the PTA is the first stage of economic integration, which is less sophisticated in nature since it just reduces tariffs instead of abolishing them completely. In addition to PTA, IORA may consider introducing FTA or even CEPA. In view of the different economic capacity of the member states, the measures towards such an economic integration could be gradually conducted rather than by simultaneous implementation. For this purpose, IORA can learn from the experiences of ASEAN with its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Asia-Pacific (APEC) with its Bogor Goals. The implementation of AFTA has been done through multi-speed approach. In its Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, while the tariffs on goods traded within the ASEAN region, which meet a 40% ASEAN content requirement, were reduced by the year 2002/2003 to 0-5%, and some countries were given exceptions (2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia) (see US-ASEAN Business Council).

In the context of the APEC’s experience, the Bogor Goals are an example. The vision of an open and highly integrated region under the Bogor Goals is all the more impressive. The Bogor Goals set up different deadline for its member economies. The deadline for industrialized economies is no later than the year 2010, while for developing economies is no later than the year 2020 (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia).

Finally, apart from the economic domain, there is an urgency to nurture people-to-people (p-to-p) contact in the Indian Ocean region. Peoples are the nexus of any cooperation within the IORA framework. In this regard, IORA, which is being driven by its core countries (Australia, India, Indonesia, and South Africa), finds it necessary to enhance p-to-p contact in the region. The first ever marine sport competition among IORA member states, called
‘IORA Games’, is essential to promote IORA as well as strengthen a sense of ownership and solidarity among IORA citizens.
### Table 1: GDP of IORA Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>GDP (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>2720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td></td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Member States Income 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Income ($12,376 or more)</th>
<th>Upper Middle Income ($3,996 to $12,375)</th>
<th>Lower Middle Income ($1,026 to $3,995)</th>
<th>Low Income ($1,025 or less)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 3: IORA Intra-regional Trade Complementarity Index (2013)

| INDEX IMPORTER | AU  | BD  | KM  | IN  | ID  | IR  | KE  | MG  | MY  | MZ  | OM  | SC  | SG  | SO  | SL  | TZ  | TH  | AE  | YE  |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Australia (AU) | -0.22| 0.19| 0.33| 0.26| 0.21| 0.21| 0.18| 0.27| 0.23| 0.20| 0.24| 0.17| 0.22| 0.12| 0.29| 0.24| 0.18| 0.30| 0.28|
| Bangladesh (BD)| 0.10| -   | -   | 0.08| 0.07| 0.09| 0.08| 0.10| 0.12| 0.08| 0.11| 0.08| 0.07| 0.08| 0.07| 0.10| 0.10| 0.08| 0.11|
| Comoros (KM)  | 0.06| 0.06| -   | 0.05| 0.05| 0.06| 0.06| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05| 0.06| 0.06| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05| 0.05|
| India (IN)     | 0.44| 0.45| 0.12| -   | 0.55| 0.44| 0.58| 0.57| 0.47| 0.59| 0.53| 0.49| 0.49| 0.56| 0.51| 0.58| 0.57| 0.47| 0.59|
| Indonesia (ID)| 0.40| 0.30| 0.14| 0.36| -   | 0.34| 0.37| 0.36| 0.29| 0.28| 0.29| 0.31| 0.29| 0.28| 0.31| 0.29| 0.28| 0.31| 0.29|
| Iran (IR)      | 0.22| 0.17| 0.09| 0.26| -   | 0.20| 0.13| 0.19| 0.12| 0.13| 0.18| 0.09| 0.26| 0.30| 0.23| 0.13| 0.18| 0.30| 0.23|
| Kenya (KE)     | 0.31| 0.28| 0.31| 0.21| 0.27| 0.29| -   | 0.34| 0.35| 0.27| 0.29| 0.28| 0.31| 0.27| 0.34| 0.35| 0.27| 0.29| 0.31|
| Madagascar (MG)| 0.14| 0.14| 0.12| 0.11| 0.13| 0.11| 0.13| -   | 0.15| 0.11| 0.15| 0.13| 0.11| 0.13| 0.15| 0.11| 0.15| 0.13| 0.11|
| Mauritius (MU)| 0.50| 0.36| 0.27| 0.37| 0.48| 0.36| 0.43| 0.35| -   | 0.40| 0.38| 0.36| 0.43| 0.43| 0.37| 0.40| 0.38| 0.36| 0.43|
| Mozambique (MZ)| 0.23| 0.24| 0.16| 0.24| 0.15| 0.20| 0.19| 0.21| 0.24| -   | 0.18| 0.20| 0.19| 0.21| 0.22| 0.22| 0.18| 0.20| 0.19|
| Oman (OM)      | 0.27| 0.29| 0.16| 0.24| 0.15| 0.21| 0.20| 0.19| 0.21| 0.24| -   | 0.18| 0.20| 0.19| 0.21| 0.22| 0.22| 0.18| 0.20|
| Seychelles (SC)| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| -   | 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12| 0.12|
| Singapore (SG)| 0.07| 0.05| 0.04| 0.03| 0.02| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| -   | 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01| 0.01|
| South Africa (SA)| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| -   | 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38| 0.38|
| Sri Lanka (SL)| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| -   | 0.19| 0.19| 0.19| 0.19|
| Tanzania (TZ)| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| 0.29| -   | 0.29| 0.29| 0.29|
| Thailand (TH) | 0.55| 0.39| 0.26| 0.67| 0.86| 0.67| 0.86| 0.55| 0.39| 0.26| 0.67| 0.86| 0.55| 0.39| 0.26| 0.67| 0.86| 0.55| 0.39|
| UAE (AE) | 0.41| 0.22| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.22| 0.41| 0.22| 0.41|
| Yemen (Y) | 0.48| 0.26| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26| 0.48| 0.26|
Figure 1: A Model


Figure 2: Various Type of Partnerships

Source: PADA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
Indonesia – South Africa: A South-South Partnership in the Making
CHAPTER SEVEN

South Africa and Indonesia: Two Nation-States Compared

Prof. Muhammed Haron

1. Introduction

Anyone undertaking a comparative study of two different nation-states that are located on two separate continents will have to factor in various characteristics; these are to underscore, on the one hand, the differences and, on the other, to highlight their commonalities. One, in fact, cannot talk about similarities as such, and the reason for this is that the word implies that either they resemble one another in many ways or they are like symbiotic twins that have the same origins but that have historically developed along distinct pathways.

Considering these remarks, this essay compares albeit briefly two significant nation-states from the South; ones that have played pivotal roles in regional, continental and global organizations over the many decades (see Figure 1). The essay reflects on South Africa and Indonesia since the two belong to the South where both continue to show their influence as middle powers; a status that has been attributed to them because of their respective economic positions and other attributes within their respective regions. It is also a position via which they demonstrated their leadership in regional, continental and international organizations.

2. Indonesia and South Africa: A Simplified Overview

South Africa gained nominal independence from Britain on the 10 May 1910 and it was called the Union of South Africa; it was, however, ‘legally’ granted white minority rule from 1934 onwards. Because of this deliberate discriminatory process, South Africa’s Afrikaner volk succeeded to gain authority by voting into power their choice of government in 1948; a regime that was – since then - characterized as a unique racist, bigoted, apartheid state. By 1961 the apartheid administration seceded from the
Commonwealth in order to establish a Republic. Prior to this and from that period onwards the banned ANC and PAC’s armed struggle continued until the racist government was forced to end its rule at the negotiating table. The outcome of the CODESA talks, as it was named, laid the grounds for South Africa to become a democratic state during May 1994.

Compared to South Africa’s changeable development from white minority rule during the mid-1910s to black majority rule during the mid-1990s, Indonesia’s road to independence was as a result of the ‘Indonesian War of independence’ (*Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) that led to a declaration of independence by the 17 August 1945; this was almost 350 years of Dutch rule. However, since the latter was not satisfied with this, the Indonesians continued their struggle from that date, which marked the peoples’ day of independence, up until the Dutch Empire was forced to grant the country its sovereignty. And this was awarded when it was given official recognition only on 27 December 1949.

These oversimplified observations clearly illustrated that both nation-states faced different socio-political circumstances and that they came into existence because of miscellaneous factors. Important to note is the fact that though their respective peoples followed diverse paths their valiant struggles were somewhat the same in wanting to achieve their independence and in desiring to attain their democratic right to rule.

### 3. Key Historical Events

Their struggles were, however, tied to key historical events that brought about a degree of optimism in the ranks of the developing nations and the liberation movements; the first of the two is the Afro-Asian Conference (AAC) and the second was the Non-Aligned Movement’s formation at the Belgrade Conference that strengthened Indonesia’s support for South Africa’s liberation movements. However, a third important conference that should be mentioned and that took place more than ten years after South Africa attained its status as a democracy was the New Asian African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) that was co-chaired between Indonesia and South Africa. See Figure 2 on the illustration of these Conferences.
3.1 Bandung Conference: AAC

Since Indonesia was among those countries that gained their independence from the colonial power relatively early as compared to others, it along with four others (Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan) decided on this important meeting; Indonesia's Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo was one of the key drivers. The Sukarno government hosted what came to be famously known as Bandung conference; this took place between the 18 and 24 April 1955 and it may be described as the first large-scale Afro Asian conference; the overall purpose of this conference was discuss and deal with their common challenges that they all encountered. The conference was set up with a few aims in mind. The first was to discuss peace; the second was to deliberate about their role as Third World countries in the Cold War that was dominated by two super powers (that is, the USA and USSR); the third was to promote economic and cultural cooperation among themselves as new nation-states; and the fourth was to counter colonialism and neo-colonialism (Acharya 2016).

Interestingly, South Africa, as a racist nation-state, was deliberately left out of the list of invitees. In its place, the ANC was rightfully represented. Molvi Ismail Cachalia (South African Indian Congress member) and Moses Kotane (ANC National Executive Council member) attended; the two received travel documents from India. At the conference, they presented the ‘Memorandum against Apartheid’ that passionately lobbied support for the ANC’s anti-apartheid activities. At the end of this historic conference, its rapporteurs issued a Declaration of Ten Principles (Dasa Sila Bandung) that was adopted by all those who attended and later reinforced by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) attendees during 1961.

Later that year, the ANC’s National Executive Committee’s 44th National Conference Report commended the Bandung conference; it stated that it ‘marked a new era’. In the report’s penultimate paragraph in that particular section, Oliver Tambo wrote that it was “with the greatest enthusiasm, (that) we greet the achievements of the Bandung conference which will inspire colonial people everywhere to redouble their efforts for freedom” (Oliver R. Tambo, Acting Secretary-General 18 December 1955).
A few decades later, Oliver Tambo once again recalled ‘The Spirit of Bandung’ in his 1979 speech; he addressed the Front-Line States in Lusaka and reminded the audience of the principles of non-alignment, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism that was adopted at that historic meeting. And more than 35 years hence, The Jakarta Post (www.thejakartapost.com) reported on 28 March 2015 that the South African political leadership eagerly expressed its interest in the Bandung conference’s 60th anniversary; this stems from the fact that the event offered a pivotal platform that assisted South Africa’s oppressed masses to firmly stand up against the apartheid system. ANC’s Zweli Mkhize, who was interviewed along with others, particularly praised the late President Sukarno for having been among those who “connected the leaders of Asia and Africa under the same values for the first time and the solidarity it created stimulated a wave of decolonization.”

Kyle Haddad Fonda made the point that Bandung conference stimulated Third World leaders “to articulate their vision of global anti-imperialist cooperation beyond their own borders” and he went on to state that it too triggered a few Third World countries “to seek both domestic and international legitimacy portraying themselves as exemplars of a commitment to Third World solidarity” (Fonda 2017).

### 3.2 Belgrade Conference: NAM’s Formation

Even though the Bandung conference, some like Fonda argued, did not give rise to any permanent organization it did indirectly lay the foundations for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of which Indonesia was a founding member. NAM was established during September 1961 at Yugoslavia’s Belgrade conference. Its members purposefully adopted a policy of positive neutrality; that is, a position that caused its members not to align with either the USA or the USSR; two dominant nation-states that were at loggerheads with each other throughout the Cold War era and that coaxed and forced developing countries to be part of their spheres of influence.

Significant to mention was that NAM’s primary purpose was to give support to those peoples that needed support for self-determination, help those who sought national independence, and those nation-states that desired sovereignty as well as territorial integrity. According to Scott Thomas
(1995), this was one of the first international conferences that the ANC sent representatives; the idea was to put forward the case of the liberation movements. Tambo, however, did not represent the ANC specifically at the NAM event, he, for the record, spoke on behalf of the United Front. He thus focused his presentation on southern Africa; a region that gallantly struggled against the colonial and apartheid forces (Callinicos 2004).

3.3 Jakarta Conference: NAASP’s Establishment

The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership was created during the 22-23 April 2005 meeting that took place in Jakarta. This Summit of Asian and African governments, which was co-chaired by Indonesia and South Africa, issued the NAASP Declaration that was accompanied by a Plan of Action as well as a joint Asian African Leaders Statement on natural disasters. The strategic partnership hinged on three pillars and they are political solidarity, economic cooperation and socio-cultural relations.

Since Indonesia was the key co-chair partner with South Africa, it took upon itself the task to develop NAASP into a fairly active and meaningful intra-governmental project; it set up a Business Meeting, Technical Meeting and a Ministerial Meeting with the idea of monitoring and advancing the projects objectives. Indonesia, for example, addressed 26 programs within the NAASP framework between 2006 and 2011; among these was a 2008 Ministerial Conference regarding Capacity Building in Palestine (see NAASP report 9 April 2019 online: https://kemlu.go.id). Scholars at the Institute for Global Dialogue in South Africa have been reflecting critically on the future of NAASP (see www.igd.org.za/infocus109).

4. Towards a Comparison

Having offered a somewhat superficial background of Indonesia’s peoples and South Africa’s oppressed masses during the post-colonial era and using the Bandung conference as part of that backdrop that inspired the ANC and other liberation movements in Africa and Asia, it is now the opportune moment to perhaps fast-track to the current period by comparing the two nation-states on at least three levels.
The first is to discuss albeit briefly the population of the two countries and comment, albeit briefly, about demographic matters that one has to take into account in the evaluation process. The second is to reflect upon the middle power status that ASEAN’s Indonesia and SADC’s South Africa hold within the world system. Here brief mention is made of their economic strength within the respective regions; their status cause them to stand out as middle powers that either act as a peace brokers or as promoters of democratic values.

In addition, the third is to assess the two countries’ respective geo-strategic positions within the Indian Ocean Rim where they have co-led developments since their approval of the Charter during 1997. One can examine other issues as well but that should be left for another occasion and for a more detailed study; now the attention is turned to the selected three with the question of demography being the first to be covered.

**4.1 Two Nation-States Demographics: An Important Factor**

When considering the process of nation building then one of the key elements that should weigh up the question of the country’s demographics. Governments are usually challenged by the demographic spread and their populations’ composition as well as the population trends that take place. On the one hand, the issue of numbers remains significant, and on the other, the question of legitimate representation cannot be overlooked.

As regards the latter, for example, many questions come to mind and among these are: who rightfully represents which ethnic cluster, linguistic group, racial category, religious gathering, and regional bloc within the country’s vast borders and how should the country ensure that those that are its representatives have been legally selected/elected so as to avoid any form of conflict? Though no attempt is being made to answer these or other relevant questions, they have been included to highlight that when one responds to the question of demographics then these are the questions have to be tabled.

Now when reflecting on the respective demographics of Indonesia and South Africa, one immediately observes that South Africa’s population, like the Indonesia’s population, is multi-ethnic, multiracial, multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious. While South Africa’s population is spread
and resides on one, large land mass, Indonesia’s multitudes live on thousands of scattered islands that – when put together - make up its land mass.

Therefore, when Indonesia and South Africa, like all other nation-states, strategically plan and chart out their futures, then they have to identify the various variables that would help them to achieve their sets of objectives. Since population studies specialists have studied demographic issues and population trends, they inevitably identified a list of demographic drives that assist in analyzing and determining these trends.

Among the primary variables that demographers normally look at are family planning (which includes both fertility and mortality), ageing, migration (complex internal and external mobility), and urbanization (that is, de-ruralization). Each one of the listed variables impact in different ways on the populations of Indonesia and South Africa respectively; in both nation-states, the countries witnessed internal migration on large scales, and these further impacted on the resources of the cities/regions where they settled. The issue of internal/external migration is just one of those that cause population trends to shift.

Anyhow, when one attempts to assess the respective populations of Indonesia and South Africa, one is struck by the fact that from among the world’s nation-states that Indonesia has a huge population compared to South Africa’s miniscule number. According to 2019 census figures, Indonesia’s population hover around 260.6 million, and South Africa’s population is 205.7 million fewer; worded differently, South Africa’s population is only about 58 m and thus much smaller than those of Indonesia. In terms of human resources, Indonesia outnumbers South Africa by far.

Despite the differences in terms of their populations both have been described as nation-states that have Middle Power status within the world systems and that means that they hold positions that cause them to different from other developing nation-states in the South.

4.2 SADC’s South Africa and ASEAN’s Indonesia: Two Middle Powers

Over the past few years, scholars have described countries such as Indonesia and South Africa as ‘middle powers’ that are located within a hierarchical system of states of which ‘superpowers’ exist on a higher level
and ‘small powers’ on the lower level. Now describing these two and others as middle powers means that they are two nation-states that have certain character traits. They succeeded to be (a) acceptable democratic states that (b) wield degrees of economic power within their respective regions and within the global system in a respectable manner; in addition, they are states that also work towards ‘maintaining a balance of power’ according to Carsten Holbraad (1984).

A principled feature of both Indonesia and South Africa is that the two are respectively regional leaders as well as global actors (Borchers 2013). Another important element to bear in mind when consider the two as middle power states is that both have their respective philosophies that drive their policies; while Indonesia draws upon the concept *pancasila* (that is, the five principles) (Brown 2003), South Africa gains strength from the notion of *Ubuntu* (that is, being human through others).

Considering these concepts and returning to Indonesia, it may be stressed that it is indeed the largest and the most populated ASEAN member state with the biggest economy; hence its recognition as a rising economic giant not only regionally but also globally. South Africa, though it does not have a huge population and nor an expansive economy like Indonesia, it does have a sizeable population when compared to others in SADC; on top of this, it is also the region’s economic power house even though it has been performing poorly of late. Most of its neighboring states such as Lesotho and Mozambique are rather dependent on South Africa.

Apart from their respective economic positions within their respective regions, they belong to those South nation-states that are members of multilateral organizations such as G20 and NAM. The latter is, of course, vastly different from the G20; it adopted a positive neutral stance towards the super powers during the Cold War era. Thereafter, it continued to play a role in encouraging its member states not to side with the major state actors throughout the post-Cold War period. For example, even though China and Russia – as (reformed) big state actors – hold significant positions in the global system NAM members should act cautiously with both of them; in fact, for countries such as Indonesia and many ASEAN members the South China Sea crisis remains a headache.
Both Indonesia and South Africa reflect middle power characteristics. They are: (a) ensuring that there is security for all at all levels; (b) promoting peace for everyone; (c) resolving conflicts wherever they exist within their respective regions and far beyond these regions; (d) working towards ending any form of human rights abuses that take place within the borders of nation-states; and (e) preserving and uphold democratic values and principles within their regional organizations and among developing nation-states.

Since both South Africa and Indonesia have been internationally active as peace-brokers and peace-keepers, they have demonstrated their ability to act in these capacities. For example, while South Africa was the peace-broker in case of East Timor that adopted the South African Truth and Reconciliation model, Indonesia participated in being a peace-broker when the border disputes broke out between Myanmar and Cambodia.

Besides being peacekeepers in other countries/regions around the globe, both Indonesia and South Africa have confirmed their willingness to assist and contribute to the security and peace with the hope that all may benefit from these outcomes. In addition to these concerns, both have acted as catalysts, facilitators and managers using their acquired and sharpened diplomatic skills in the interest of all.

4.3 Indian Ocean Rim: Distant Maritime Neighbors

Since both Indonesia and South Africa have been active nations at various levels internationally, they were also jointly instrumental for creating new platforms – as one has noted with NAASP - to bilaterally deepen and expand their relationship through multilateral initiatives; one of the structures, which they jointly formed with others, was the formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC); now called by its shortened name: Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Apparently, a former minister, Minister Pik Botha who was a member of the apartheid cabinet, met up with his Indian counterparts during 1993 and suggested the idea of forming this organization.

Before IOR-ARC came into existence; it was preceded by the adoption of a Charter by 14 nation-states on 7 March 1997 in Mauritius (Charter for IOR-ARC in International Legal Materials 36[4]: 8-7-812, July 1997). The latter
catalogued (http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/iorarc.htm) a long list of objectives of which the following are noteworthy:

- To promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Member States;
- To create common ground for regional economic cooperation;
- To focus on those areas of economic cooperation which provide maximum opportunities in order to develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits;
- To encourage close interaction of trade and industry, academic institutions, scholars and peoples of the Member States…,
- To strengthen cooperation and dialogue among Member States in international fora on global economic issues;
- To develop shared strategies and take common positions in the international fora on issues of mutual interest: and
- To promote cooperation in development of human resources, particularly through closer linkages among training institutions, universities and other specialised institutions of the Member States.

As one ponders over these objectives and as one think about the geo-strategic positions of Indonesia and South Africa, it is observed that they are key maritime nations that are significant maritime actors in IOR. Being part of this family of twenty-two nations implies that they benefit from this vast ocean and this too means that their peoples, who live in this expansive region, somehow connect with one another via the seas. In other words, the ocean has made it possible for them to be connected and it facilitated them to reach out to each other.

Historical and archaeological scholarship, in fact, affirmed that in the distant past seafarers, prior to the VOC that has linked Batavia with the Cape of Good Hope during the mid-17th century, have made use of the shipping routes using dhows and sailboats crossing from one side to the other. If historians, archaeologists and other social scientists undertake further research, then one is sure – though still speculative at this stage - that evidence will surface to prove that earlier movements did taken place between earlier communities in the archipelago and southern Africa.

That aside and when first looking at Indonesia, one notes that it covers an area of approximately 1,904,569 sq km. As one shift one’s sights to South
Africa, the recorded information reveals that the area is approximately 1,219,090 square km. From a comparative perspective, the measurements highlight the fact that Indonesia is far bigger than South Africa in terms of land mass. Moreover, while South Africa only claims to have a coastline that is 2,798 long, Indonesia, which includes all its islands, has a coastline that amounts to 54,716 km. Now when one zooms in on each of these maritime countries, it is evident that they differ slightly from one another. While South Africa’s coast runs from the Indian to the Atlantic Oceans (since it is at the foot of the African continent), Indonesia - with its many coastlines as a result of its myriads of Islands - straddles across two oceans; on the west it is the Indian Ocean and on the east it is the Pacific Ocean.

The political leadership of both Indonesia and South Africa are indeed aware of that their respective countries are strategically located, and these locales should work in their interests in multiple ways. Their geo-strategic setting place them along prime trade routes that they have so far been managed reasonably well, but that needs further attention as a result of possible conflicts that involve various maritime activities in the Oceans that surrounds them. In any case, these two nation-states mother body IOR identified six primary areas of which maritime security and fisheries management form a part; and in addition to these IOR added Blue Economy as another priority area.

In fact, when President Joko Widodo was IORA’s chair he hosted the first IORA Leaders’ Summit between 5 and 7 March 2017 and this took place in Jakarta. Once again, one observes to what extent Indonesian political leadership has contributed towards regional cooperation. A while prior to this Summit, President Widodo held the view that Indonesia has an important position that supports the idea of a “global maritime axis.” Since Indonesia is indeed the world’s largest archipelagic state, Widodo stressed that being at the crossroads of these two oceans Indonesia should make use of its strategic maritime status and make this ‘the cornerstone of (its) foreign policy.’

Santikajaya (2014), who made this point in her online essay, raised pertinent questions as regards Indonesia’s position vis-à-vis the ASEAN - a regional body that was always part of Indonesia’s foreign policy – if Indonesia should bring about this policy change. Widodo’s view that IORA should
become the cornerstone of his country’s foreign policy will, however, lead to further questions as to what role ASEAN would have in Indonesia’s foreign policy if he opted to pursue this idea. Related to this, one may hypothetically ask: would South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa adopt a similar approach or remain faithful to SADC? One assumes that being part of IORA might have more benefits than can be imagined, and this might work in South Africa’s - and Indonesia’s - interest. Well, perhaps its best to leave this speculative thought aside and bring this essay to an end.

5. Towards a Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to compare rather briefly South Africa and Indonesia as two significant nation-states from the South. The rationale for this comparative exercise was to highlight to what extent both played pivotal roles in the regional, continental and global organizations over the many decades. The essay referred to, at least, three historical conferences in which representatives from both countries contributed substantially and upon reflection, this was indeed the case.

The essay then moved further by selecting three issues that it used to underline this comparative approach. In the first, it skimpily discussed the importance of these two countries’ population trends and it simply commented on the demographic matters that one must consider when undertaking an evaluation. In the second section, it reflected upon the two nation-states as middle powers status.

It was illustrated that ASEAN’s Indonesia and SADC’s South Africa are important countries that have vibrant democracies, effervescent economies, and strategically located within their regions and the world system where they demonstrated their ability to be among other peace-brokers. Moreover, in the final section it assessed their respective geo-strategic positions within the Indian Ocean Rim where they have co-led developments; once again showing their leadership on the global platform.
Regional, Continental and International Affiliations

- SADC + AU
- ASEAN + APEC
- IORA + G20
- IORA + G20
Three Historical Conferences

Afro-Asian Conference
Bandung 1955

New Asian African Strategic Partnership
Jakarta 2005

Non-Aligned Movement
Belgrade 1961
PART THREE

Economic and Trade:
Advancing Their Connections
CHAPTER EIGHT

Business Indonesia: Prospects for South African Companies

Mr. Ebrahim Patel

1. Introduction

“Indonesia is a country with 18 000 islands”. That statement from an Indonesian businessperson at a trade show in Johannesburg in 1993 sparked my fascination with Indonesia and led to a longstanding relation with the beautiful island nation and its people. Indonesia is a country with an Ancient civilisation, a rich history, diverse culture, a tapestry of people, a vibrant economy and people who are serious about business.

Its strategic sea-lane position in South East Asia along the Equator has fostered international trade from ancient times with historical evidence showing Sumatran ships carrying goods to Africa as earlier as 1CE. Trade has fundamentally shaped Indonesia’s history and is entrenched into its heartbeat.

It is a country with a centuries-old civilization of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic Cultures mixed with Dutch, Portuguese and British influences (Brown 2003). The warm welcome and friendly nature of the Indonesians as well as their eagerness for business shows the potential of the country.

2. Indonesia and South Africa: Historical Links

The historical links between Indonesia and South Africa date back to the 17th Century when both countries were Dutch colonies. Shaykh Yusuf from Makassar and Tuan Guru from Tidore, two notable members of royal families from Indonesia, were brought to the Cape by the Dutch as political prisoners. Tuan Guru was among the first political prisoners of Robben Island. Their families and descendants are the vibrant Cape Malay community, which has given Cape Town its cultural flavour.
In contemporary times, Indonesia broke off relations with the South African apartheid state after the 1955 Bandung Conference Resolution and provided support for the anti-apartheid movement. Nelson Mandela had an affinity for Indonesia and an admiration for its cultural diversity and social cohesion, which he saw as lessons for a post-apartheid South Africa. When Madiba visited Indonesia in 1994, he became a fan of the Batik Shirt, which became his signature dressing and inspired the Madiba Shirt fashion among South Africans.

The opening of the South African Embassy in Jakarta in 1994 and the Indonesian Embassy in Pretoria in 1995 cemented the relationship between the two countries. These strong historical, cultural and political links are critical in expanding business and trade potential between our countries. Over the years, bi-lateral trade has developed but not to the potential or levels that are possible.

3. Economic Overview

My first visit in 1994 brought fascinating insight into the economy, development and business opportunities. A large, diversified and export-oriented manufacturing sector with a vibrant and developing SME sector and a burgeoning financial sector resulted in the economy growing at 7% pa and Per Capita GDP had grown 570% making it one of the ASEAN Tigers. Economic reform and regulation were bringing rapid development and industrialization.

The 1998 Asian Financial Crisis negatively affected the Indonesian economy resulting in the overnight devaluation of the Rupiah, wiping off its strong trade surplus and foreign reserves, 13.5% of the GDP lost and a ratings downgrade to “Junk Status”.

However, prudent macroeconomic policies and progress in structural reforms combined with the resilience of the people and the strong business culture has seen Indonesia recover and climb up the international rankings of competitiveness and the business environment. Today it is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and 7th largest in the world in terms of GDP with a population of 260 million people. See illustration of the current GDP Growth 2019 on Figure 1.
Living standards are higher than before and GDP per capita has risen by 70% during the past two decades. GDP growth has remained around 5%, and per capita income has increased by almost 4% annually. The Indonesian consumer is ranked as one of the most confident in the world. Since 2015, Indonesia has leapt 34 places in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking to 72nd.

With around half of its population under 30 years of age, this young and vibrant democracy is urbanizing and modernizing rapidly. It is estimated that by 2030, more than 90 million Indonesians will join the ranks of the consuming class, that is almost 5 million each year, and the number of Indonesians shifting to urban areas is expected to reach 70 percent of the total population. Indonesia is home to the most active Twitter population in the world with Jakarta holding the position as the Twitter Capital of the world and is one of the most social media connected societies. See Figure 2 on GDP Growth Forecast 2024.

The response by seasoned businessperson to my question on how Indonesia was able to overcome challenges and become successful was the Indonesian proverb: *Dimana ada kemauan, di situ ada jalan* which translated means “If you are sufficiently determined to achieve something, then you will find a way of doing so” and Indonesia has demonstrated that it is determined to achieve.

During my recent visit to the Province of East Timur and the TradeExpo in Jakarta, the benefits of President Jokowi’s and his Government’s economic strategy and innovative approach is clearly visible. East Timur with its population of 39 Million and a workforce of 21 million has just 850 000 unemployed. In the first half of 2019, the Province exported more than US$5.8 Billion much of which has come from SMEs. The Province has plans for 11 Industrial Parks to be opened in the next two years.

Hundreds of SMEs displayed their products at the TradeExpo, the largest of its kind in Indonesia, covering items such as Furniture, Food Products, Snacks, Healthcare and Beauty Products, Technology and Agricultural Products and Services. From small villages and co-operatives to medium scale factories, the depth of products available is an indication of the versatility of Indonesia’s economy.
4. **Tourism**

Indonesia has managed to tap into its rich cultural and natural beauty to become a major tourism destination. From the stunning beaches of Bali or the pristine forests of Borneo or the ancient wonders of Borobudur and Torajaland to the Komodo Islands there is plenty of attraction for every taste. The hospitality and attention to visitors of Indonesians is exemplary. Their warm and friendly character makes one feel welcome and at ease. Government creating better service sees tourism as a strategic industry with training and skills development.

More than 18 million international tourists and 241 million local tourists add more than US $8 Billion to the economy per annum. From dive sites to surfing, from mountain trails to forest hikes, from wildlife to cultural tours, Indonesia has an adventure to offer to any taste.

5. **Business Culture**

In order to successfully start and expand a business it is important to establish a good network with Indonesian business and government circles. Organizations such as the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) and the Indonesian Trade Promotion Centre (ITPC) can provide information and linkages.

The diverse and rich cultural dynamics of Indonesia dominate its business culture. Having a better understanding of it helps in doing business with Indonesian companies. Learning about the people and about the unwritten habits will help in opening relationships. Indonesians are very proud of their cultural heritage and show kindness towards a foreigner. Building relationships is very important as Indonesians grow a strong bond with people they know. Putting in time to make relations and nurturing them is key to long term business. While Indonesians have a desire to do business, do not expect to walk away with signed contracts on the first meeting.

Having a local trustworthy partner helps support you on business but even more vital is them sharing an insider’s knowledge of the business environment. Loyalty to a brand and recognition of its name is entrenched. Indonesians prefer and trust local brands. They take pride in using Indonesian brands and they believe that local companies truly understand Indonesian
consumers, providing better value for money compared with foreign brands. However, it is only the perception of being local that matters and foreign companies have been able to successfully capture the market through localization or acquisition strategies.

As a large and diverse country, each region has its own characteristics that suit different investors depending on their niche. For example, beyond the familiar regions of Jakarta and the Riau Islands, regions such as Central and East Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan are resource rich and offer potential for manufacturers, especially those targeting the large domestic market. Cities such as Bandung, Makassar and Yogyakarta offer opportunities in urban development, smart cities and consumerism. These regions are worth considering as the need for infrastructure development is high, and the cost of land, manufacturing and labour could be more competitive for some industries. My experience with Indonesia and Indonesian business has been not just positive but also educational to the outlook of doing business.


South Africa is Indonesia’s second largest trade partner in Africa and one of Indonesia’s key non-traditional export markets. Bilateral trade between the two countries peaked to US$2.14 billion in 2011 when Indonesia’s exports were valued at US$1.44 billion but dropped to US$850 million in 2017.

Indonesia mainly exports motor vehicles, rubber, footwear, tires and paper, while South Africa’s major exports include chemicals, wood pulp, ferrous waste, iron ore, aluminum, fruit and mechanical appliances.

For South African companies, Indonesia’s under-developed public infrastructure presents opportunities in aviation, rail, ports and land transport, as well as in municipal infrastructure projects such as water supply and wastewater systems. Emerging opportunities include palm oil, biofuel processing, clean energy and technology to improve local production capacity, and potentially cold storage and fish processing equipment and services.

The robust and expanding banking sectors offers opportunities for IT and banking equipment, software and technology providers as more
Indonesians look for secure payment platforms. With its large geographic spread, there are opportunities for telecommunication infrastructure such as satellites, ground stations, handheld devices and services. The Government has announced its intention to increase electricity generation by 35,000 MW providing a growth in power generation projects, conventional and renewable, and IPPs for the next decade.

Education and professional training remain in high demand. The USA has always been a desired destination for Indonesians students with more than 9000 currently studying in the US. South African Educational institutions can be an attractive alternative for Indonesian Students.

Currently Indonesia imports high-quality American agricultural commodities, which retain their market edge even with premium prices. Processed Vegetables, Fruit and Beef are demands that South African companies can find opportunity in. Indonesian Manufacturers and exporters are always keen to grow into international markets. They have a good understanding of demand areas and are always interested in finding opportunity. The SME industry is extremely vibrant with more than 41 million small business units that make up 99% of the total number of business enterprises. SME development has been a top priority for the Indonesian Government.

The introduction of the 2008 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Law, the establishment of the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs, as well as numerous SME programmes in many Ministries, have all contributed to the development of Indonesia’s SME sector. Today the SME sector accounts for 16% of all exports from Indonesia.

Indonesia’s manufacturing sectors producers a number of quality products with high volumes available for export. South African companies would do well to consider Indonesian products and suppliers as an alternative. The country’s well-established exporters and even SMEs have an eagerness to expand into new markets. Goods such as Furniture, Health Care, Automotive Parts, Clothing, Footwear and ready-packed Foods are perfectly suited for the South African and Sub-Saharan Markets. Indonesia is already a top supplier of Palm Oil to South Africa. See Table 1 on the Indonesian Export Products.
The country’s Eximbank, under its treasury department, supports and facilitates collaboration between Indonesia and African countries. The Eximbank provides overseas investment financing, insurance and advice to local companies that wanted to expand overseas. In terms of direct financing, Eximbank could also provide African buyers with buyer’s credit financing - in either a commercial scheme or concessional loan scheme.

7. Unlocking the Potential

For South Africa to benefit from the strategic partnership with Indonesia, we need to have shift in the thinking. Currently South Africans can visit Indonesia without any Visa requirements. A reciprocity allowing Indonesian Businesspersons and Tourists visa-free travel to SA will create a greater awareness and demand.

Indonesia has a large Middle class who are keen travelers wanting to explore Africa for its wildlife and sights. Due to the visa restrictions, many Indonesian travelers tend to go to Botswana, Kenya and other African countries. More frequent trade delegations and business missions between the two-countries will align the trade potential and unlock opportunities.

As a frequent visitor to Indonesia and having done business with Indonesian companies, it represents an opportunity for South African businesses looking not just to import goods but also to grow into a burgeoning export market.

A visit to Indonesia is an eye-opening and valuable experience.
### Table 1: Indonesian Export Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>INDONESIA’S EXPORT PRODUCT</th>
<th>2018 VALUE (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coal, solid fuels made from coal</td>
<td>$20.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>$16.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Petroleum gases</td>
<td>$10.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>$5.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Copper ores, concentrates</td>
<td>$4.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Natural rubber</td>
<td>$4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>$3.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cars</td>
<td>$3.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Industrial fatty acids and alcohols</td>
<td>$3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Footwear (leather)</td>
<td>$2.7 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.worldstopexports.com/Indonesia-top-10-exports/
1. Introduction

“Until the lion learns how to write, every story will glorify the hunter” is an African proverb that resonates with people whose conditions have been defined by others. In Africa, the 21st century has been characterised by battles for independence. Over many years, Africans fought gallantly against European colonisers to gain independence. However, for many years after independence, new African countries still struggle to stay afloat and often relied heavily on developed nations including those that had previously colonised them.

Many of these struggling countries are heavily indebted to the IMF and other global lenders. Interests on loans and penalties for missed payments exacerbated the dire conditions that people were living in these countries. Ghana was the first African country to gain independence on 6 March 1957, the day Britain relinquished its control. Since then many other African countries won their independence by having largely remained dependent on the former masters for, among other needs, development aid, grants, skills, and trade. The uncomfortable and often unfair relations with the former colonisers have seen the influence of Asia rise on the African continent.

With poor African countries buckling under the burden of massive debt arrears owed to the West and Western institutions, many of them began to look east. Among the leading nations to oblige were China, India and not so far behind Indonesia. These rising giants and other Asian countries had themselves endured many years of occupation and colonialism. Their experiences under colonisation are similar to those of African countries. Trade between Africa and India has increased more than eight-fold from US$7.2 billion in 2001 to US$59.9 billion in 2017.
Last year the growth rate of China’s trade with Africa was the highest in the world. China’s exports to Africa were US$104.91 billion, up 10.8%. Its imports from Africa were US$99.28 billion. However, in recent time China has not had an easy ride in Africa – a backlash has come its way for alleged “debt trap” lending policies.

In the meantime, the ties between Indonesia and Africa – South Africa to be specific – have continued to grow with each partner bringing trade and a wealth of cultural diversity to the blossoming friendship. Indonesia is made up of thousands of islands and yet it remains largely united. South Africa, by contrast, is one huge landmass that suffers multiple divisions that can be traced to its divided past. Under apartheid authorities, the phrase “separate development” was touted and this was a poor sorry excuse for the worst type of discrimination, which was declared a crime against humanity by the UN. Perhaps South Africa will adopt enough tolerance of differences – just like the Indonesians do - to be able to be united in a true sense that goes beyond religion, politics, race, and gender.

2. Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo: His Vision for Unity

During a recent a television interview on CNN, Indonesia’s re-elected President Joko Widodo said Islam in his country was tolerant. Asked about the rise of fundamentalism in his country, Widodo blamed fake news for the problem and said he would instead do everything to steer the country to more peace and prosperity. “I still believe that Islam in Indonesia is a tolerant and moderate Islam. Islam in Indonesia is modern, it is forward-thinking,” said Widodo, who is affectionately known as Jokowi.

The patterns of his beautiful well-fitting batik shirt could easily epitomise the harmony in Indonesia. Different shapes and designs orderly put together make for a splendid picture. Just as if the masterful makers of batik blend different elements – Widodo said he was ready to work with different entities to rejuvenate Indonesia. “We would like to work with all elements of society,” said Widodo. “We would like to work with everyone to develop this country, but not with those who want to ruin this country in terms of its ideology and in developing our economy. There is no compromise for me.”
Considering that Indonesia has 583 regional languages that are spoken across more than 17,000 islands that make up the archipelago, Widodo must be credited with keeping his country united. This demonstrable ability to unite people who speak a multitude of languages could benefit Africa, especially South Africa which suffers from fractious race relations.

3. Indonesia Hosting Events in South Africa

Some recent events such as the ASEAN Festival in Pretoria show that there is more to the relations between countries than just trade. On Saturday, 29 June 2019, under the collective cultural showcase – ASEAN Festival – shoppers were not only treated to cooking demonstrations, they also enjoyed tasting a variety of dishes. Brooklyn Square mall in Pretoria was transformed into the best of Asian food, fashion, artefacts and the best cuisine demos by renowned chefs and culture exponents from Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia.

Another memorable event that endeared Indonesia to South Africans was the “Coffee and Chocolate Africa Expo 2019” at the Ticket Dome Pro in Fourways, which took place from 26 to 28 July. Commenting on the event Indonesia Ambassador to South Africa Salman Al Farisi said: “True coffee lovers must have been familiar with the reputation of Indonesian coffee, such as Luwak Coffee, Gayo Coffee or Toraja Coffee. “We continue our effort in penetrating the food and beverage market in South Africa, we bring Sumedang Coffee to this exhibition. “Sumedang Coffee has its own flavour and aroma, the same quality grade with its other Indonesian coffee-peers.”

Even though Africa is rich in mineral resources, has an excess of human labour and is endowed with vast landmass it remains unable to reach its full potential owing to wars, political instability and endemic corruption. South Africa is leading the way in turning around this perception by focusing on fighting corruption and state capture.

President Cyril Ramaphosa was elected on a ticket of fighting corruption - something he has already succeeded in doing through commissions of inquiries that have exposed the extent of the rot. When united as one trade area, Africa’s huge population of more than 1.2 billion, represents a very attractive trade market. Asian countries like Indonesia have sought out
relations with particular African countries and found many areas of mutual cooperation and benefit.

Many years ago – 25 to be exact – Indonesian and South Africa began diplomatic relations, perhaps cemented by Batik shirts. Former SA president Nelson Mandela was so fond of batik shirts they were re-named by locals as “Madiba Shirts”. South Africa, which has about 58 million people, continues to maintain cordial diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the ties are getting stronger.

Indonesia, a Southeast Asian nation, is known worldwide for its exotic culture that includes tasty cuisines, Batik fashion, and dance. Tourists are attracted to Indonesia’s beaches, volcanoes, jungles, Komodo dragons, elephants, orang-utans, and tigers. Historic buildings also form a major attraction. South Africans, in growing numbers, are traveling to Indonesia to enjoy the sights and hospitality. Lindi Masinga, a South African journalist recently visited Bali, Indonesia. Upon her return, she remarked that her holiday trip was not only affordable but was also “spiritual, relaxing and informative”.

Visitors to Indonesia can enjoy the majestic sights that include the Masjid Agung Palembang mosque in South of Sumatra built by Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin I Jaya Wikramo in 1738. The architecture exhibits European and Chinese influences. Indonesia is an archipelago of wonder. For example, Komodo island – the habitant of the Komodo dragon, is a major tourist attraction for visitors to the Komodo national park. Komodo Island is located in the East Nusa Tenggara province, east of Java and Bali. It is most well known for being the largest of three islands that make up the UNESCO recognised Komodo National Park, and home to the Komodo dragon. With a rich cultural heritage and a variety of languages Komodo Islands, folklore has an interesting tale about the dragons – giant lizards that grow as long as three metres.

4. Local Legends: Indonesia’s Komodo Dragons and SA’s Deadly Mermaids

Locals believe in the legend of an ancient beautiful princess who married and gave birth to twins - one was a human boy named Gerong and
the other was a female Komodo dragon called Ora. Variations of the story all point to Ora living in the forest while her twin lived in the village. After many years, goes one version, Gerong went into the forest to hunt. When he was on his way home with his catch – a deer, Ora came out of nowhere anddevoured the game.

Before Gerong could strike the Komodo his mother appeared and told him not to do it because the dragon was his twin sister. From then on, the villagers say they have lived in harmony with the Komodo dragons, which have become an increasing tourist attraction. Other folklore tales suggest the Ora were banished to the forest after neighbours complained she was feeding on their chickens. Either way locals have over the centuries lived peacefully with the dragons.

On the other hand, South Africa is not short of mystical tales of old such as that of the Mermaid of the Karoo. Situated outside the little town of De Rust, between the Klein and Groot Karoo, is the famous Meiringspoort (canyon), where legend has it that rock pools were home to a beautiful dark-haired mermaid. The mermaid thought to be the manifestation of an angry water spirit would lure her intended victim. Once the victim was close enough the mermaid would strike and drag the victim to the depths of the rock pools. The frightening fight to the death under the water has been likened to the violence unleashed by the spirits of the Eseljagtspoort outside Oudtshoorn.

An old Bushman apparently told the story of the Eseljagtspoort water spirits to a local farmer in 1875. The myth was given credence by ancient Khoi-San rock paintings of what appear to be mermaids in the area that can still be seen to this day. Unlike peaceful encounters with Komodo dragons, liaisons with the mermaids always ended in tragedy.

With mystic and reality interwoven in the contemporary, there are many facets to the Indonesia relationship with South Africa, one of Africa’s leading economies.

5. **South Africa is Indonesia’s leading African trading partner**

South Africa became Indonesia’s largest trade partner in Africa about nine years ago, and it accounted for 22.18 percent of Indonesia’s total trade.
Back then in 2011 bilateral trade between Indonesia and South Africa reached US$2.14 billion. However, more than trade has been the cultural and friendship exchanges between Indonesia, which is 80 percent Muslim and South Africa a secular state. At the same time, Indonesia has quietly spread its wings in Africa, where it continues to establish itself as a genuine friend and business partner of the continent and South Africa in particular. Both nations have seen massive growth in urban areas where there is more economic activity.

President Ramaphosa has a vision of building a new city simply because South Africa’s economic hub – Johannesburg – has become saturated and cannot be expanded further. Johannesburg has a population of about 8 million residents. A similar thing is happening to Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta with more than 9.5 million residents has become too populated. The government of Indonesia is mooting the building of a new capital.

South Africa has every reason to diversify its interests in the East and look further than China to countries like Indonesia that offer so much more. Given the growth in trade and cultural ties, it is clear the lions of Indonesia and South Africa have now learned how to write their own stories and all the hunter can do, is to read and admire the blossoming partnership.

Indonesia counts South Africa among its leading African partners!
CHAPTER TEN

Luring Companies, Marketing Products: The Role of Indonesian Trade Promotion Center (ITPC) Johannesburg

Prof. Muhammed Haron

1. Introduction

Under the Directorate General of National Export Development (DGNED) that liaises and operates under the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian Trade Promotion Centre (ITPC) was initiated; it was set up as a non-profit organization under DGNED’s supervision. The idea behind this enterprise was to essentially enhance and expand the export of Indonesian products to all corners of the world. However, for it to be successful in this business venture and achieve its ambitious aims, it decided to connect with potential business partners within Indonesia; and it did likewise in the host countries where ITPC was established.

For more than a decade and more, DGNED has explored new markets and it thus spread its wings far and wide. It, therefore, did not only open up such centres in one city but it did so in several cities around the globe; it has centres from Budapest to Sydney to Chicago and as a result, Indonesia has been and continues to be rewarded with successful trade missions. In addition to these developments and as part of its marketing outreach program, DGNED also offered the host partners the necessary assistance to gain attractive and reasonable investment opportunities. It operates on a win-win situation that is beneficial to both the business partners that have agreed to be in this adventurous trade mission.

2. ITPC: Its Global Footprints

Through these centres Indonesia’s manufacturers/exporters have eagerly explored fresh markets; the purpose of this effort was to, among others, (a) find new associates, (b) enlarge their market, and (c) moderate
their dependency on existing ones. While undertaking these tasks to identify and locate reliable overseas/foreign buying partners remain largely a difficult challenge, it was also a rewarding one for Indonesian exporters.

In these instances, DGNED has been searching for trustworthy facilitators that are in the position to channel the relevant information to the prospective markets about the available Indonesian products; these facilitators have and continue to play a pivotal role that offer key linkages between Indonesian exporters and buyers from abroad.

It is for these reasons that the Indonesian Government through DGNED, the body that functions under Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade – as stated at the outset – and that is closely connected to the Pretoria-based Embassy of the Republic Indonesia, established ITPC as its commercial and trade promotion institution in Johannesburg. The purpose was to not only access the South African market but to also tap into the relatively sizeable Southern Africa Development market too.

3. Indonesia’s Companies and Its Miscellaneous Products

Over the years, Indonesia has a range of companies that deal with a range of products that includes palm products and plastics, wooden products and pulp, and fish products and shrimps (see Figure 1 for some samples of Indonesian products). The types of companies that exist are indeed vast and therefore Indonesia has opened up opportunities for them to extend their tentacles into countries where it has official representation, as is the case in South Africa. Many Indonesia’s companies have been participating in exhibitions that have been taking place in Johannesburg and other cities.

These companies would not have developed if it had not been for their wide-spread resources. It may be argued that compared to some of its ASEAN members, Indonesia has been endowed with a variety of rich natural resources. It has a fair mixture of resources and from the long catalogue that is available, Crude Palm Oil tops the list. According to the available statistics, both oil and liquefied natural gas contribute 70% of Indonesia’s total export earnings; and this translates into 60% of the Indonesian government
revenues. As one considers these handsome revenues, it is significant to note that 90% of the country’s large population participates and engages in the farming sector where they produce various agricultural products that include, inter alia, forestry and rubber products. Added to these, Indonesia has an abundance of natural resources such as tin, nickel, and copper. Since it has thousands of islands, it has an enormous amount of fish and fish products that contribute towards the country’s export earnings. Besides these, one should add coffee, cocoa and tea as well as palm products that were mentioned in passing earlier.

According to the City Press report, Sinthya Roesly - the chairperson of the country’s export-import bank, EximBank – stated that it is one of four parastatals under Indonesia’s treasury department. She mentioned that Indonesia has one of the more protected small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sectors in the ASEAN region. It is a sector, according to the report, that does not permit foreigners to wholly own small businesses in certain sectors. In this manner, she pointed out, the Indonesian legal system ensures that the SME sector, which has become a huge employer, remains and continues to be resilient (http://citypress.news24.com).

Alongside these developments, the Indonesian government has created incentives for its entrepreneurial-oriented communities by having taken a number of significant steps in order to promote and stimulate various sectors through the process of diversification; one the market, for example, Indonesia also has miscellaneous non-oil products for export. It has, among others, tea, tobacco, cement, fertilizers as well as manufactured goods.

On top of these, Indonesian has set up plant assemblies that produce various types of automobiles, trucks, buses and motorcycles; all of these under license from foreign manufacturers. The country also produces electronics equipment and electrical appliances. All these products have been and are being produced for both the domestic and the overseas market. See Figure 2 for the list of Main and Prospectives Products.

Since Indonesia’s economy, like most other countries, is tied to the global market, it has had to create a stimulating economic environment. It did so to be in line with the global economic marketplace Indonesia has put in place a liberal foreign exchange system that has a few restrictions
as regards transfers outside the country; the country largely freely allows conversions to and from foreign currencies.

South Africa, being part of the foreign market, has been one of Indonesia’s target countries on the African continent. Over the past number of years, it has exported some of the country’s key products to South Africa; it has, however, also identified numerous other potential products that it considered exporting; these are said to form part of Indonesia’s attractive products.

4. ITPC’s South African Presence

ITPC Johannesburg has been operated in South Africa since 2004 and has been actively promoting Indonesian products and services in South Africa. During the early part of 2017 Indonesia and South Africa, who are active NAM and IORA members as well as G20 and G77 plus China, decided to renew and deepen their connections; one of the methods of doing this was through intensifying and increasing trade between both countries. The two Minister of Trade met in Pretoria in a Joint Trade Committee on 21 July 2017 and agreed to facilitate business-to-business contact and to support each other efforts in diversifying trade and improving the structure of trade.

Since ITPC Johannesburg opened its doors in South Africa, it readily participated in many trade exhibitions to display Indonesian products to South Africa market, among others, the Africa Big Seven (AB7) that include Indonesian food and beverages big as well as small medium companies that are ready to export to South Africa (Figure 3).

In addition, there were also trading partners from companies that hailed from Turkey, Poland, Zimbabwe, PRC, Malaysia, and Nigeria. Approximately 6,000 visitors according to statistics that were taken visited the three-day exhibition; most of these were prospective buyers and importers from the food and beverage products industry. At this exhibition, ITPC Johannesburg promoted its catalogue of products and handed out business cards; it too encouraged potential buyers to make direct contact with the producers via email/website or via ITPC.

ITPC has been a participant in this exhibition since it is aimed at the international market and may be described as “the most suitable means
for in-depth analysis and broad comparisons of food products which have recently been confronted by issues of changes in food and beverage consumption trends among African society in general, and South Africa in particular.”

Not only in food and beverages sectors, ITPC Johannesburg promote Indonesian furniture by participating in Decorex and SARCDA exhibitions (furniture and home décor exhibition) (Figure 7). It supports Indonesian fashion, including textile, shoes and jewelry by participating in Apparel, Textile and Footwear (ATF) exhibition (Figure 4). And encourages the promotion of Indonesian tourism and outdoor travel equipment by participating in Gauteng Getaway Show (Figure 5).

ITPC Johannesburg also actively promoting and inviting South African companies to Trade Expo Indonesia (Figure 6), the biggest trade expo in Indonesia that showcasing multi-sectors Indonesian products and services. ITPC participation in various exhibitions as well as its continuously effort to promote Indonesian products and services through all media shows that Indonesia is ready to become international player in goods as well as services.

Other than exhibitions and promotions through media, ITPC Johannesburg also organized Indonesia-South Africa business forum. The one purpose was to boost and strengthen the economic relations between the two countries. And the other was to facilitate Indonesian businesses who wish to explore business and investment opportunities in South Africa and vice versa.

The Business Forum’s main objective was to promote Indonesia in various ways. One of these was in the field of TTI (trade, tourism and investment). And the idea behind this was to increase the expansion of cooperation in the field of trade and investment; and it was also to encourage the realization of increased economic, trade and investment cooperation between the two countries as well as a means of disseminating relevant trade and tourism information.

5. Conclusion

As indicated in the introduction, ITPC Johannesburg was created to promote Indonesian trade in and beyond South Africa. However, it was set up
to create a win-win situation; one that would benefit business partners from both countries. Since both have been involved in multilateral organizations and have developed strong diplomatic ties, it was important to deepen their trade ties. Moreover, it is for this reason that DGNED explored new markets and South Africa was viewed as one of those important locations.

Since ITPC’s operations in South Africa, it has exhibited and marketed Indonesian products, and this has attracted great interest. One thus concludes that the future for Indonesia’s products in Southern African generally and South Africa in is quite positive and indeed bright.
Figure 1: Indonesian Products

Samples of Indonesia Products

Figure 2: Main and Prospective Products

Products: Main & Prospective

Main Products
- Crude Palm Oil
- Textile and Textile Products
- Electronics
- Rubber and Rubber Products
- Wood Products, Pulp and Furniture
- Chemical Products
- Metal Products
- Machinery
- Processed Foods
- Automotive Components

Main Products
- Footwear
- Jewelry
- Plastic Products
- Leather and Leather Products
- Handicraft
- Fish and Fish Products
- Shrimps
- Spices
- Coffee
- Cocoa
Figure 3: Exhibition Africa Big 7

Africa Big Seven 2019

Figure 4: ITPC Apparel, Textile and Footwear Exhibition

ATF Expo 2019
Figure: 5: Gauteng Getaway Show

Getaway Show Gauteng 2019

Figure 6: Trade Expo 2019

Trade Expo 2019
Figure 7: SARCDA 2019

SARCDA 2019

Figure 8: South Africa-Indonesia Business Forum

Shaheed Esau addressing South Africa-Indonesia Business Forum
PART FOUR

NON-STATE ACTORS: ENRICHING THE RELATIONSHIP
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Early Communal Connections
(Circa 1650s-1850s):
South Africa’s Kaap de Goede Hoop and
Indonesia’s Batavia

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1. Introduction

If one should ask present-day school kids in both Cape Town and Jakarta about the links that exist between Kaap de Goede Hoop and Batavia, then they would look at one puzzled and with no forthcoming answer. The reason for their confused response may be attributed to the fact that ignorant of geographical names that were used before. They do not know that Cape Town was known as Kaap de Goede Hoop (English: Cape of Good Hope and Portuguese: Cabo da Boa Esparanca), and they do not possess the knowledge that Jakarta was called Batavia (Melayu: Batauia, and previously known as Jayakarta that was part of the Sultanate of Banten).

They too are very ill informed about the erstwhile Dutch colonial power’s role in connecting these Indian Ocean locales and their communities through the slave trade system and other commercial ventures. One may further point to a third fact; that is that their knowledge about the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC – also known in English as the Dutch East India Company’s with DEIC as its acronym) – a trading network that was granted monopoly on Asian trade by the Dutch government during 1602 - and its elite’s activities by and large comes to naught.

As the respective multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious communities of Cape Town and Jakarta look ahead into the future, it seems that their current generation of women and men – as well as the ones to come - has very little knowledge about the distant past. One may add that they do not have much information about how their cities’ communities
evolved over time to become cosmopolitan in make-up. Nonetheless, this essay intends to touch upon how these communities developed. It also wants to illustrate how VOC’s elites, among others, enslaved peoples from the archipelago and elsewhere by transporting them to far-away places such as Kaap de Goede Hoop; a Dutch controlled trading post where they were incarcerated in the Slave Lodge and in the hinterland of that region.

Besides this, the essay also narrates how the VOC apprehended political prisoners by having them forcefully exiled to this trading station from which it was impossible to escape. Essentially, this essay reflects on the communal connections between these two cities/regions during the early VOC period. As already mentioned, the VOC had itself entrenched in each of these places and since they were dominant, as a colonial power for about three hundred years, they controlled and managed the Indian Ocean trade routes.

2. VOC’s Batavia and Kaap de Goede Hoop

About three decades before VOC’s Johan van Riebeeck (d.1677), the Dutch colonial administrator, landed at the Kaap de Goede Hoop during 1652 changed and transformed this location into a permanent VOC refreshment station, the VOC elite, which had a close relationship with the Sultanate of Banten, the foundations for Batavia was laid during 1619. And more than a year after this on the 8th January 1621, it was officially called by this name. Being VOC’s executive capital, the entire region was managed and controlled from this expanding city. For the record, the VOC administered this whole region for about three centuries until it filed bankruptcy in 1799; by then, the Dutch government took over to govern the region until it officially granted Indonesia sovereignty in 1949.

As the VOC rooted itself in the East Indies generally and Batavia specifically, its enthusiastic Johan van Riebeeck did the same in Kaap de Goede Hoop. He and other VOC representatives realized that Kaap de Goede Hoop was conveniently situated with an immense territory that was a sprawling hinterland. Kaap de Goede Hoop was located near and not at Africa’s southern tip that was along a key sea trade route that linked three regions, namely, Europe, Africa, and South & Southeast Asia.

Kaap de Goede Hoop was thus one of the nodes along the
route that conveniently connected with other VOC outposts; geographical nodes that were suitable for the rewarding spice trade; a profit-making activity that was fully supported by the VOC’s political, commercial and military structures.

Being an European colonial power, the VOC chased like its counterparts (i.e. the Portuguese and British) after the East’s wealth such as nutmeg and cloves; hence the VOC ships having had ample storage space - at a premium – for these spices and other commercial goods (Brown 2003). Though it was less concerned about the mass transportation of cheap forced migrant labour to the Kaap de Goede Hoop (hereafter: Cape) from Batavia and its surrounding regions, its representatives realized that it would be worthwhile venture to explore. They observed that it was a business venture in the Americas that imported vast numbers of West African slaves; and they thus implemented a similar system.

3. VOC’s Bannelinge, Bandieten and Slaven

So as the VOC expanded its interest horizontally and vertically across the Indian Ocean, it seriously turned its focus to slave labour. In the end, as the VOC became more brazen and brash with its unfolding internal and external political drama, and as it encountered an effervescent economic development in and outside Batavia, it slowly drafted in South East Asian ‘bannelinge’, Southeast Asian Chinese ‘bandieten’, and slaves (Mogamat Kammie email 1 February 2016).

Taking this into account and apart from having been a trading partner with some of the Melayu Archipelago’s Sultanates (such as Banten and Malacca), the VOC gradually benefitted from their socio-economic and political weaknesses. It thus colonized vast swatches of land and having been the Portuguese’ successors the VOC gained from their experience and thus took full advantage of these Sultanates’ diverse linguistic and cultural communities. The VOC countered those who opposed them militarily, subjugated all of them politically, and enslaved many of them socially. The VOC’s fleet of ships brought along with them many (Muslim) convicts, slaves and political prisoners; and each of these groups were treated differently by the VOC authorities. Anyhow, on board the Malacca - a VOC ship, Abraham
van Batavia was one of the three male and eight women slaves; they were regarded as the very first batch of slaves that landed at the Cape in 1653.

3.1 Placaaten: Its Harsh Proclamations

The VOC entrenched its rule at the Cape by issuing harsh proclamations (i.e. the Placaaten); these made it extremely difficult for the slaves, criminals, and political prisoners to ever think of escaping. According to Bradlow & Cairns (1978), the VOC shipped a sizeable number of Muslim political prisoners, slaves and convicts from South-East Asia (Sulawesi, Sumatra, Makassar and Tidore) using Batavia as its passageway to the Cape. In fact, Governor-General John Maetsuycker (d.1678) anticipated the coming of the Mardyckers who hailed from Amboyna in Southeast Asia’s Southern Molucca islands during 1658 he thus proactively re-issued the Placaaten on 23 August 1657 to restrict their religious practices.

The Placaaten, inter alia, prohibited the Christian master’s slaves from converting them to Islam and it forbade anyone from publicly practicing Islam. If the slave, for example, was caught doing so openly he/she was given the death penalty; and even when the master was caught for allowing them to do so he would be heavily fined, he would characteristically have his slaves confiscated. Samuel Rochlin (1939) quoted from the Placaaten: “That within the Town of Batavia no other religion should be exercised, instructed or propagated in private or public, than the Reformed Protestant Church….and that should any congregation … be held or kept (by) either Christian, heathen or Moor (Muslim) all property of such (keeper) should be forfeited and be… banished out of the country or punished corporally or with death…”

But regardless of the insensitive decrees and statutes, the enslaved groups and political prisoners clandestinely and courageously performed their religious rites; they did so by consciously entrenching their Muslim identity through political insurrectionary acts against the VOC; by then VOC’s members have advocated Calvinist religious thought and teachings. The Muslim slaves and prisoners espoused a religious identity that eventually gave rise to the formation of the early Cape Muslims. By the end of 1658, the Cape only consisted of 162 persons of whom the Burghers (those who...
were released from VOC’s services; though this number included the slaves (who were owned by the VOC authorities and Burghers who became private slave owners). It excluded the Khoi/Khoekhoe communities that inhabited these areas. And even though these slaves were still numerically weak and in spite of their challenging circumstances of having been scattered to far-flung farms and locations, they made constant efforts to remain connected.

3.2 Orang Cayen and Others

From the VOC’s standpoint, these individuals were deliberately kept apart for fear of escaping and dreading that they might incite rebellion. Another possible reason for having implemented this policy (of containment) was that they were somewhat anxious that these slaves might devise ways of countering the policies that forbade them from performing their religious rites and that were indeed not in line with Christian religious thinking. The VOC, according to Worden (1985), feared slave revenge attacks and particularly the Bougies who were described as characteristically capricious and viciously vindictive. Nonetheless, these decrees and other complementary policies, which were zealously carried out by the Cape colonists who justified the mishandling and maltreating of slaves, did not stop nor did they deter the Muslim slaves from seeking ways of practicing Islam.

Apart from having been brought as slaves to the Cape, several individuals were banished because of their anti-VOC political activities. The Cape witnessed an influx of prominent high-ranking individuals known as the Orang Cayen who were apprehended from different parts of the Malay Archipelago. Subsequent generations view these men as their forebears who made substantial inputs towards the growing Muslim community’s formation. Therefore, when the Polsbroek, the VOC ship, docked at the Cape during 1667 it had on board Sayyid Mahmud and Shaykh Abdurahman Matebe Shah who were both highly respected Muslim leaders. The VOC apprehended them in Sumatra - a region that was ruled by a Malay-Indonesian Sultanate, and it imprisoned them at the Cape. They were, in fact, intentionally isolated by the Cape authorities from the rest of the community for fear of instigating their co-religionists politically. Nevertheless, these
two died and were buried in Constantia (a suburb of Greater Cape Town). Prior to their death and after 1681 they were joined by other Ternate and Makassarese noble men who were convicted for similar anti-VOC acts.

One of the most respected Makassarese men was Shaykh Yusuf al-Khalwati (d.1699) (see Salie 2013). The authorities arrested him and imprisoned in Batavia and thereafter exiled to Ceylon before having been transferred to the Cape. Besides the Shaykh's fascinating story, mention should be made of the Rajah of Tambora (Albubasi Sultan d.1719). The latter was connected to the Javanese Kingdom of Majapith and he, like others, was also imprisoned for political reasons at the Cape's Castle (est.1666) during 1697. As expected, the exiled Shaykh Yusuf used his position at the time to intervene on behalf of the incarcerated Rajah with the hope that he would be shifted to Makassar to join the Shaykh's family and followers; alas, this was not to be. The Rajah, incidentally, married the Shaykh's daughter, Sitina Sara Marouff during 1698; the year before he was transferred to Vergelegen - a district outside the Cape's centre.

Davids and others opined that each of the Rajah and Sitina Sara's children converted to Christianity during the 1720s; this may be attributed to the fact that they were isolated and kept from socializing with other Muslims. In any case, it is interesting to record that the Rajah penned a copy of the Qur'an from memory and this was apparently handed as a gift to the then Governor-General Simon van der Stel (d.1712) who retired from that post in 1699. However, during the early part of 1700 Ronso of Tambora - along with six other political prisoners - who was a close acquaintance of the Rajah were banished to the Cape for their political insurrections.

Prior to the Shaykh Yusuf's banishment to the Cape's Makassar he had already written more than twenty theological and mystical manuscripts. Although these, it is assumed, mainly circulated among his followers and perhaps reflected upon by the religious men who were with him, there was and still is no tangible evidence that some were written or even left at the Cape. Nevertheless, soon after the Shaykh's death in 1699 most of his relatives and associates were shipped back to the Melayu Archipelago; sadly, those who stayed behind, as far as could be ascertained, did not disseminate any of the Shaykh's teachings.
Subsequent to the Shaykh’s demise, there were others such as Shaykh Noorul Mubeen (d.1716), Shaykh Madura (d.1754), Tuan Said (Sayyid) ‘Alawi (d.1760), Tuan Nuruman (a.k.a Paay Schaapie, d.1786), Qadi ‘Abdus-Salam (d.1807) and Pangerang Arja Dipanagara (d.1855) who aroused and inspired their co-religionists. Ebrahim Salie’s (2015) critical reflections on the Eastern Muslim aristocrats and political exiles such as Dipanagara, who were banished to the Cape, makes fascinating reading. Nevertheless, these Orang Cayen enthused those who were brought as convicts and those who were enslaved at the Cape; among these the convicts stood out as a significant group and as a consequence they were categorized as Vryezwarten (Free Blacks).

### 3.3 Vryezwarten

As already indicated the Vryezwarten were convicted for criminal acts that they committed in Batavia and elsewhere in that region. When the VOC authorities apprehended them during 1743, they were taken to the Cape where they, among others, constructed Table Bay’s breakwater. So instead of returning from whence they were brought, these convicts - who had by then served their sentence - opted to remain behind; and as a group they made up the Vryezwarten community. Davids confidently argued that they were really the ones who consolidated Islam’s presence and saw to its growth at the Cape (also see Mason 2003: 185).

That being the case it may be further stated that they were indeed the ones who profited from the Shaykh’s saintly powers and spiritual legacy. An interesting fact that one witnessed, during the time the group of Vryezwarten surfaced, was that they became significant stakeholders in the Colony’s economy by, among others, also trading in slaves and being slave owners like Shaykh Yusuf. Important to mention is the fact that Vryezwarten became a significant part of the early Muslim community. The reason for this is that they had the economic capacity ‘to fund the cultural practices like mouloods (celebrating the prophet’s birthday), gaajats (spiritual gatherings), kiefeiyaats (burying the dead), and other celebratory events such as colourful weddings that became identity markers of Cape Islam’ (according to Mogamat Kammie email 1 February 2016; Mason 2003:187).
Perhaps reference should be made to two informative examples from the 1820s cited by Loos (2004: 55-57 & 129-137) that illustrate the status of Vryezwarten: the first is the case of Jaria; the latter was a manumitted Vryezwarten. She was married to Absolom van Batavia who she considered to be her enslaved husband; this is based on the documents that she possessed. Now the local authorities opined that since he was married to her whether according to Muslim or other rites, he was a free person. They based themselves on the fact that he was employed as a fire brigade officer and that no slave would be permitted into such an employment. Since that was the case, she argued otherwise because she wanted her husband to skip a jail sentence for having neglected his duty as a fire brigade staff member. Though the story is slightly more complex than what is narrated here, it was re-told here to highlight how slaves were perceived with familial and communal environments.

The second case is that of Carel Pilgrim (d.1863) who was a slave; when he grew up, he and his brother became tailors. Carel of the Cape (also known as: Hadjie Gazadien) later abandoned this profession; and he then chose to be a teacher and thereafter an Imam (i.e. a Muslim religious leader). Carel was one of the first individuals who performed hajj (i.e. the obligatory pilgrimage) probably at the end of 1834 and he returned about three years after to teach Arabic; and he later took up a post at Cape’s Keerom mosque where he was subsequently embroiled in theological disputes.

When reflecting upon these two cases, one noticed that each of these individuals was at one time or the other a slave and as soon as they gained their freedom their social status also changed. What is also of interest is that many of the slaves were skilled in various professions and many of the Muslims were absorbed in the building industry because of their artisan skills (i.e. carpenters, plasterers, bricklayers, and etcetera); others like Carel entered the clothing profession and became a tailor. They therefore brought skills that were indispensable to the Cape Colony economy (see Shell 1994: 50-52).

That aside, these Vryezwarten demonstrated on occasions that they were quite willing to manumit their slaves either before their death or upon their death as mentioned in their wills. In addition, these Vryezwarten’s efforts to transform their conditions religiously and economically were further
bolstered when two ‘Mohamedaansche Priesters’ (that is, Muslim Imams), namely Tuan Said and Tuan Matarah Sayyid Abdurahman Matarim (who probably came from the Batavian region via Mocca [Yemen] where the VOC had a station), joined them. According to the 1744 *Bandieten Rollen*, they were exiled in chains to the Cape. Tuan Matarah died while incarcerated on Robben Island, and Tuan Said spent eleven years as a prisoner; upon Tuan Said’s release from the Island he became a police officer. This appointment gave him the opportunity to freely enter the Cape Slave Quarters (see Shell 1994) where he unobtrusively propagated Islam. He, however, used his house to clandestinely conduct classes, and through this process of disseminating elementary teachings and educational empowerment, he attracted many slaves who eventually embraced Islam. George Foster - a British traveler, who was quoted by Davids, observed in 1770 that, ‘a few slaves regularly met in the home of a free Mahommadan to read, or rather to chant, several prayers and chapters of the Qur’an.’ What this comment tangibly suggested was that these *Vryezwarten* played a critical role in the gradual emancipation of slaves through manumission, education and the other processes.

4. **Tuan Guru: The Cape Muslim Community’s Founding Father**

Just more than ten years after Tuan Said’s demise, Imam ‘Abdullah ibn Qadi ‘Abdus-Salam (alias ‘Tuan Guru’) arrived at the Cape during the 1770’s in “zijn hoog klimende jare” (Ebrahim Salie email 1 February 2016). He was a Tidore royal family member and a religious figure from Goa (West Java). Like Shaykh Yusuf, Tuan Guru’s spiritual powers have been deeply felt by the Muslims. Since that was the case, it is worth comparing the two: Both were famous for their acts of religio-political defiance against the VOC in the Melayu Archipelago and their rebellious deeds inspired many subsequent generations of Muslims.

Shaykh Yusuf was, however, widely respected among the South East Asians for his heroic anti-colonial activism and famous for his series of Sufi tracts such as *Zubdat al-Asrar* (Quintessence of Secrets) that was written in Banten in 1676 (Lubis 1996; Dangor 1994). Though these works were written at the Cape, ample oral evidence and written sources record that his mystical thoughts and practices filtered down over generations among
members of the Cape Muslims who follow various *tasawwuf* (i.e. Sufi) orders (e.g. Naqshbandiya, Qadiriyya, and Tijaniyya). During recent years a few of the Shaykh’s mystical texts have been commented upon by Lubis and translated into English by Dangor; in fact, at the University of South Africa under the directorship of Dr. Mohammed Auwais Rafudeen all of Shaykh Yusuf’s extant manuscripts have been translated and will appear in book form from UNISA Press.

### 4.1 Tuan Guru’s Institutions and Texts

While the Shaykh’s texts remain rather restricted to certain circles, Tuan Guru’s appeared to have found a wider urban audience at the Cape and this is because he wrote them there. Important to recall too is the fact that Tuan Guru wrote the theological-jurisprudential texts such as *Ma’rifat al-Islami* formed part a larger manuscript; this and other related manuscripts shaped the thinking of this expanding community who were naturally guided by these texts. He too wrote from memory a copy of the Qur’an while he was incarcerated; this again illustrated that he was very much a creative individual. So, upon Tuan Guru’s release he went on to establish a homebased *madrasa* where he prescribed his texts; thereafter he laid the foundations of the building of the *Awwal* mosque in Bo-Kaap’s Dorp Street. Since Tuan Guru owned no property, he relied on members of the Muslim community to assist. The person who selflessly donated her property was the generous Saartjie van die Kaap (d.1847). Saartjie, who was a manumitted slave and the wife of Achmat van Bengalen (d.1843) who subsequently succeeded Tuan Guru as *Imam*, was from Tryn van die Kaap’s daughter. Upon the death of Tryn, who had been married (c.1779) to Coridon of Ceylon (d.1797), she left her properties to Saartjie; the latter, in turn, endowed and earmarked one of these as the mosque’s site.

When freedom of religion was granted during mid-1804, Tuan Guru’s *madrasa* along with the mosque was thriving and it attracted scores of pupils. Davids (1980) made reference to a comment that stated, ‘The Earl of Caledon… hand been convinced that, if the slaves were left in a state of ignorance, they would fall prey to the zeal of the Mohammedan priests, who at the time were conducting a school in Cape Town that was attended by
375 slave children. “The statement was with reference to Tuan Guru’s school. It indicated that it was a success story bearing in mind that slave children were not granted the opportunity to attend Christian schools. And since there was no alternative the madrasa attracted a wide range of pupils and it further underlined to what extent these disadvantaged children were willing to be educated in the basics of religion and to learn the fundamental aspects of the Arabic language.

In fact these slave children’s exposure to the Arabic script gave them the chance to become familiar with some of the words and sentences of the Melayu language; a language that was written in the Arabic script. Via this method, they also managed to fluently read the emerging Afrikaans language that used the same pliable script. Because of these developments, one witnessed a plethora of texts that were written in Ajami format; at the Cape, this is known as Arabic-Afrikaans.

4.2 From Batavia to Kaap de Goede Hoop: The Melayu Language on the Move

When dealing with the question of language at the Cape it should not be overlooked that the early Southeast Asian slaves and prisoners, who were isolated at the Cape, came from assorted geographical regions (see Shell 1994: 44). All of them obviously belonged to various ethnic groups (such as Javanese, Malay, and Madurese) and they naturally spoke distinctly diverse dialects (such as Achenese, Bugis and Banjarese). Nevertheless, in spite of this diversity, these communities understood and spoke Melayu that was a regional lingua franca and that was easily learnt because of its diaglossic characters as compared to Javanese.

In fact, when Huygen van Linschoten navigated the Melayu Archipelago during 1614 he remarked that Melayu was indeed the region’s lingua franca (see Shell 1994: 61-64). So, it was not surprising to read about the use of Melayu among the Cape’s Orang Cayen and the slave community many of whom came from the Melayu Archipelago. Worden (1985:94) as well as Shell (1994:61) mentioned that Melayu along with (a low-) Portuguese and a creolized Dutch was spoken among the slaves to the extent that the Council of Justice required an interpreter. Melayu’s wide-spread use among the slaves
at the Cape gradually contributed towards the evolution of Afrikaans as a language and that was only officially recognized by 1925. For the record it is important to remember that the extant set of Arabic-Afrikaans literature contributed in a substantial manner towards the evolution of South Africa’s Afrikaans language; a language that became one of the country’s official languages during its democratic period.

5. In Conclusion

The essay reflected on the early connections between Batavia and Kaap de Goede Hoop (that is, the Cape). It illustrated the extent to which VOC officials shipped convicts, political prisoners and others from Batavia and its surrounding areas to the Cape. Through this process, it contributed towards the development of the Cape Muslim community (also referred to as the Cape Malays). Even though it did not provide a detailed discussion regarding this community’s evolution, it made reference to individuals who came from Batavia and elsewhere and who were the ones that formed part of this emerging religious community. It demonstrated how VOC’s elites enslaved peoples from the archipelago and elsewhere and transported against their will to the Cape that was indeed geographically distant.

It too narrated how the VOC apprehended political prisoners who it forced into exile to the Cape; it mentioned a few prominent individuals who made inputs to the formation and development of the Muslim community. It, essentially, discoursed about the communal connections that developed between Batavia and Kaap de Goede Hoop during the early VOC period. It showed that individuals such as Tuan Guru who were incarcerated at the Cape and who settled there used Melayu as their language of communication. They were the ones that creatively saw to the opening of a Muslim school, the establishment of a mosque, and they were the ones who inspired succeeding generations some of whom too prepared and wrote theological texts – as Tuan Guru did - to guide and reinforce the community’s religious identity.
CHAPTER TWELVE

Quest after Ancestral Roots: 
Al-Haj Nurel Erefan Rakiep’s (1922-2005) Story

Shaykh Muttaqin Rakiep

1. Introduction

Al-Haj Nurel Erefan Rakiep (Al-Haj) was the fourth direct descendent of the exiled Imam Abdullah (Tuan Guru) Bin Qadi Abdus-salaam to Cape Town, South Africa. His genealogy to Tuan Guru, who hailed from Tidore, Indonesia, includes his father, Imam Abdul Mu’ain, his grandfather, Imam Abdurrakiep and his great grandfather, Imam Abdurra’ouf, the son of Tuan Guru.

The story of Al-Haj’s passionate search to reconnect with his Indonesian family is, indeed, a very rich and colourful one, filled with interesting encounters and wonderful experiences. This essay is a brief attempt to trace the journey of Al-Haj in discovering his ancestral roots - a journey that would take him from his country of birth to the country of his ancestors where he would eventually be initiated as a true son of the soil (see Figure 1).

Born April 5 1922 in Frere Street, District Six; an iconic area in Cape Town known for its tightly knitted community life and racial integration that was later destroyed by Apartheid legislation of racial segregation and disenfranchisement. The seeds of Al-Haj’s deep-seated desire to reunite with his family were planted from an early age.

2. Tuan Guru’s Tomb

A regular institution in the household of his father, Imam Abdul Mu’ain, was a weekly visit to Tuan Guru’s tomb. It is situated at the top of Longmarket Street in the graveyard, Tanah Baru (Figure 2). The Tanah Baru overlooks the Bo-Kaap and central Cape Town. These visits would either take place after Jumu’ah on a Friday, or on a Sunday morning. Imam Abdul Mu’ain would take Al-Haj and his siblings to pay respects and clean the grave. During these visits, they would reverently recite verses from the Qur’an, salutations and
blessings upon the esteemed Prophet Muhammad (s) and supplications in forgiveness for the deceased. Then, in awe, Al-Haj, as a child, would listen to his father telling them about Tuan Guru and keeping his memory alive.

Imprinted on his mind, Tuan Guru was a fiery prince, steeped in knowledge and spirituality; he was one who fought against colonialism and he was banished to the Cape where he was imprisoned on Robben Island. Oral tradition narrated by his father, family elders and community leaders who frequented the family home, informed everyone that Tuan Guru brought Islam here; that he wrote copies of the Qur’an from memory while incarcerated on Robben Island. Moreover, he established the first madrasa and mosque in Bo-Kaap which formed the nucleus of Islamic development in South Africa.

3. Tuan Guru’s Intriguing Artifacts

The artifacts of Tuan Guru included: A Compendium on *Tauhid, Fiqh*, Quranic verses, *Ahadith* and supplications; a sword and shield (Figure 3); a compass; his original Will or Testament; and Family Tree as scripted by his grandson Abdurrahkiep (Ta Tuan).

Being a prominent family within the Cape Town society, especially the Muslim Community, the leading Muslim theologians would often gather at the house of Imam Abdul Mu’ain where they would study and have discussions on the *kitab* and other writings of Tuan Guru. Among them were Shaykh Muhammad Al-Iraqi, Imam Ahmad Talaabodien, Shaykh Abdullah Gamieldien, and Shaykh Agmad Behardien; they were indeed all prominent Imams who frequented the house.

Al-Haj, found these deliberations fascinating, and he was taught by these Imams from Tuan Guru’s *kitabs*. He would study *tawhid* (God’s oneness) under the tutelage of Shaykh Muhammad Al-Iraqi, while Shaykh Abdullah Gamieldien would teach him *fiqh* (jurisprudence). His love for Islam and the Qur’an grew and he pursued *hifth-al-Qur’an* (memorization of the Qur’an) at the feet of Shaykh Muhammad Geyer, and did further studies with Shaykh Ismail Ganief.

What intrigued Al-Haj was Tuan Guru’s writing using the Jawi script (Malay language in Arabic letters). None of the Arabic speaking theologians...
could really read or understand the Arabic-Malay writings of Tuan Guru (Figure 4).

The mystery around the messages locked into the Arabic-Malay script inspired Al-Haj to earnestly delve into its study. With the assistance of his brother, Abdurrakiep, his close friend, Yusuf Barnes (who knew some Malay) and Indonesian seamen passing through the harbour in Cape Town, Al-Haj set out to make sense of these Arabic-Malay writings of Tuan Guru.

4. Creative Links: Indonesian Sailors and the Language

Another tradition within the household of Imam Abdul Mu‘ain was to host Indonesian seafarers. He would frequently go the Cape Town harbour to bring these seamen dressed in their sarongs to his house. According to Al-Haj, people would often poke fun at them and speak about “the men dressed in skirts”. This tradition, however, saw the Indonesians sharing the Indonesian Raya or anthem as well as keeping the recital of the Kitab Berzanji alive in the household.

These encounters had such a major impact on the children that Al-Haj’s younger brother, Abdurrakiep, approached his parents requesting permission to sail to Durban, on the eastern coast of South Africa, to find work. This trip would eventually turn into two years during which he ended up working as a deckhand on board a Malaysian cargo ship. After the two years he returned home, knowledgeable in the terminologies of the seafarer and able to converse in the Malay tongue. His conversation would often be interspersed with Malay words like tali (rope), tarik (pull), laut (ocean), kapal (ship) and others. He eagerly shared with his family and friends the songs that he learnt while at sea; these songs like “Rayuan Pulau Kelapa” would be sung by all with great fervor at family gatherings and celebrations. A favourite song of his was “Terang Bulan”:

Terang Bulan, terang di pinggir Kali
Buaya timul, di sangkalah mati
Jangan percaya mulutnya lelaki
Berani sumpah tapi takut mati

The Indonesian connection and identity were thus, most definitely, held dear and perpetuated by the family.
5. Tuan Guru’s Wasiyyat

Al-Haj, with the aid his brother, Abdurrakiep, his friend Yusuf Barnes and the sailors spent hours trying to make sense of the will written in Jawi script (Figure 5). Al-Haj, proficient in Qur’an reading, but not understanding the Malay language would sound/formulate words. They would listen attentively to him and verify the correctness of it, until they could string words into sentences.

Transliteration

Qaulu-hu al-Haq

Saksi inci Abdul Malik dan Abdul Wasi’.
Al Wasiyyatul maut la yataghayyar.

Translation

His word is the truth

This is the letter of Imam Abdullah the son of Qadi Abdus-salaam, wherein which his testament appears. My possessions, namely, slaves, precious metal gold, and silver, whether plenty or little are for my children, Abdurrakiep and Abdurraouf and for their mother Pai Arafiiyah, who will hopefully take care of them. Whosoever should change this will, I will hold court with him on the Day of Judgement in front of the Lord, Who is Of- forgiving.
Witnesses: Abdul Malik and Abdul Wasi’.
The Testament of death is never to be altered.

This information read in conjunction with the Family Tree, inspired Al-Haj and opened the possibilities of connecting to the world of Tuan Guru.
6. Tuan Guru: The Family Tree

The author of this family tree was Imam Abdurrakiep, the grandson of Tuan Guru and the grandfather of Al-Haj (Figure 6).

Transliteration
Imam Abdurrakiep ibn imam Abdurraouf ibn Imam Abdullah, ibn Qadi Imam Abdussalaam, ibn Imam Umar Rahmah wafat di Tidore dan adapun saudaranya mereka itu yaitu Abu Qasim, kemudian Nurul Irfan, kemudian Shi-aan, kemudian Dhamara, kemudian Abdul Hadi, kemudian Ahmad, kemudian Hamza, kemudian Yasin, kemudian Muhammad, kemudian Taha, kemudian Gameem.

Translation
Imam Abdurrakiep wrote that he was the son of imam Abdurraouf, the son of Imam Abdullah (Tuan Guru), the son of Qadi Imam Abdussalaam, the son of Imam Umar Rahmah who died on Tidore and his relatives are Abu Qasim, Nurul Irfan, Shi-aan, Dhamara, Abdul Hadi, Ahmad, Hamza, Yasin, Muhammad, Taha, Gameem.

He then continued to write other names, which Al Haj initially thought, were the brothers of Tuan Guru. It was later discovered that it was indeed Tuan Guru’s children who were left behind on the island of Tidore when he was send into exile.

From the family tree, Al-Haj discovered crucial names that he could research further on the island of origin - Tidore. With the encouragement of the Indonesian sailors, Al-Haj was motivated to correspond with an Indonesian magazine *Tempo*. The widely read *Tempo*, carried the story of Al-Haj and finally his family in Tidore made contact with him. After more than two hundred years, Al-Haj’s endurance, patience, passion and hard work paid off.

7. Indonesian Correspondence

After the posting in *Tempo* magazine, Al-Haj received various correspondences from Indonesia. A direct seventh generation descendent of Tuan Guru, Sekretaris Muhammad Amin Faaroek from Tidore saw the
article of Al-Haj in the *Tempo* magazine. He sent Al-Haj a well-structured family tree that confirmed family links.

It also ascertained that that the names found in the family tree, as written by Imam Abdurrakiep, were that of Tuan Guru’s sons. Al-Haj’s reply letter was received on the day that Sekretaris Muhammad Amin’s wife, Bibi Hawa gave birth to a boy. Imam Ja’far Idrus Faaroek, father of Sekretaris Muhammad Amin, immediately instructed him to name the baby Nurel Erefan, after Al-Haj, in recognition and consolidation of newly found family ties.

A government letter from The Department of Religious Affairs in Indonesia also arrived in the post (Figure 7). They expressed their interest to have the artifacts of Tuan Guru brought to Indonesia. Al-Haj was not too keen to relinquish the artifacts. In fact, in the past many people showed interest in purchasing the artifacts. A local Edinburgh trained doctor, Dr. Abdullah Abdurrahmaan, warned against such a deal that would see the family giving up on their Indonesian heritage/identity.

Another interesting response came from Ternate, an adjacent island to Tidore. In his letter, the writer, Sultan Mudhaffar Shah, claimed that he was the long-lost family that Al-Haj was searching for (see Figure 8).

After a long discussion, Sultan Mudhaffar Shah suggested that he and Al-Haj meet up in Singapore. At the time, South African citizens were not allowed entry into Indonesia because of South Africa’s racist policy of Apartheid.

In 1981, Al-Haj and his friends, Ismail Isaacs and Igsaan Alexander, set out on a journey to Singapore to meet Sultan Mudhaffar Shah. Unfortunately, because of prior engagements Sultan Mudhaffar Shah had, the meeting could not materialize. A deeply disappointed Al-Haj and his friends had to return to South Africa.

It was only in 1993 that another opportunity arose for Al-Haj to undertake the journey to the country of his ancestor. In March/April 1993, a delegation of Malaysian Academics and businesspeople under the leadership of Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussain arrived in Cape Town where they had a joint conference on Malay Identity that was hosted by the Malaysian Welcome Committee. At this conference, Al-Haj had the opportunity to present his research and findings to this delegation.
On an invitation from Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussain, Al-Haj left Cape Town for Kuala Lumpur on an academic expedition. On petitioning the Indonesian Embassy in Malaysia, he and his friend Bapak Ismail Pietersen were granted special visas to enter Indonesia. In May 1993, Al-Haj was fortunate to be the first South African of Indonesian origin to visit the motherland of his ancestors.

In Jakarta, he met up with family who made arrangements for him to travel to the Tidore that was located in the Northern Maluku region. He flew from Jakarta to Ujung Pandang; from there to Manado and then he travelled with a small aircraft to the island of Ternate. Here he was received by Sultan Mudhaffar Shah who took charge, and he had Al-Haj ferried to the island of Tidore.

### 8. Tidore Visit

What a momentous and joyous occasion for Al-Haj when he first caught sight of the island of Tidore and when the ferry sailed into the Rum harbour. On the shore, there was a delegation of local government officials, ‘ulama and family members to welcome Al-Haj. Tears were streaming down his face as he was received with drumming and singing of *Tala‘a al-Badru ‘alayna*; and as this was taking place, he recited Tuan Guru’s du’a that was taught to him by his father.

All the traditions of Tidore for welcoming a forgotten son were performed on him. As the eldest lady of the village washed his feet, he couldn’t help but wonder about the prediction of Tuan Guru that “a fourth generation descendent will reveal the past” and him being honoured and finding closure. *Al-Hamdu lillah* (All praise be to the Almighty)!

Al-Haj’s lifelong desire to reconnect with family indeed came full circle when Sekrataris Muhammad Amin Faaroek and the Sultan of Tidore, Husain Abubakar Alting, visited Cape Town during 2017 (see Figure 9, 10, and 11). On this trip, they visited Tuan Guru’s tomb and they reconnected with his descendants and the wider community.
Figure 1: Haj Erefan’s Historical, Familial Tidore Visit

Al-Haj Erefan: Maiden Voyage to Tidore

Figure 2: Tanah Baru (Tuan Guru’s Grave)

Tuan Guru’s Grave
Artifacts: Sword, Shield & Manuscript

Figure 3: Tuan Guru’s Shield and Sword

The Manuscript

Figure 4: Tuan Guru’s Manuscript
Tuan Guru: His Will

Figure 5: The Will

Tuan Guru: The Descendants

Figure 6: The Family Tree
Indonesia’s Department of Religious Affairs: A Request

DEPARTEMEN AGAMA R.I.

JALAN MOHAMMAD HUSEIN THAMRIN No. 6
TELP. 48862 - 48863 Pn. 1408, 2030, 2368
JAKARTA

F/085/1980

Jakarta, January 17 1980

Dear, Mr. Radja N.R. Rakiep
1 Snowdrop Square, Bridge Town,
Athlone, Cape Town,
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Bismillahir rhamanir rahim.
Assalamu’alaikum warahmatullahi wa barakatuh.

It is a great pleasure to answer your letter dated November 19,
1979 that was addresssed to Mr. Adam Malik, the Vice President of
the Republic of Indonesia, who transferred it to the Minister of
Religious Affairs, telling us about some manuscripts written by
Imam Abdullah bin Odil Abu Salam together with some of his
heirlooms you have in your possession.

It is a good idea to translate those manuscripts, because it
will be very useful for the purpose of writing history of Islam
in your country as a contribution for the world of Islam in
general.

We would like to state that we can help you for both transla-
ting and to display them in a museum in Indonesia, as you wish.
If you agree, therefore, please send us those manuscripts or
otherwise if you have a good chance, it would be better if you
could come personally to Indonesia.

May God bless and guide us. Amin.

SINCERELY YOURS,

MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS:
OFFICE OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT

cc: 1. Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia
2. Menteri Agama Republik Indonesia
3. Kepala Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama
   (untuk perhatian).

"ann"
Figure 8: Sultan Shah’s Letter to Al-Haj Erefan

Sultan Mudhaffar Shah’s Letter

To Mr. M.N. Madiap
Snowdrop Square
Bridge Yarn, Uthoone, Cape Yarn
Republic of South Africa.

Dear brother,

I hereby take the liberty to write you after having read “Tempo” magazine, in which your letter of appeal are printed, because I am the man you are looking for. I mean we came from the same ancestor. Imam Abdullah Qadi Abdul Salam was exiled during the reign of Sultan Amir Rukanar of Ternate. He is one of the younger brother of Sultan Amir Rukanar Syah.

My name is Mudhaffar Syah, age 44 years. I am now Sultan of Ternate and also member of Parliament (senator) of the Republic of Indonesia. And for the sake of unity, all power (political) has been turned over to the central government of the Republic of Indonesia since 1950.

Since 1970 I have converted my palace in Ternate into a museum in cooperation with the Department of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia. All the property (antiques) including my crown are kept in good condition.

I am glad to hear that you still possess some belonging of Qadi Abdullah Salam like some compass, written Qur’an etc. If you are willing to put these property of the Imam in my palace in Ternate, I think it is not the wrong place; because it goes back to where it came from (Inaya Allah).

I think you know already that there is no diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and South Africa. So it is impossible for you to visit Indonesia as a subject of South Africa. Have you ever try to apply for a visa to Indonesia?

We only could meet in a third country like Singapore, I hope you will send your picture and also of the belonging of the Imam (sword and Qur’an), I hope I have reacted to your letter according to your need, and hoping to receive a reply from you at your earliest convenience.

Jakarta, 16th January 1980

Mudhaffar Syah

As your brother,

[Signature]

Mudhaffar Syah

Bima DPR-RI Blak. 07
Jl. Pancasila 1619
Figure 9: The Familial Connections

Al-Haj Erefan and Sekretaris Muhammed A. Farouk
President Cyril Ramaphosa and Sultan of Tidore: Husain Abubakar Alting and Cape Town Relatives
Figure 11: Tuan Guru Symposium

Tuan Guru Symposium Cape Town 2017
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Shaykh Ridwan Rylands and Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah: Creating Networks, Forging Ties

Shaykh Ridwan Rylands (with Prof. Muhammed Haron)

1. Introduction

It is indeed a challenge when reflecting upon one’s personal journey in creating networks and forging ties. While some of these networks and ties were carefully planned because of one’s profession, others were accidental, or shall one describe it as part of Allah’s qada wa qadr (simply put Allah’s decree).

The purpose of this essay is straightforward and that is to describe rather than analyse my selected activities over years; through these, I succeeded to establish networks that continue to benefit others and me to this day. In addition to this, ties were forged because of only lending a hand and without wanting anything in return.

Bearing these remarks in mind, I would like to offer a brief synopsis of my personal background to kick-start this essay. The idea is to share with the reader that though I pursued a specific career, I eventually landed up in established networks. Via these, ties were forged with unknown individuals such as our respected Prof. Dr. Tutty Alawiyah to whom this essay is dedicated and for whom I have a great deal of respect as a result of her enormous contributions over the many years in and outside the academia in Indonesia in general and Jakarta in particular.

2. My Personal Background

My name is Ridwan Rylands and I was born 12 September 1954 to proud parents whose names were Moegamad Sedick and Amina Rylands. It was in the Bo-Kaap; a place that was and us still known as the nucleus of Muslim
I grew up in the era of racial segregation and social discrimination; a period during which the oppressive and brutal system of Apartheid was operative. Being part of the Cape Muslim community at that time also implied that one was part of the oppressed communities and hence my disdain for that system that has psychologically and socially deeply affected our society to this day.

Though I am now a retired Chief Inspector of Public Works for the Education sector, I presently serve as Life President of the Strandfontein Islamic Assembly (SIA) (in the Greater Cape Town region). My personal growth trajectory and my contribution to society reflect a steadfast and a strict upbringing; and this is because of the Muslim values I was forced to adhere to in our family home in the Bo-Kaap. However, as I was brought up alternative educational pathways opened up and because of this I had, what one might call, a multifaceted attitude that spurred me on to adopt a similar approach to capacity building and service. Perhaps I should share in summary form my basic formal education that I received in the 1960s and 1970s.

I received my primary and secondary schooling at St. Pauls Catholic (1960-1968) – note that it is a Christian oriented school - and Trafalgar High Schools (1969-1970) – a secular school - respectively. At St. Pauls, I learned to embrace the religious and cultural diversity of people and the tolerance needed for mutual coexistence. At Trafalgar High School, known for an ethos of social and political activism, I became politically aware. It was because of this conscientization and the restrictive educational policies of Apartheid as well as its oppressive and exploitative policies of job reservation that brought about economic hardship for all of us as oppressed South African. Because of this, it was deemed necessary for me to exit school at Standard 7/ Grade 9 at the end of 1970, to help sustain his family.

Between 1971 and 1974, I started my unconventional training in the plumbing trade and interrelated building practices. Employed by Central Plumbing Works (CPW) as an apprentice, I found my mentor in Master Tradesman Stanley Williams. Under his guidance and through self-study, I
was able to learn the trade with excellence. So much so, that within a year of employment, CPW used me in various capacities to supervise major projects that required detailed tradesman-ship and leadership skills.

At CPW, I experienced the exploitative nature of white supremacist business ethic, first-hand. Employed as an apprentice and used as supervisor of projects, I later found that CPW neglected to duly register me with the Apprenticeship Board. Upon agitation by myself, my case was taken up by Mr. Griesel of the Apprenticeship Board; instead of serving an apprenticeship of 5 years, I was allowed to complete my trade test after 4 years. In 1973, I passed the National Technical Certificate I (NTC I) at the Athlone Technical College and successfully completed the Trade Test in 1974 at Olifantsfontein.

As the exploitation of black labour persisted, I embarked upon self-employment and job creation. In 1975, I founded Rylands Plumbing that provided services in domestic and industrial works. This business venture provided opportunity for the development of entrepreneurial skills, building of networks, employment of youth and transferral of skills, until 1977. During this period, I also became self-trained in the Metallurgy Industry, dealing with petrol and flammables installations.

During 1977, I left for Saudi Arabia. In Jeddah, I lived with the Sayed Kutbi family where I met Fuad Fasi – Head of Intelligence. It was through him that I gained access to a six-month intensive Conventional and Counterintelligence Training course at Khamis Mushait Military Base. During my stay in Saudi Arabia where I was guided and advised in Intelligence and Counterintelligence by Fuad Fasi. This was at a time when many unemployed married/unmarried men/women landed up in Jeddah looking for greener pastures. Many of them were highly skilled and qualified as artisans in the building industry and it is with these men and women that I networked. In fact, I acted as a facilitator with the assistance of influential figures such as Abdullah Bahsh (a major jewellery manufacturer), Zaki Yamani (the then, oil minister), Umar Walli (that is, a wealthy businessperson who was the host of many South Africans such as Ash-Shaheed Imam Abdullah Haron).

Along with their critical help, I communicated, negotiated and liaised with building and Civil Engineering companies. For example, I connected with Frans Holtzmann (that is, the German company that was involved in
the construction of a big hospital), Jaffali Sulzer (that is, the Super Mercedes Benz construction plant), Bin Laden (that was involved in the construction of Jeddah’s new airport along Tariq Madina) and many other.

These companies employed many of these South African men and woman on their terms and conditions of agreement due to these workers’ desperation to be employed in order to send monies to families back home. At that time, I liaised with Kamal Semar, who was a contract’s manager for Central Installation Works (CIW). Through the latter’s mother company, Dura Construction, they directly struck a successful deal with Ballis Nedim, a sister Dutch Company to employ a sizeable number who were interviewed, short-listed and sent via London (since South Africa had no diplomatic ties with the Middle Eastern Countries).

Let me cut my personal story short, so that I can fast-track to my connections with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah. Now my eventual ties with her was not direct but through indirect connections and part of the qada wa qadr type that I mentioned earlier.

3. **Forging Ties with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah**

My actual relations with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah commenced during the Moulood period of 1997; this was when a honourable Cape Town lady, Hadja Kulsum Gane who was fondly known as ‘Aunty Koeni,’ had a thikr/moulood jama’at (group) of elderly ladies; this group had weekly gatherings every Thursday evenings and especially during other religious events.

Aunty Koeni led her group of women to a Moulood gathering in Malaysia where she met Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah. Aunty Koeni provided me with her information and an open invitation for South African Muslim women to visit Indonesia for future Moulood celebrations. Time passed and during 2008, I was approached by a different women jama’at known as Da’iratus Saulihiyah (that is the Pious Circle and it was apparently taken from the first ladies circle of piety that was situated in the city of Mecca).

When everything was set in motion for these women to depart on the 12th March 2008 and stay until the 23rd of March 2008, they then realized that they were financially not able to cover the travel costs to Indonesia and to complete this religious undertaking that they were keen on doing.
Since Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah was aware of my earlier connections with Aunty Koeni, she immediately took a decision to officially extend an invitation to me to participate UIA’s International Seminar and to also be at the celebration of (Badan Kontak Majelis Taklim [BKMT]) 27th anniversary. She arranged at that time that my visa be issued by the South African Indonesian Consulate.

I arrived in Jakarta on the 31 August 2008 after I spent a few days in Malaysia. Here I participated in their programmes and was exposed to the Universitas Islam As-Syafi’iyah (UIA) for the first time. The family also managed an Orphanage under her leadership and she had her regular ta’lim (teacher-student) following of women. All of them belong to BKMT; this organization has a phenomenal membership of about 15 million women who come from the 17,500 Islands and who are located in 400 Districts and 34 Provinces!

For this occasion, 100,000 BKMT women attended and this was excluding the local and international guests. The President and First Lady were her guests and so were a number of us; some came from Saudi Arabia (Dr Elly Maliky) and Morocco (Dr Abdel Kebir) as well as the Proxy Prime Minister of Iraq (Prof. Dr Jamal El Sumarai). I, of course, represented South Africa through her good offices and I was among the fortunate who were personally hosted by Prof. Dr HS Tutty Alawiyah on her Estate during that period.

From then onwards, I was in constant contact with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah who on occasions requested advice on small matters; I thus obliged with my little inputs. Nonetheless, during March of 2011, I was once again invited to the 30th Anniversary of BKMT; this time I was unable to attend due to work and family commitments. However, I always reminisce about the one I previously attended.

Time passed and by 2016 another was extended to me and by now my ties with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah had been extremely close and she took me like her son with whom she could share many thoughts. At the 2016 event, I attended and there I delivered a speech that focused on ‘Islam and World Peace’ (see Figure 1).

My speech was based on the etymological sources of the word ‘Islam’ and that was further rooted in three very important points: that is, *Islam*, *Iman* and *Ihsan*. At this specific event I was in the company of the eminent Prime Minister of Malaysia, who was also the Keynote Speaker, Dr Mahathir bin
Mohamad (and his wife). At this august gathering there were representatives from Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, America and South Africa (see Figure 2).

Sadly Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah passed away shortly after my return to South Africa during April of 2016. But my relations with her family members as well as their institutes continued; this remains so through the good offices of her respected son, Prof. Dr.H.Dailami Firdaus.

Apart from the BKMT celebrations in which I participated, I was also requested to attend the graduation ceremony of the Islamic University of As-Syafi’iyah (UIA) on several occasions. But like I mentioned previously, due to time constraints and tasks at home, I was unable to attend any of these graduation ceremonies. Even though I so much wanted to do so, it was just beyond my circumstances during those times. However, during the early part of 2019, I received a special request to attend the graduation and on this occasion, the university decided to appoint me as its International Advisor. In fact, during April of 2019 I was inaugurated and capped as UIA’s International Advisor. This was more than an honour for me.

One of the reasons why the university did this is partly because of my relationship that I had forged with Prof. Dr HJ Tutty Alawiyah who was the one who saw in me as someone with the ability to network and communicate with individuals who come from various backgrounds. So, in a way, I owe this appointment to her.

Now that I in this position, I have more and more realized how critical it is to communicate from a social perspective that eliminates bureaucracy and that moves past formalities. I became aware of using diplomacy in order to unlock communication to access various and different levels. And I acknowledge that having networked in non-formal ways and having formed relationships have had their results and effects; it is because of all these that I am where I am today.

4. **Telegraphic Notes: My Networks**

At this point, I wish to provide insight via telegraphic notes of the networks and ties that I have had and continue to have.

- I introduced Prof Dr Jameel Muhammed Allie Khayyat – Dean of Education of Ummul Qura University (at the time) to Prof. Dr HJ Tutty
Alawiyah while she was on ‘umrah. Prof Khayyat then played a huge role in assisting UIA.

- I was requested by the Advisor of Chief Mandla Mandela (Zaid Nordien) of the Royal House to arrange for him and his family to visit Indonesia and specially Makassar due to the history of this Island with Cape Town and UIA. After all arrangements were finalised and the program for their visit structured by the relevant parties in Indonesia, the request was sadly not honoured;
- I assisted the Muslim Judicial Council with hosting the direct family of Shaykh Yusuf of Makassar during their visit to Cape Town;
- I introduced Prof. Faiz Sayed Ahmed Elgaali (Professor of Chinese Traditional Medicine and founder of several TCM Medical centres in the Arab region) to UIA for a possible faculty to introduce TCM;
- Since I have now become part of the extended family and Prof. Dr.H.Dailami Firdaus, his family have shown great care towards me. I, in turn, have done likewise. In fact, when the latter went on ‘umrah earlier during 2019, through my relations with people I could arrange a warm welcome gift for them at their place of stay in the Holy City of Mecca.

5. My UIA Acceptance Speech

As part of my conclusion, I share with the readers my acceptance speech when I was appointed by UIA as its International Advisor (see Figure 3 and 4):

As-Syafi’iyah Islamic University

Acceptance Speech for Honorary Appointment as International Advisor – Shaykh Ridwan Rylands

As-salamu alaykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatu-hu

Honourable Chancellor,
Members of the University Community,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.
I am deeply grateful to Universitas Islam As-Syafi’iyah (UIA) in conferring upon me the opportunity to be an international advisor to UIA; in doing so, your institution is also honouring the Cape Muslim community from where I hail. So, I accept this honour with heartfelt gratitude both for myself and on behalf of all those who have contributed to my development and journey through life. Furthermore, as a Cape Muslim with an Indonesian religious and cultural heritage, I commit myself to this position and wish to show those who had fundamentally influenced my life that I am quite willing to make further contributions at this level and to represent my community; a community that has largely been denied or gone unnoticed in academic circles.

My speech today is not intended as a lesson in history, but to point out the strong connection between the development of Islam in South Africa, the Indonesian contribution and the lessons we can learn from it. It was scholars like Shaykh Yusuf Al-Makassari and Tuan Guru Abdullah bin Qadi Abdus-Salam Al-Tidori, who provided the oppressed enslaved and dehumanising coloniser alike, with an alternative way of life - Islam - during the late 17th and 18th centuries. Exiled to the Cape, under severe conditions, of brutality, imprisonment and isolation, they steadfastly remained the ‘vice-gerents of Allah on earth’. The life of Shaykh Yusuf and Tuan Guru (who institutionalised Islam at the Cape by writing the Quran from memory and a compendium of ‘Aqidah and Fiqh; establishing the first Madrassah system and Masjid for communal prayers), speak volumes of their trans-continental impact and relevance. Today I share this stage with you, graduates of 2019, a proud product of Islam, humbled by their contribution.

In a global society where change is the only constant, what are some of the lessons that we can learn from their lives? I want to point out, as mentioned previously, that they have lived their lives as ‘vice-gerents of Allah on earth’ as best as possible, steadfast in the face of any challenges, adverse conditions and atrocities perpetrated against them. They had the requisite knowledge, critical abilities and presence of mind to critically assess their situation and adopt the appropriate action to facilitate positive change. Acting as such, they have become change-makers. They were active contributors to change, rather than passive recipients of change; hopefully, with this new responsibility that you have assigned to me, I – along with your Board - will assist to be a change-maker insha Allah. Graduates of 2019, as you graduate here today and become
Indonesia – South Africa: A South-South Partnership in the Making

ambassadors of UIA and, of course, Islam, know that Indonesia and the world need you to become agents of change.

Now, what does one need to be an agent of change? In my experience and cumulative knowledge acquired in formal and informal settings, we need to take the first injunction of the Quran ‘Iqra’ very seriously. To coin a phrase, we need to become an Iqra-community – a community of reading, deep reflection/research/study, writing and expounding. Such an Iqra-community should not confine itself to a specific field of education but incorporate all relevant aspects of existence and necessities for such existence.

Graduates of 2019, here at UIA you have already become part of such a community. As individuals, you have sacrificed your time an effort to acquire a beneficial base of knowledge that prepares you for life. Now it is time, as you graduate and as you embark on a new phase of your lives, in various careers and different professions, to put your goals into action.

Be open to new ideas and ways of doing things to unlock the latent possibilities deep inside each one of you. Do not confine yourselves to what is. Look at what can be and be agents of change. It is my prayer that a pure intention (niyyat), the value underlying the mission of UIA guides your action in further contributing to the global corpus of knowledge and righteous action. While I make du’a for you, I also implore each of you to make du’a for me in this new post and insha Allah we can all work together to make the necessary changes.

I have said put your goals into action. Yes, even with information and knowledge at hand, one cannot be an agent of change if he/she does not have clearly defined goals. So set your goals in that which is good for life and upliftment of humanity in justice, equality and peace. Let your goal be to ‘compete with one another in good works’, to ultimately serve the creation of Allah, the Creator of all, in order to gain His satisfaction. Allah says in the Holy Quran (51:56): “And I (Allah) did not create Jinn and mankind except that they may worship/serve Me”. The ultimate object in life is thus to serve Allah and realise His Will in this life. An important aspect of serving Allah is to be in the service of the creation of Allah.

In conclusion, in South Africa, Islam was brought to the Cape from Indonesia by exiled religious scholars, sultans and the enslaved, resilient and resistant
under colonial oppression and steadfast in their worship of Allah and service unto mankind. Their contribution changed the face of the Cape. Al-hamdu lillah, through their contribution, not only did Islam grow, but Muslims became some of the best tradesmen in building construction, boatbuilding, pipefitting, plumbing, wooden craft, fishing etc. Let us take a lesson from this and build international relations that can contribute to better understanding and mutual co-operation and co-existence among communities. And finally, now that I have been granted this chance to serve UIA and its various stakeholders, I will work hard to do my best and to take us – insha Allah – to a different level with the goals that we have in mind and through networks that are at our disposal; personally, I would like to see UIA to be one of the most competitive Muslim institutions not only nationally and regionally but also globally.

Was-Salam
Date: 20 March 2019
Figure 1: Gift Presentation

Prof. Tutty Alawiyah handing a gift to Sh. Ridwan

Figure 2: Guests of Honour

Sh Ridwan, Prof Alawiyah and Dr. Mahathir
Figure 3: Sh. Ridwan’s Acceptance Speech

Shaykh Ridwan’s Speech

Figure 4: Farewell Event

Post-Speech Event
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

AWQAF SA: Its Relations with Indonesian Institutions

Zeinoul Abedien Cajee

1. Introduction

The National Awqaf Foundation of South Africa (AWQAF SA) was initiated in the year 2000 and is now in its 20th year of existence. Post 1994 was a time of euphoria and a time for searching a way forward for a better life and better ways of living as Muslims in a new democratic South Africa. The legacies of colonization and apartheid were present then and lingers on today. Who knows when all South Africans will truly be free? In the founding of AWQAF SA we saw the emergence of a powerful institution that will look after the interests of the ummah, develop the institution of waqf (or wakaf, as it is known in South-East Asian countries) and pay attention to the various needs of the community and beyond. We identified several needs: from economic empowerment to international relations; from youth leadership development to arts, culture and heritage; from Dawah to contributions to poverty alleviation, and more.

One of the areas of need was to develop cultural contacts with Muslim countries. Having had connections with south-east Asia during the early days of South African history and the importation of human cargo – slaves and political exiles - by the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), there began a new era of contacts with the world and Indonesia during and post 1994. The latter opened its embassy in South Africa during August 1994. The opening of the embassy paved the way for opening trade and cultural contacts.

2. Waqf Cadre Training Programmes

As a specialist waqf institution, AWQAF SA deems the training of cadres as highly imperative for the acquisition of knowledge from experts as well as for the proliferation of the waqf system both in South Africa and in various countries, especially where Muslims live in minority communities. Five International Training programmes have been held since 2007, the last one...
being held in Durban during 2017. Several local training programmes are also held during the year. For the international programmes, the cadres are drawn from mainly Southern African countries but also from other countries from participants who have a keen interest. Participants come from Uganda, Nigeria, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Indonesia, and from various parts of South Africa.

During 4-6 December 2009 AWQAF SA together with the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation and the Islamic Training and Research Institute (IRTI); a member of the Islamic Development Bank Group (IDB)) held its first WAQF CADRE TRAINING PROGRAMME under the theme “Developing Managerial Skills of Waqf Professional Cadres” in Pretoria (see Figure 1). Several speakers and presenters were invited from abroad. Three speakers were from South East Asia. These were Prof. Dr. Syed Khalid Rashid, Dr Adi Setia, and Dr Mustafa Edwin Nasution – all of whom were very accomplished and added tremendous value to the discussions that took place.

Dr Mustafa Edwin Nasution was Vice Chairman of the Badan Wakaf Indonesia (BWI) (or the Indonesian Waqf Board) and Head of Center of Syariah Economy & Business, Economic Faculty, University of Indonesia. His topic was “Techniques and Modalities of Investment in Waqf Institutions”. It was by sheer coincidence and by the will of Allah that we met again in Jakarta at the offices of BWI during a later visit.

Another participant-speaker at the AWQAF SA Waqf Cadre Training Programmes, which was held in Cape Town during 9-11 December 2016 under the theme “Business & Investment Models for Waqf Funds” was Dr. Raditya Sukmana from Indonesia. At the time, he was a lecturer at the Department Ekonomi Syariah, Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia (see Figure 2).

3. Youth Leadership Development

Another area of community need is the development of the leadership potential among the Muslim youth. Since we see the importance nurturing young minds and providing them with excellent opportunities, both locally and abroad, we were delighted when the Al Azhar Institute of Indonesia invited a group of young students to its International Youth Leadership Camp, which was held in Jakarta during the December of 2014. 10 students were accompanied by the “mother” of the group Sr Mariam Gillan. This is what two students had to say:
(a) From Naeema Hussien El Kout

Upon our arrival in Jakarta, our group of 10 South African students experienced our first blast of warmth from the Indonesian people. This can be also taken in the literal way as the humidity overwhelmed us, but nonetheless it has been breath taking. Meeting powerful ambitious students from all around the globe has opened our mind to other people’s lifestyles and a new global network. One can only be reminded that truly, there is unity in Diversity. Allah says in Al Qur’an: “WE have created you in nations and tribes, so that you may know one another”. This verse is so apt in describing our engagement with the other students from Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Uganda. This been such an uplifting experience thus far and we hope it can only escalate. We make du’a that Allah return us safely, and that we return as spiritually rejuvenated, empowered and inspiring youth who will change this world for the better.

We give thanks to Allah firstly, and all those who have made this possible. Particularly our parents and families, who have nurtured us into the young adults we are. May Allah bless you all. We are also grateful to Awqaf S.A. For their efforts in allowing this to be possible. And for always taking an interest in the development of our Muslim youth.

(b) From Shakeel Garda:

Indonesia is not only a nation based on the principles of humility and Life according to the Sunnah, its weather is conducive to Salaah, such that the afternoon Thuhr and Asr prayers serve as refreshers to the swearing traveller on his course. The students from South Africa have experienced a subtle Transformation from the laid-back approach johannesburgers have towards Salaah, performing just about every salaah on time and with jamaah, gaining full benefit from the experience, al-hamdulillla. Those of us who are not extremely fluent in the recitation of the Qur’an are being moulded by none other than Al-Azhar’s Ustad Mukhtar, an undeniably fierce lover of Tajweed and Ma’kharij. Each nation has come with its own ‘lagu’ or tune, making Quran recitation as cosmopolitan as roaming the streets of Jakarta.

While the Malaysia “contingent” had to take their leave last night in what was certainly a tearful farewell, Philippines, Uganda, Indonesia and Australia, along with the vibrant and (especially), largest group at the Camp, South Africa, continue to look forward to the challenges and adventures before us, beginning nothing without Bismillah, and ending each day with al-hamdulillla.
4. Waqf related Conferences and Seminars:

4.1 World Islamic Economic Forum Roundtable

On 5 June 2014, Awqaf SA was represented at the WIEF – IDB Awqaf Roundtable, which was held in Jakarta, Indonesia. As a role player, we presented AWQAF DEVELOPMENT – THE WAY FORWARD (see Figure 3).

4.2 Waqf Core Principles Meeting

During 2015 Zeinoul Cajee, the CEO, and Mickael Collier, the Deputy CEO attended the first Waqf Core Principle (WCP) workshop; at this workshop, various stakeholders from Awqaf organizations participated in discussions around the development of WCP. Since then AWQAF SA has been participating on an annual basis in the development of the WCP which coincided with the annual Indonesian Shariah Economic Festival (ISEF).

These festivals were held in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta. The WCP was finally launched in BALI in 2018 and has become a world standard on the institution of waqf. In this regard, Indonesia has played a significant role together with a team of practitioners, academics and Bank Indonesia staff in creating the first world class document titled Waqf Core Principles.

The WCP working group has now embarked developing sub documents on standards to be implemented by waqf institutions. The most recent one i.e. 2019 is the issue of Risk management. Awqaf SA being part of this group from inception has been providing inputs and comments on the different versions of the documents.

Jakarta has also witnessed the 2nd Meeting of the WIEF International Awqaf Development Council held in conjunction with the 12th World Islamic Economic Forum. The meeting was held on the 3rd August 2016. This meeting was also attended by Awqaf SA at the Jakarta Convention Centre.

5. Meetings with Ambassador Salman Al Farisi.

On the 11 March 2019, Ambassador Salman Al Farisi hosted a lunch meeting with representatives of AWQAF SA in Sandton, Johannesburg (see Figure 4). Several points of interest and collaboration were discussed including the Tuan Guru book launch in Cape Town which the Ambassador gratefully graced despite his busy schedule. The development of the waqf sector in Indonesia was also highlighted by explaining the huge success it
has had in Indonesia of using an example of how a crowd funding platform raised 3.5 million US dollars in the short space of 3 months. Discussion also took place about an endowed educational institution that was being considered for Lombok by someone from South Africa.

The writer who represented AWQAF SA at the meeting explained that “one of our objectives, as an organization is to connect with the international community as well, culturally and otherwise. He also explained that western countries provide a fair amount of aid to South Africa. (e.g. US Aid, British Council etc.) in comparison to Islamic countries. He pointed out that South Africa is the most unequal society in the world and has the highest geni index in the world. He called on our international brothers and sisters to view South Africa as part of a strategic investment in Africa”. To elaborate further on foreign aid, for example, the recent visit by Prince Harry resulted in major aid packages to various organizations in South Africa e.g. R150million towards a youth skills initiative. Ambassador Al Farisi mentioned that during 2018, Indonesia created an institution for international aid and expressed that even though the money is not a big amount, they could possibly consider a small capacity-building project.

The meeting concluded with prayers and commitments to continue a cordial and brotherly relationship. Other meetings arranged by Ambassador Farisi was with Dr Imam Kamaluddin Suratman from DarussSalaam University, Gontor, and representatives from AWQAF SA on 6 June 2019. Discussions were held around the development of relations between the two institutions and this was followed by an invitation to attend a waqf conference at the university on 1 July 2019. We are hoping to enter into a Memorandum of Friendship and Cooperation with the university’s International Centre for Awqaf Studies. Awqaf SA Shaheen Hoosen also played the role of Guest MC recently at the Sales Promotion Mission held by Tourism Indonesia.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

AWQAF SA relations with Indonesia commenced with the invitation of the expert speaker for the Awqaf SA Waqf Cadre Training Programme. This followed with sponsorship of our young leaders to attend the Indonesian International Leadership Programme. Since then our relationship flourished with the events in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta and locally with the
development of the Pencak Silat, the book on Tuan Guru, and further interactions with and through the past and present Indonesian Ambassadors to South Africa. Apart from Awqaf SA other South African organisations have also been actively involved with humanitarian efforts in Indonesia, especially during time of the tsunami. Two of these we need to mention; the first is the Al-Imdaad Foundation and the second is the Gift of the Givers Foundation.

Going forward, we believe that a few further collaborations can take place between Awqaf SA and Indonesia in the various aspects of community development and nation building. As indicated earlier, regarding poverty levels and wealth disparities, we believe that the Charity & Aid organisations can play a role in water and sanitation, food and agriculture development, education and healthcare. Then there is scope for student exchange and sponsorship of South African students to universities in Indonesia. On the religious side, our doors are open for scholars to share their knowledge and expertise. Indonesian Qur’an reciters, nasheed singers, and tariqas could help develop local talent.

At the broader macro level, Indonesian experts such as economists can assist in providing economic solutions from a Muslim perspective to a country that is currently undergoing tremendous stress. Indonesia, being at the forefront in the development of small business may share their knowledge and experience in that sector as a growth point for South Africa. The Trade Missions role may also be strengthened with deeper engagement with South African business and vice versa. The Pencak Silat initiative needs to be capacitated for further and widespread development and proliferation. The partnerships between Awqaf SA and its counterparts in Indonesia should also be strengthened. Well-established and successful organisations such as Baznas and Dompet Dhuafa could be well placed to share systems and processes.

Bank Indonesia, which has been in the forefront of the annual ISEF, can also play the role of mobilising the waqf institutions in Muslim Minority and Majority countries into a kind of Federation to share experiences and resources. We present the opportunity to the Indonesian government to assist in strengthening local NGO’s such as AWQAF SA by adding to its Waqf funds, which in turn can help play a stronger role as a community development agent.
Figure 1: AwqafSA Participants

AWQAF SA  Waqf Cadre Training Programmes

Figure 2: AwqafSA Workshops

Waqf Workshop

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Figure 3: Roundtable Discussions

Awqaf Roundtable

Figure 4: AwqafSA CEO Zeinoul and the Indonesian Ambassador

Sariat Arifia, Zeinoul Abedien Cajee, Ambassador Salman al Farisi; (Former) Ambassador Sugeng Rahardjo
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Muslim Judicial Council’s Indonesian Ties: 
Recording its International Profile

By Shaykh Shaheed Esau (with Prof. Muhammed Haron)

1. Introduction

As a Non-Government Organization (NGO), the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) has been around for almost 75 years; this is indeed a long time. Since its inception during 1945, one of its objectives was to serve the growing Cape Muslim community. Its founding fathers were visionaries and they were the ones who laid its groundwork that we all benefit from to this day. While we commend these men, we should say that they would be surprised if not astounded at its current profile; one that started out to be a modest local organization to one that has grown into a formidable one; an NGO that has widened its activities and that has succeeded to create profile that is known nationally and internationally.

Despite the MJC’s shortcomings, its image and standing have soared over the years because of its inputs nationally through the office of the United ‘Ulama Council of South Africa (UUCSA) and its outputs internationally via its links and ties with NGOs in North Africa, Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. Apart from being acknowledged by the Cape community and the South African Muslim society, the MJC has been given recognition by international and regional NGOs. The MJC, for example, has struck ties with Turkey’s Diyanat that annually extends invites to its gatherings; it has links with Malaysia’s Pusat Islam that has an interest in the halal industry; and it has bonds with Indonesia’s Nahdlat al-Ulama (est.1926). MJC’s connection with each of these structures and many others noticeably demonstrate that is a South African faith-based NGO that has established itself as a global player despite its size.

Now since the MJC has a perceptible presence on the international front, it was decided to capture part of its rich international profile in this short
essay. We do know that during the apartheid years that the MJC has had ties with the Mecca-based Muslim World League, with the Riyadh-Based World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and with the Islamabad-based Muslim Islamic Congress. And as it entered the post-apartheid era, it extended it reach by setting up links with similar organizations in stretching from Central Asia to beyond Southeast Asia. As soon as this era kicked-in the MJC’s profile was given a further boost as it was lured into creating ties with theological bodies and religious centres in different parts of the world. The MJC, it may be claimed, has a long story and it will, however, not be possible to mention all of its international activities over the many decades in this essay. So, here it will narrate a summarised version of its international profile with its focus being on Indonesia.

One of the reasons for doing this is because the Cape community’s forbears hail from the Malay Archipelago, and even though many Cape families have lost contact there are a few that have successfully traced their roots. Tuan Guru’s offspring, namely the Rakiep and Abderouf families have, for example, managed to reconnect with relatives in Tidore; and others have found familial ties elsewhere in other parts of the Republic of Indonesia. So, the ties that bind the heterogeneous Cape community and Indonesian society should be explored from various angles; scholars and researchers should not only consider the historical, linguistic, and genealogical connections but also the archaeological dimensions since these seafaring nations were connected despite the geographical distance that existed and still do exist.

Anyhow, even though the bloodlines have thinned over the centuries, the mutual feelings of respect remain intact and the desire to be reconnected has become intense communally. In fact, many countries including those from ASEAN such as Malaysia and Indonesia forged diplomatic and commercial connections as soon as South Africa abandoned its apartheid image.

2. MJC’s Story: Its Place in Democratic South Africa

Soon after the first democratically elected government was voted into power by the end of April 1994, Nelson Mandela (d.2013) was identified as
the ANC’s president to lead the new government. When Mandela was sworn in to be the first democratically elected President of the Republic of South Africa, it was the MJC’s President Shaykh Nazeem Mohamed (d.2000) that was invited to be part of an inter-faith team that was tasked to officially bless him into office. For that event the Shaykh - being the MJC’s president - was also representing South Africa’s Muslim community and thus made his supplication that President Mandela succeeds in his newly elected post as the country’s ‘head of state.’

Besides this being an honour for the MJC and its leadership, it was a palpable indication that the democratically elected government recognized the MJC as a bone fide religious body. A representative organization that was active as an anti-apartheid structure in the South African Chapter of the World Council for Religion and Peace and one that publicly participated in the anti-apartheid struggle during the final decade of apartheid rule (circa 1980s-1990s). Apart from having been acknowledged by our government, the MJC was also duly recognized as a respectable religious NGO by Muslim governments that had strengthened their links with the Republic of South Africa. One of the Muslim states that gave the MJC credit for its positive status as a known reputable Muslim NGO was government of the Republic of Indonesia.

From among the many governments around the globe, Indonesia was among those countries that had shared a special bond with South Africa’s newly elected government; the reason for this distinct bond rests upon two historical events. The first was the VOC’s act of transferring their apprehended slaves and detained political prisoners from Batavia and its surrounding areas to the Cape of Good Hope during the late 17th century; and the second was the famous 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian Conference that was attended by two ANC representatives. These historical events have undoubtedly remained pivotal in their relationship and that are often mentioned.

Since the MJC’s profile was known in the diplomatic circles among most Muslim countries that opened embassies and high commissions, it was natural that some of these would extend invites to the MJC’s leadership (see Figure 1). The Republic of Indonesia was among the few Muslim countries that used the opportunity of officially extending an invite to the MJC;
the latter grabbed it with open arms since it realized that through these opportunities the MJC would be able to also engender ties with influential Indonesian religious NGOs. Besides being Indonesia’s guests, the MJC was accorded the same status by other ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore.

It should be stated that during the first few years of South Africa’s democracy, the country had an interim Constitution and during this time, the Muslims also clamoured to have Muslim Personal Law (MPL) recognized. Now this quest had already been on the agenda during the apartheid period; unfortunately, it was never finalized for several reasons that will not be recorded here. So, when the new democratic government stepped into office it wanted to speedily address matters regarding the Customary Laws and this included MPL. Abdullah Omar (d.2004), who was the first appointed (Muslim) Minister of Justice in Mandela’s cabinet, created an enabling environment that assisted with the MPL process; he supported the idea of sending the MJC (and others) on a fact-finding mission during 1994.

The team of individuals went to visit Southeast Asian countries, which included Indonesia in order to collect and collate all the necessary MPL information. On this trip, the MJC representatives met with all the relevant authorities. In Indonesia, the MJC delegation met, among others, the then Minister of Religious Affairs. Upon the MJC delegation’s return, it conferred with South African government representatives to deal with MPL issue. As expected, Minister Omar took charge of this process with the hope of finding a solution with the MJC and other stakeholders. Subsequent to this mission, President Mandela travelled to Indonesia on an official visit during 1997 and President Soeharto reciprocated soon thereafter.

For the record, mention should be made of the fact that there have been and are numerous initiatives underway between the governments of South Africa and Indonesia respectively. Significant to note is the fact that an MOU exists between South Africa’s Western Cape government and Indonesia’s South Sulawesi government; the special relationship was constructed because of the historical roots of Shaykh Yusuf and his family; some of whom hail from that Indonesian province. Even though the agreements have been signed between the two provincial governments, the MJC has always been drawn in as a consultant.
3. MJC’s Institutional Connections

The MJC thus facilitated the visits of many Indonesia delegations that came on official or non-official trips to South Africa; and one of the first visiting sites these delegations are taken to is the shrine of Shaykh Yusuf; a towering spiritual figure whom many regard as the Cape Muslims’ founding father. Since, according to extant sources, the Shaykh lays buried at Macassar, it is high on the list of Indonesian tourists and religious groups that consider him a saintly personality. He is not only a respected figure in their eyes, Cape Muslims revere him and so does the MJC as the Cape’s main theological body. Now being based in Cape Town, many Indonesian officials have made it a point of dropping by to pay respects to MJC officials; some of whom have struck special relations with their Indonesian counterparts. Here one should mention the fact when His Excellency Mr. Rahadi Iskandar was appointed the first Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia in South Africa the MJC developed a good rapport with him.

Apart from the Indonesian delegations paying homage to the shrine as well as to the MJC, there were numerous occasions when the MJC dispatched its representatives to go on official visits to Indonesia; one such visit was during 2015. At that time, Shaykh Ighsaan Taliep who was the MJC’s Deputy President led a delegation to meet the leadership of Indonesia’s largest ‘Ulama body; an agreement was reached at that meeting between the MJC and the Nahdlatul Ulama that is one of Indonesia’s well-established theological body. In addition to the signing of an agreement between the two theological bodies, Shaykh Ighsaan Taliep, also being the principal of the Internal Peace College of South Africa (IPSA), signed three institutional agreements.

IPSA entered into and signed several agreements with, at least, three Indonesian universities; one of these was southern Jakarta’s Banten-based (public) State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah (est.1957); the other was West Java’s (private) Bandung Islamic University (est.1958); and the third was East Java’s (private) University of Darussalam Gontor (est.2014). It should be recalled that IPSA emerged because of the merger and amalgamation of two Muslim institutions of higher learning; the one was Darul Arqam that was managed by the MJC and ICOSA; the latter was based at Al-Quds Masjid
and it was under the auspices of a separate board. When IPSA was formed, it has since then had representatives from both groups on its board.

4. MJC: Playing the role of a Facilitator

All MJC’s official activities in Indonesia would not have been possible if its members - especially its leadership - did not enjoy good relations with the Ambassadors and the Embassy’s office of its Consul General. Over the years the MJC’s relations with the Embassy and its Cape Town Consul General office was cordial and friendly. The MJC has always been invited to the Embassy’s major functions in Cape Town and Pretoria. Moreover, whenever a newly appointed ambassador presented his/her diplomatic credentials to the Republic of South Africa’s president, the MJC’s leadership pro-actively used the chance to pay a courtesy call to welcome the new appointee. The opportunity, however, also furnished the MJC to offer its assistance whenever needed. In this regard, the MJC would appoint a team to facilitate the visit of the Embassy’s members by organizing their agenda and itinerary for the short period they are in the Western Cape. In addition, the MJC would arrange communal meetings and organize functions where the Embassy’s officials gathered to meet some of the local NGOs and other representatives (see Figure 2).

Speaking of NGOs, mention should be made of one of the MJC’s finds when it had been in Indonesia. The MJC came across a plethora of NGOs collaborating with other NGOs to meet their objectives; accordingly, it not only found NGOs that worked and partnered with the national/local government but among themselves. Among these NGOs, the MJC met an NGO or rather a Foundation that was set up for Shaykh Yusuf’s descendants; members who live in different parts of the country. Nonetheless, those that established ‘IKSYAM’ (I = Ikatan, K = Keluarga Besar, S = Syekh, Y = Yusuf, A = Al, and M = Maqassary: The Association of the Great Families of Shaykh Yusuf Al Maqassary [Ms. Sahib Muzdalifah email 21 Dec 2019]) - as it is called - organize regular Cape visits to, of course, Shaykh Yusuf’s shrine and other places of interest. And the MJC members frequently met with the Foundation’s officials whenever they travelled to Jakarta, Bandung or Sulawesi. The MJC thus helps anyone who wishes to go on a journey to
meet NGOs such as the mentioned Foundation or any government office depending on the nature of the trip.

Important to record is the fact that since Indonesia’s Consul General offers Indonesian language program the MJC encouraged and assisted individuals to join its program. In addition to this program, the MJC being a facilitator has also helped to identify young men and women to participate in the different events and competitions that Indonesia usually organizes and offers; for example, whenever there is a Quranic recital competition or a calligraphy competition then the MJC extends its hand to assist.

An issue that is still being discussed between the Indonesian Government officials via the Embassy and the Cape Town Consul General office is their preparedness to set up a special Indonesian library. Up until now, this could unfortunately not materialize because they required special permits since the Indonesian officials would want the library to be designed in accordance with the Indonesian traditional design; one that uses, among others, Indonesian wood etcetera. Being associated with this project, the MJC has engaged the Western Cape government as regards the permit and where it should be built. Since the idea is still on the agenda it has been left aside for now. However, alternative talks have in mind to shift and have it built on Consulate’s premises.

5. Towards a Conclusion

Ending this narrative, another important story should be shared; this is partly to underline the relationship that the MJC has struck with the Indonesian authorities. Years ago, as soon as South Africa became a democracy the MJC pro-actively showed an interest to carry out a task that would create a strong bond. Since 1998, the MJC made attempts by applying via the Land Claims Trust for land that is adjacent to Shaykh Yusuf’s shrine; this piece of land was and still is under the legal jurisdiction of the Western Cape Provincial government. According to historical sources, the Indonesian slaves occupied this area during and after Shaykh Yusuf’s incarceration. Because of this, the MJC planned to secure it; it did so with the fervent hope that as soon as it succeeds in this venture, it will then erect a museum, create a cultural centre where arts and crafts be offered,
and open a library; something similar or related to what was discussed in the previous paragraph.

In the MJC’s view, the place can be used as a major hub to promote Indonesian and local arts/crafts as well as other activities. Though this matter is still under discussion, it is an opportunity that is seriously being considered. Over the past few years, there have been meetings with various stakeholders; and these included the families who own the land in the Kramat area. Part of the MJC’s proposal is the opening of a Diyar ul-‘Ilm wa Da’wah (Knowledge and Mission) centre; the centre will possibly have, inter alia, a hostel-based *hafith* (Quranic memorization) institute and other meaningful structures. The MJC is, however, acutely aware that the project – if the land is secured for that purpose - will involve huge costs to excavate and prepare to realize it. The MJC has already shared these thoughts with some of the officials from Indonesia with the hope that they will financially assist in making this project happen.

Finally, it should be stated that the MJC has over the past twenty-five years played and continues to play a very prominent role nationally and internationally. On 28 September 2018 when the tsunami struck the Sulawesi Island, the MJC and many other South African Muslim organizations such as the Gift of the Givers made a national appeal for assistance; and as usual, they succeeded in bringing in a reasonable amount for that community (see Figure 3). In any case, being a *bona fide* representative of South Africa’s Muslims and particularly those from the Western Cape and – to some extent - Eastern Cape, it used its position to speak in the interest of the Muslims in different capacities. Since the MJC has participated in both national matters and international issues, its profile as an international player naturally increased. Because of this, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has accorded it that recognition and for this, the MJC is indeed deeply honoured and pleased.
Figure 1: MJC’s Guests: An Indonesian Delegation

Indonesian Delegation @ MJC Office

Figure 2: MJC and Indonesians at Voice of the Cape

Indonesian Guests with MJC at Voice of the Cape
Figure 3: South African Muslim Organizations and Indonesia Tsunami

MJC and Others: Indonesia Appeal

[Image of the Joint Indonesia Emergency Appeal]

*Indonesia – South Africa: A South-South Partnership in the Making*
HOMECOMING
A Poem by Shaykh Luqman Rakiep

A journey with my father

The engine-driven boat glides through the waters of the Bay of Tidore causing ripples reflecting the brilliance of the sun, bright above. Ripples that cut across time and space;

I see technology… oars dipping into stormy waters.
I hear the engine… sails slapping in the wind.

Cape Town… Tidore…. Cabo de Goede Hoop

I see the Polsbrook, many, many moons ago!!!
I hear the echo of pain of its human, load, masts sighing, bulwarks crying…

Is it the sun of Africa that I see reflected?
on shining gold and diamonds,
on glistening skin – dark, bathed in sweat of slaving toil
with rippling muscles underneath, taut under the inhuman load?
Do I hear lions roaring, drums of Africa beating persistent in ferocity, pain and joy?
two hundred years and more ago,
or is it the wild, crescendo- reaching pulsating beat of my heart, the deafening gush of blood that roars through my veins ecstatic at the sound of tambourines and melodious chanting floating on the breeze across the ocean, beckoning?
Innocent voices, sweet:

children - immortality - singing praise and welcome
a long-lost father … a son - crying.
My world is a whirlpool of memory.
Equilibrium of here and there, now and then defied. Four generations of progeny.
O! The images…
Voices that speak from the depth of my soul:
   Pain, love, sadness, joy, denial, longing …
At last;
   Tidore, O! Tidore soil of my birth!!!

Stepping onto shores so long denied.
I see faces through the oceans of time,
radiant in exultation over such a Mercy Divine.
O! Elder mother of my people as you wash my feet
now, strangers they shall never be
   as the beat of it, on the soil of birth,
   is the drum of my heart.

Luqman bin Nurel Erefan Rakiep
Jamad-ul- Thani 3, 1414: November 17, 1993
POSTSCRIPT:
The Way Forward

Muhammed Haron and Ardhya Erlangga Arby

As Indonesia and South Africa have had a good relationship in terms of their histories and in terms of their ties since 1994. Now that the 25-year celebrations of their bilateral relations are gradually ending, the time has come for both countries’ political leadership and their various structures to reflect upon the nature of their links. They must look back and critically assess how it was nurtured over the period and in which way it developed into the type of partnership that it is today.

In the process of doing this, they should not forget that both countries have strategic positions in the global environment. Indonesia is set to grow at a steady pace with an economy that is vibrant and South Africa has been described by some specialists as ‘one of the most sophisticated emerging markets’ within this environment; and it has also been styled as one the ideal country that is ‘the gateway into Africa’. Similar descriptions – with slight differences of course - may be applied to Indonesia that has a huge population and invaluable land and sea resources.

So when these countries have identified areas and issues that should be evaluated, they should also bring in stakeholders such as the academia and NGOs that have an interest not only in foreign policy affairs but in bi- and multilateral relations in order to have a good insight into the relationship. While we would want to suggest that these countries consider adopting a strategic bilateral relations approach that they together developed over time, both countries should consider the various options that should help them find common ground.

Since both countries have been leading members of IORA, they may use their influence to make it a critical international body that should be able to offer sensible leadership. To date, both have played, since IORA’s inception, leading roles. During Indonesia and South Africa’s position as co-chairs, they have worked towards transforming it into an influential body
globally. They made efforts to draw in this body’s Dialogue Partners (such as Germany, Turkey, and South Korea) into the conversation. However, they have to operationalize the organization’s Working Group in order that (a) it assists in opening up opportunities for pursuing reasonable ways of caring for the oceans’ ecosystem; (b) it addresses Maritime Safety and Security and (c) it deals with the Fishing management system.

In fact, IORA’s Jakarta Summit of 2017 produced positive outcomes and we are of the opinion that South Africa should be able to build on these and further advance these results as a key member. In line with their pivotal positions, we are also of the view that Indonesia and South Africa should strengthen their cooperation at different levels and in various sectors. One of these is employing New Asian African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) as a conduit of building relations. Moreover, it should be through tangible economic exchanges, commercial cooperation, trade ties, cultural connections and socio-political solidarity.

There are different platforms via which these two countries should consider strengthening and positively pursuing their bilateral relations. In addition, they should consolidate the current dialogue platforms. In the process of doing this, they should be able to assess their relations critically not only for themselves as nation-states but on behalf of their regional bodies such as ASEAN and SADC. In fact, both Indonesia and South Africa should adopt a realistic balanced approach towards their respective continents wherein they recognize the various possibilities of growth. Both countries not only consider dialogue as an avenue, but they should use other structures such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Asia-Africa Growth Corridor as further opportunities for development and expansion.

Therefore, for them to make reasonable inputs with even-handed impact, they should, among others, contemplate in working towards not only appreciating but also more importantly in understanding one another’s policies. They should not just be acquainted but become familiar with each other’s general goals and prime priorities. Moreover, they should initiate bi-annual summits to evaluate their respective developments; the can be done by addressing issues that pertain to their bilateral agreements, regional structures and global schemas.
At these summits, they should stress the importance of promoting trade and other forms of cooperation and work out short, medium and long term plans to deepen their ties; they, for example, can collaborate in managing their marine resources, they can explore their renewable energies, and they stimulate various types of tourism. Both have to adopt a comprehensive plan of action that should work towards actualizing programmes of collaboration and cooperation; these should be undertaken with a win-win scenario in mind. In other words, both countries should mutually gain from their relationship and this may be done in conjunction with other regional and global institutional agreements.

Over a decade ago, a ‘Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful & Prosperous Future’ was agreed upon during 2008. Unfortunately, it seems that there has not been much progress since that year. During 2017, however, this document was revisited and consequently a ‘Plan of Action 2017 – 2021’ document was signed. Now, we would therefore wish to reiterate and even re-emphasize the importance of this Plan. It is, after all, a blueprint for the implementation of the ‘Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful & Prosperous Future’; we are thus optimistic that with this signing that the two countries will be able to rapidly realize and concretize their partnership.

In conclusion and here, we take the opportunity to return to this book’s introduction in which we made the point that we do not have any form of close cooperation among academic institutions from the two countries. There is no form of sustained cooperation and continuous collaboration that exist; and because of the absence of this, very few texts are to be found that could assist policy makers in making informed decisions at either the bilateral or the multilateral level. If this sector is given the necessary attention and if they do cooperate by developing research projects such as post-area studies as stated by Hofmeyr (2012) that would contribute towards the respective countries’ policymaking processes, then they would certainly be making a difference. And they would, in turn, bring about changes that would leave a lasting legacy as the decades unfold.
ACRONYMS

AAC: Afro-Asian Conference
AAGC: Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
AASROC: Asian-African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference
AB7: Africa Big Seven
AfCFTA: African Continental Free Trade Agreement
ANC: African National Congress
APEC: Asia-Pacific
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU: African Union
AWQAF SA: National Awqaf Foundation of South Africa

BDF: Bali Democracy Forum
BKMT: Badan Kontak Majelis Taklim
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BUILD: US Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development
BWI: Badan Wakaf Indonesia

CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CEPT: Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CPW: Central Plumbing Works
CIW: Central Installation Works

DA: Democratic Alliance
DEIC: Dutch East India Company
DGNED: Directorate General of National Export Development

EU: European Union

GGG: God, Gold and Glory
GEAR: Growth, Employment and Redistribution
IAID Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue
IAF: Indonesia-Africa Forum
IAID: Indonesian Agency for International Development
ICOSA: Islamic College of Southern Africa
IORA: Indian Ocean Rim Association
IOR-ARC: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IRTI: Islamic Training and Research Institute
ISEF: Indonesian Shariah Economic Festivals
ITPC: Indonesian Trade Promotion Centre
KADIN: Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
LPI: Logistic Performance Index
LORI: Liaison Office of the Republic of Indonesia
MJC: Muslim Judicial Council
MPL: Muslim Personal Law
MSME: Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
NAASP New Asian-African Strategic Partnership
NAFTA; North Atlantic Treaty Association
NAM: Non-Aligned Movement
NGO: Non-Government Organization
NTC: National Technical Certificate
PADA: Policy Analysis and Development Agency
RCEP: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SDG: Sustainable Development Goals
SME: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
TCI: Trade Complementarity Index
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TTI: Trade, Tourism and Investment

UAE: United Arab Emirates
UIA: Universitas Islam As-Syafi’iyah
UNODC: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC: United Nation Security Council
USIDFC: US International Development Finance Corporation

VOC: Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie

WTO: World Trade Organization
WCP: Waqf Core Principle
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